Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Shatzer v. Berryhill

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

March 22, 2017

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, [1]Defendant.


          Donetta W. Ambrose U.S. Senior District Judge.


         Pending before the Court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. [ECF Nos. 12 and 14]. Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. [ECF Nos. 13 and 15]. After careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth below, Defendant's Motion [ECF No. 14] is granted, and Plaintiff's Motion [ECF No. 12] is denied.

         I. BACKGROUND

         Plaintiff has brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“Act”). On or about February 18, 2013, Plaintiff applied for DIB. [ECF No. 6-7, at 194]. In his application, he alleged that since August 24, 2010, he had been disabled due to chronic back pain and depression. Id. at 194, 197. His date last insured is December 31, 2015. Id. at 194. The state agency denied his claims initially, and he requested an administrative hearing. [ECF No. 6-4, at 69-72]. Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Donald M. Graffius held a hearing on December 5, 2014, at which Plaintiff was represented by counsel. [ECF No. 6-2, at 29-58]. Plaintiff appeared at the hearing and testified on his own behalf. Id. A vocational expert also was present at the hearing and testified. Id. at 51-57. In a decision dated February 5, 2015, the ALJ found that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform and, therefore, that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. [ECF No. 6-2, at 12-24]. Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ's determination by the Appeals Council, and, on March 3, 2016, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. [ECF No. 6-2, at 1-3]. Having exhausted all of his administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed this action.

         The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. [ECF Nos. 12 and 14]. The issues are now ripe for my review.



         The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Commissioner's decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). Additionally, the Commissioner's findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner's decision or re-weigh the evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if the court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however, the district court must review the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. § 706.

         To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he cannot engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(A); Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).

         The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use when evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The ALJ must determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment, whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1; (4) if the impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant's impairments prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by medical evidence that he is unable to return to his previous employment (steps 1-4). Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful activity (step 5). Id.

         A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).


         The ALJ found that Plaintiff had severe impairments, including scoliosis of the right hip; mild degenerative disc disease at the T11-12 level; bilateral piriformis syndrome; mood disorder, secondary to medical condition; depressive disorder due to another medical condition; unspecified depressive disorder; major depressive disorder, single episode, moderate; unspecified anxiety disorder; post-traumatic stress disorder; bipolar disorder with psychotic features; marijuana abuse; and alcohol dependence in remission. [ECF No. 6-2, at 14]. He then found that Plaintiff's impairments or combination of impairments did not meet or medically equal the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. at 14-15. The ALJ further found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), except that he was limited to occasional postural maneuvers such as balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and climbing ramps and stairs; was limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks, not performed in a fast-paced production environment, involving only simple work-related decisions, and in general, relatively few work place changes; and was limited to working primarily with objects rather than people and to no jobs requiring teamwork ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.