Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Armstrong v. Equifax Information Services LLC

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

March 8, 2017

CRYSTAL ARMSTRONG
v.
EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES LLC

          ORDER-MEMORANDUM

          Kearney, J.

         AND NOW, this 8th day of March 2017, following issuance of a rule to show cause questioning the propriety of venue (ECF Doc. No. 3), Defendant's response to the rule to show cause (ECF Doc. No. 7), Plaintiff electing not to show cause to demonstrate the propriety of venue or otherwise respond and for good cause finding venue is more appropriate in the District where the injuries arose and the only nexus to this District is the Plaintiffs residence but she has not opposed transfer, it is ORDERED the Clerk of Court shall immediately transfer venue to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia under 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) and close this case in this District.

         Analysis

         A. Background

         Pennsylvania resident Cheryl Armstrong sues Georgia citizen Equifax Information Services, LLC under the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("Act") and Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act ("FACTA").[1]

         Ms. Armstrong brought the underlying action in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania alleging jurisdiction and venue are proper in the Montgomery County because: (1) "a substantial portion of the transactions, occurrences or omissions took place in this jurisdiction;" (2) "Defendant regularly transacts business in this jurisdiction and avails itself of the market place in this jurisdiction:" (3) "Plaintiff resides near this jurisdiction[2];" (4) "a substantial portion of the acts, transactions, occurrences or omissions occurred at or near this jurisdiction;" (5) "letters referred to as exhibit in this Compliant were processed in this jurisdiction;" and (6) "Plaintiffs attorney's fees were incurred in this jurisdiction."[3]

         Ms. Armstrong alleges Equifax violated the Act by failing to disclose the method of verification for a disputed account with First Premier Bank. Ms. Armstrong alleges she disputed an "an alleged debt" with First Premier Bank.[4] Ms. Armstrong alleges Equifax did not describe the procedure to verify the disputed account; failed to provide a description of the method of verification used to verify the disputed account; failed to disclose if any documents were sought of obtained from the furnisher, First Premier Bank; failed to disclose whether it used documents supplied to it by Ms. Armstrong; provided Ms. Armstrong with only "the least bit of generic information [it] could get away with" in response to Ms. Armstrong's question about the verification procedure; refused to provide a description of the specific method of verification; and, when Equifax responded to Ms. Armstrong's request for the verification method, its response "was woefully deficient."[5]

         Equifax timely removed Ms. Armstrong's Complaint to this Court.[6] On February 23, 2017, we ordered the parties to file memoranda addressing why we should not transfer venue to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, the location of the only named Defendant.[7]

         B. Discussion

         Under 28 U.S.C. §1404(a), a district court "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, . . . may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties consented." "Section 1404(a) is intended to place discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness."[8]

         Under § 1404(a), we first ask whether the alternate venue is one in which the case "might have been brought."[9] Venue is determined under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b): "A civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action."[10] Ms. Armstrong could have sued Equifax in Georgia under § 1391(b)(1) or (2).

         Equifax did not move to dismiss this action for lack of venue and, in response to our Order, did not argue improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1406. Instead, Equifax argues we must transfer this case to the Northern District of Georgia under §1404(a) and the Jumara factors.[11]

         Jumara factors warrant transfer to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

         Having found Ms. Armstrong might have brought this case in Georgia, we now ask whether Jumara's private and public interest factors support a transfer for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.