United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
J. PAPPERT, J.
se Plaintiff Emily Torres Moran seeks review of the
Commissioner of Social Security's decision denying her
application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits
and Supplemental Security Income. Because Moran filed suit
after the statutory deadline and equitable tolling does not
apply, the Court grants Defendant's motion to dismiss.
applied for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits and
Supplemental Security Income on May 11, 2012. (Decl. of
Lillian Gremillion, hereinafter “Decl.”, Ex. 1,
at 4, ECF No. 7-1.) She appeared and testified at a hearing on
June 2, 2014. (Id.) An Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) denied her application on January 27, 2015. (Decl., Ex.
1, at 14.) The Appeals Council denied her request for review
of the ALJ's decision by letter dated June 17, 2016.
(Decl., Ex. 2, ECF No. 7-2.) The letter was sent to the same
Appeals Council's letter explained that Moran could
commence a civil action within sixty days of her receiving
notice of the letter. (Decl., Ex. 2.) Moreover, the letter
stated that the Council would presume Moran had received such
notice within five days of the date of the letter.
(Id.) Moran was deemed to have notice of the letter
by June 22, 2016; her deadline for bringing this action was
therefore sixty days later, August 21, 2016. Because August
21 was a Sunday, her deadline for filing became August 22,
2016. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C). Moran filed
her complaint and motion to proceed in forma
pauperis on August 24, 2016. (ECF No. 1.) The
Commissioner filed her motion to dismiss the case on January
31, 2017. (ECF No. 7.) Moran did not file a response.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) prescribes the procedures and
requirements for judicial review of a final decision made by
the Commissioner of Social Security. Section 405(g) states in
relevant part that “[a]ny individual, after any final
decision of the Commissioner made after a hearing to which he
was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may
obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced
within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice
of such decision or within such further time as the
Commissioner of Social Security may allow.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has
explained that § 405(g)'s statute of limitations is
“a mechanism by which Congress was able to move cases
to speedy resolution in a bureaucracy that processes millions
of claims annually. Thus, the limitation serves both the
interest of the claimant and the interest of the
Government.” Bowen v. City of New York, 476
U.S. 467, 481 (1986).
405(g)'s sixty-day requirement is subject to equitable
tolling. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 478; id. at
480 (“[W]e conclude that application of a traditional
equitable tolling principle to the 60-day requirement of
§ 405(g) is fully consistent with the overall
congressional purpose and is nowhere eschewed by
Congress.” (quotations and citations omitted)). The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that there are
three principal bases for applying equitable tolling:
“(1) where the defendant has actively misled the
plaintiff respecting the plaintiff's cause of action; (2)
where the plaintiff in some extraordinary way has been
prevented from asserting his or her own rights; or (3) where
the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights
mistakenly in the wrong forum.” Oshiver v. Levin
Fishbein, Sedran & Breman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1387 (3d
is not entitled to equitable tolling. She did not respond to
the Commissioner's motion to dismiss, and the Court is
unaware of any facts which could justify tolling §
405(g)'s timing provision in this case. Moreover, Moran
did not request an extension of time to file her complaint
from the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §
422.210(c) (explaining that the time to file “may be
extended by the Appeals Council upon a showing of good
appropriate order follows.
 “In deciding motions under Rule
12(b)(6), courts may consider documents integral to or
explicitly relied upon in the complaint or any undisputedly
authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to
a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based
on the document.” In re Asbestos Prods. Liab.
Litig. (No. VI), 822 F.3d 125, 133 (3d Cir. 2016)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Here, the
Commissioner has attached as exhibits to her motion to
dismiss, inter alia, the ALJ's decision and the
Appeals Council's letter to Moran. These documents, upon
which Moran's claims are based, are undisputedly
 The complaint, however, was unsigned.
On August 30, 2016 the Court ordered the clerk of court to
return Moran's unsigned complaint to her and request that
she submit a signed complaint to the Court. (ECF No. 2.) The
clerk mailed notice of the Court's order to Moran on
October 31, 2016. The Court ...