United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
N. Bloch United States District Judge.
NOW, this 31st day of March, 2017, upon consideration of
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 10)
filed in the above-captioned matter on June 17, 2016, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that said Motion is DENIED.
further, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 8) filed in the above-captioned
matter on May 17, 2016, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said Motion
is GRANTED. Accordingly, this matter is hereby remanded to
the Commissioner of Social Security
(“Commissioner”) for further evaluation under
sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) in light of this
Robert Duane Page protectively filed a claim for Disability
Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act
(the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, on
June 10, 2013, claiming that he became disabled on May 31,
2013, due to diabetes, silicosis, plantar fascia, and sleep
apnea. (R. 14, 135-36, 162). After being denied
initially on September 19, 2013, Plaintiff sought, and
obtained, a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) on January 29, 2015. (R. 28-53, 64-68,
69-70). In a decision dated April 17, 2015, the ALJ denied
Plaintiff's request for benefits. (R. 14-24). The Appeals
Council declined to review the ALJ's decision on December
4, 2015. (R. 1-4). Plaintiff filed a timely appeal with this
Court, and the parties have filed cross-motions for summary
Standard of Review
review of a social security case is based upon the pleadings
and the transcript of the record. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). The scope of review is limited to determining
whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards
and whether the record, as a whole, contains substantial
evidence to support the Commissioner's findings of fact.
See Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir.
2001) (noting that “‘[t]he findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported
by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive'”
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g))); Schaudeck v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d
Cir. 1999) (stating that the court has plenary review of all
legal issues, and reviews the ALJ's findings of fact to
determine whether they are supported by substantial
evidence” is defined as “‘more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate'” to support a
conclusion. Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d
Cir. 1999) (quoting Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900,
901 (3d Cir. 1995)). However, a “‘single piece of
evidence will not satisfy the substantiality test if the
[Commissioner] ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict
created by countervailing evidence.'” Morales
v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting
Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir.
1983)). “‘Nor is evidence substantial if it is
overwhelmed by other evidence- particularly certain types of
evidence (e.g., that offered by treating physicians)-or if it
really constitutes not evidence but mere
disability is established when the claimant can demonstrate
some medically determinable basis for an impairment that
prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful
activity for a statutory twelve-month period. See
Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38-39 (3d Cir.
2001). “A claimant is considered unable to engage in
any substantial gainful activity ‘only if his physical
or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that
he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage
in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in
the national economy . . . .'” Id. at 39
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)).
Social Security Administration has promulgated regulations
incorporating a five-step sequential evaluation process for
determining whether a claimant is under a disability as
defined by the Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
In Step One, the Commissioner must determine whether the
claimant is currently engaging in substantial gainful
activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If
so, the disability claim will be denied. See Bowen v.
Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987). If not, the second
step of the process is to determine whether the claimant is
suffering from a severe impairment. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). “An impairment or
combination of impairments is not severe if it does not
significantly limit [the claimant's] physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1522. If the claimant fails to show that his or her
impairments are “severe, " he or she is ineligible
for disability benefits. If the claimant does have a severe
impairment, however, the Commissioner must proceed to Step
Three and determine whether the claimant's impairment
meets or equals the criteria for a listed impairment.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If a
claimant meets a listing, a finding of disability is
automatically directed. If the claimant does not meet a
listing, the analysis proceeds to Steps Four and Five.
Four requires the ALJ to consider whether the claimant
retains the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
to perform his or her past relevant work, see 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), and the claimant bears the
burden of demonstrating an inability to return to this past
relevant work, see Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 46
(3d Cir. 1994). If the claimant is unable to resume his or
her former occupation, the evaluation then moves to the fifth
and final step.
stage, the burden of production shifts to the Commissioner,
who must demonstrate that the claimant is capable of
performing other available work in the national economy in
order to deny a claim of disability. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the
ALJ should consider the claimant's RFC, age, education,
and past work experience. See Id. The ALJ must
further analyze the cumulative effect of all the
claimant's impairments in determining whether he or she
is capable of performing work and is not disabled.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523.
The ALJ's Decision
April 17, 2015 decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the
insured requirements of the Social Security Act through
today, March 31, 2017. (R. 16). Accordingly, to be eligible
for DIB benefits, Plaintiff had to establish that he was
disabled on or before that date. See 42 U.S.C.