United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
se plaintiff Darnell Robinson brings this action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges violations of his
constitutional rights while incarcerated at Curran-Fromhold
Correctional Facility (“CFCF”). Defendants,
Michael Nutter, Louis Giorla, and John Delaney
(“defendants”) have filed a motion to dismiss
plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
reasons described below, the motion to dismiss will granted.
Plaintiff will be given leave to file an amended complaint.
was incarcerated at CFCF in Philadelphia from March 6, 2011
to January 7, 2013. During that time, he claims he was housed
in a three-person cell that was originally designed for two
people. Plaintiff asserts what is commonly referred to as a
“triple celling” claim. Plaintiff alleges he is
forced to sleep in a “boat.” This boat is
situated next to the toilet, exposing plaintiff to urine and
also alleges he was subjected to inadequate medical
treatment. He claims the prison has subjected him to
“lockdowns, ” inadequate medical care, neglected
his basic life's necessities, barred him access to the
courts, alienated him from his family, and put him under risk
of serious harm. Plaintiff claims he has experienced bugs,
roaches, and mice in his cell.
further alleges his mattress is not sterilized and his
laundry is not done properly. Finally, plaintiff alleges that
the defendants “each play an integral part in the Daily
[sic] operations at CFCF.” (Doc. No. 7 at 3). He has
named former Mayor Michael Nutter, Louis Giorla, CFCF Warden
John Delaney, and the Prison Health System as
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted examines the legal sufficiency of the
complaint. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46
(1957). The factual allegations must be sufficient to make
the claim for relief more than just speculative. Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In
determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss, a federal
court must construe the complaint liberally, accept all
factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Id.; see also D.P. Enters. v. Bucks County Cmty.
Coll., 725 F.2d 943, 944 (3d Cir.1984).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a plaintiff
to plead in detail all of the facts upon which she bases her
claim. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. Rather, the Rules
require a “short and plain statement” of the
claim that will give the defendant fair notice of the
plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests.
Id. The “complaint must allege facts
suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564. Neither “bald
assertions” nor “vague and conclusory
allegations” are accepted as true. See Morse v.
Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d
Cir.1997); Sterling v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp.
Auth., 897 F.Supp. 893 (E.D. Pa. 1995). The claim must
contain enough factual matters to suggest the required
elements of the claim or to “raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of”
those elements. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515
F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme
Court defined a two-pronged approach to a court's review
of a motion to dismiss. “First, the tenet that a court
must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Id. at 678. Thus, while “Rule 8 marks a
notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical,
code-pleading regime of a prior era . . . it does not unlock
the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing
more than conclusions.” Id. at 678-79.
“may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no
relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be
proved consistent with the allegations.” Brown v.
Card Service Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 456 (3d Cir. 2006)
(quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,
73 (1984)). Courts construe a plaintiff's allegations
liberally when he or she is proceeding pro se.
Higgs v. Att'y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir.
defendants offer one basis in support of their motion to
dismiss. They argue that the complaint fails to state a claim
because plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating the
defendants had “personal involvement” in the