United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
JOEL HENDRICK, individually and as a representative of all other persons similarly situated Plaintiff
ARAMARK CORPORATION, et al . Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION INTRODUCTION
I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, J.
before this Court is a motion to dismiss filed by
Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), in which they seek dismissal
of the single claim asserted against them by Plaintiff Joel
Hendrick (“Plaintiff”), under the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act. [ECF 15]. Plaintiff has
opposed the motion. [ECF 17]. The issues raised in the motion
to dismiss have been fully briefed by the
parties and are now ripe for disposition. For the
reasons stated herein, Defendants' motion is granted.
28, 2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants in
which he asserts a single claim for violation of the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act (“FACTA”), 15
U.S.C. 1681c(g)(1). [ECF 1]. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges
that Defendants violated FACTA when a store they operated
gave him a receipt, following a purchase of a soft drink,
which displayed ten digits of his credit card number.
Plaintiff also purports to assert this claim on behalf of a
class of similarly situated individuals.
September 23, 2016, Defendants filed the underlying motion to
dismiss in which they argue that Plaintiff has failed to
allege facts sufficient to establish Article III standing
because he has not alleged facts sufficient to show an actual
injury-in-fact. [ECF 15]. When ruling on Defendants'
motion to dismiss, this Court must accept, as true, all
relevant and pertinent factual allegations in the amended
complaint and construe these facts in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Succinctly, the
allegations are that:
On April 1, 2016, Plaintiff Joel Hendrick purchased a drink
refill using his credit card at the Stewart's Corner,
located on the University of Alabama campus in Tuscaloosa,
Alabama. (Comp. ¶¶24, 40). The store was operated
by Defendants. (Id. at ¶23). At the point of
sale, Plaintiff was given a paper receipt for the transaction
that contained ten digits of his credit card number, which
Plaintiff alleges violated the FACTA. (Id. at
¶¶23, 40). A copy of the paper receipt was attached
to the complaint as Exhibit A. (Id.). Plaintiff
alleges that this FACTA violation “exposed [him] to at
least an increased risk of identity theft . . . .”
(Id. at ¶44).
stated, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(“Rule”) 12(b)(1) on the basis that Plaintiff has
failed to allege facts sufficient to establish Article III
standing, and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failing to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. “A motion to
dismiss for want of standing is . . . properly brought
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), because standing is a
jurisdictional matter.” Constitution Party of Pa.
v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 357 (3d Cir. 2014). Rule
12(b)(1) challenges may be either facial or factual
challenges. Id. A facial challenge asserts that the
complaint does not allege sufficient grounds to establish
subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Where a Rule
12(b)(1) motion is filed prior to an answer, as is the case
here, it will be considered a facial challenge to
jurisdiction. Id. at 358. When considering such a
facial challenge, a court must apply the same standard of
review that would apply on a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6). Id. As such, well-pleaded factual
allegations are taken as true, and reasonable inferences are
drawn in the plaintiff's favor. Id. The
complaint will be dismissed for lack of standing only if it
appears that the plaintiff will not be able to assert a
colorable claim of subject matter jurisdiction.
Cardio-Med. Assocs., Ltd. v. Crozer-Chester Med.
Ctr., 721 F.2d 68, 75 (3d Cir. 1983).
may grant a motion to dismiss an action under Rule 12(b)(6)
if the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must
“accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts
as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions.”
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11. The court must determine
“whether the facts alleged in the complaint are
sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible
claim for relief.'” Id. at 211 (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). The
complaint must do more than merely allege the plaintiff's
entitlement to relief: it must “show such an
entitlement with its facts.” Id. (citations
determine the sufficiency of a complaint, “a court . .
. must take three steps.” Connelly v. Lane Constr.
Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016); to
wit: a court must (1) “tak[e] note of the elements
a plaintiff must plead to state a claim;” (2) identify
allegations that are merely legal conclusions “because
they . . . are not entitled to the assumption of
truth;” and (3) assume the veracity of all well-pleaded
factual allegations and “then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”
Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679).
While a complaint need not assert detailed factual
allegations, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
may determine that a complaint's factual allegations are
plausible if the court is able “to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). “But where the well-pleaded facts do not
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not
‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to
relief.'” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)) (alterations in original). In other words,
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to survive a motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a plaintiff must
allege facts sufficient to ‘nudge [his] claims across
the line from conceivable to plausible.'”
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234
(3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
“Although the plausibility standard ‘does not
impose a probability requirement, ' it does require a
pleading to show ‘more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.'”
Connelly, 809 F.3d at 786 (citations omitted).
Reviewing the plausibility of the complaint is a
“context-specific” inquiry and requires a court
to “draw on its experience and common sense.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663-64.
complaint purports to assert a violation of FACTA which
allegedly occurred when Defendants gave him an electronically
printed receipt that showed ten digits of his credit card
number. Though Defendants do not dispute these facts (nor
could they at this motion to dismiss stage), they argue that
Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to establish that
he has Article III standing to maintain his claim. This Court
was enacted in 2003 as an amendment to the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (the “FCRA”), 15 U.S.C.
§§1681 et seq. FACTA prohibits retailers
who accept credit or debit cards from “print[ing] more
than the last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration
date upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point
of the sale or transaction.” Id. at
§1681c(g)(1). In enacting FACTA, Congress was attempting
to combat identity theft by reducing the personal data
printed on credit and debit card receipts. Fair and Accurate
Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117
Stat. 1952 (2003); S. Rep. No. 108-166, at 13 (2003). Those
violating FACTA may be liable under the two-tiered system of
liability set forth in the FCRA. See 15 U.S.C.