United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
J. Schwab United States District Judge
the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of
this Court's Order Granting Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss. See doc. no. 18.
Standard of Review
purpose of a Motion for Reconsideration is to correct
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence. Howard Hess Dental Laboratories Inc. v.
Dentsply Intern., Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir.
2010), citing Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d
906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). Generally, a Motion for
Reconsideration will only be granted on one of the following
three grounds: (1) if there has been an intervening change in
controlling law; (2) if new evidence, which was not
previously available, has become available; or (3) if it is
necessary to correct a clear error of law or to prevent
manifest injustice. See, Howard Hess Dental, 602
F.3d at 251, citing Max's Seafood Café by Lou
Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir.
may not grant a Motion for Reconsideration when the motion
simply restyles or rehashes issues previously presented.
Pahler v. City of Wilkes Barre, 207 F.Supp.2d 341,
355 (M.D. Pa. 2001); see also Carroll v. Manning,
414 Fed.Appx. 396, 398 (3d Cir. 2011) (affirming denial of
“motion for reconsideration and ‘petition' in
support thereof appears to merely reiterate the allegations
made in the . . . petition and does not set forth any basis
justifying reconsideration.”); and Grigorian v.
Attorney General of U.S., 282 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (3d
Cir. 2008) (affirming denial of Motion to Reconsider because
it “does nothing more than reiterate the arguments
underlying his motion to reinstate the appeal.”).
Motion for Reconsideration “addresses only factual and
legal matters that the Court may have overlooked . . . . It
is improper on a motion for reconsideration to ask the Court
to rethink what [it] had already thought through rightly or
wrongly.” Glendon Energy Co. v. Borough of
Glendon, 836 F.Supp. 1109, 1122 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(internal citation and quotes omitted). Because federal
courts have a strong interest in the finality of judgments,
motions for reconsideration should be granted sparingly.
Rossi v. Schlarbaum, 600 F.Supp.2d 650, 670 (E.D.
to the three bases upon which a Motion for Reconsideration
may be granted, Plaintiff (“Encompass”) does not
argue that there has been an intervening change in
controlling law, nor does it present any new evidence, not
previously available, alleging new evidence has become
available. See doc. no. 18 and 19. Rather, Plaintiff argues
that this Court should reconsider its prior Order (doc. no.
17) dismissing this case in order to correct a clear error of
law or to prevent manifest injustice. Id. More
specifically, Encompass claims that this Court improperly
considered a provision in Pennsylvania's Dram Shop Act,
arguing that the Court should have instead relied upon
Pennsylvania's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
(“UCATA”). Id. The Court's reliance
upon the Dram Shop Act provided the Court with its basis upon
which Defendant's (“Stone Mansion's”)
Motion to Dismiss (doc. no. 7) was granted. See the
Court's Memorandum Opinion, doc. no. 16.
and foremost, Encompass' Motion for Reconsideration will
be denied because none of the three grounds established in
Max's Seafood exist. As noted above, Encompass
did not argue that there has been an intervening change in
controlling law, nor did it present any new evidence, not
previously available. Moreover, the Court finds that no
“clear error of law” nor “manifest
injustice” was created in its prior Opinion and Order
(doc. nos. 16 and 17, respectively), which now requires
Brief in Support of its Motion for Reconsideration merely
reargues that which it previously argued: Pennsylvania's
UCATA renders Stone Mansion a joint tortfeasor, because
Section 4-497 of the Dram Shop Act renders Stone Mansion
liable for Hoey's injuries. See doc. no. 19, p. 2. The
Court disagreed with this position as stated in it its
Memorandum Opinion. See doc. no. 16.
the Court's position set forth in its original Opinion
(doc. no. 16), which is self-explanatory, acknowledged the
existence and operation of Pennsylvania's UCATA, unlike
Encompass' claim in its current Motion for
Reconsideration. Encompass filed its lawsuit claiming it had
a right to recover from its insured's (Viviani's)
joint tortfeasor, namely Stone Mansion. Encompass predicated
(and continues to predicate) Stone Mansion's liability
upon the Stone Mansion's status as liquor
licensee. Pennsylvania's Dram Shop Act contains
a provision (Section 4-497) which outlines to whom, and what
circumstances must exist, before a liquor licensee will be
held negligent per se for serving alcohol to a
customer. This provision limits a liquor
licensee's liability, whereas Encompass' argument
sought to expand a licensee's liability.
prior Memorandum Opinion, this Court granted Stone
Mansion's Motion to Dismiss refusing to expand the Dram
Shop Act's Section 4-497 so as to render Stone Mansion
liable to Viviani/Encompass for Hoey's injuries.