United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
KEB HANA BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a national banking association, Plaintiff,
RED MANSION, LLC d/b/a NAOMI VILLAGE RESORT, Defendant.
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK United States Magistrate Judge
the Court is a motion for summary judgment (Doc.
62), filed August 1, 2016 by Plaintiff KEB Hana Bank
USA, National Association (“Hana”). Hana seeks
summary judgment in both mortgage foreclosure and in
personam in the amount of $1, 874, 727.35, plus
interest, as a result of the alleged default by Red Mansion,
(Doc. 62, at 4). Red Mansion counters that they have
raised issues of material fact disputes regarding the
initiation of the loan transaction and suffered
“catastrophic damage” to the property not timely
compensated by insurance, which caused the lapse in payments.
Background and Procedural History
initiated the instant action on August 26, 2014. (Doc.
1). Having served the complaint and receiving no answer,
Hana moved for default which was entered on January 8, 2015.
(Doc. 15). Red Mansion moved to vacate the judgment
on June 27, 2015, citing improper service, unavailability of
the sole LLC member during the relevant time period, and a
lack of prejudice to Hana should the default be opened.
(Doc. 23). The Court found service proper, but
vacated the default judgment, finding that Defendant had a
meritorious defense in the action, and finding no indication
of any prejudice resulting in adjudicating the matter on the
merits. (Doc. 30; Doc. 31). On January 15,
2016, Hana filed a second amended complaint, per stipulation.
(Doc. 41). Red Mansion filed an answer to the
amended complaint on February 28, 2016 (Doc. 49). On
August 1, 2016, Hana moved for summary judgment. (Doc.
62; Doc. 63). Red Mansion filed its brief in
opposition on August 15, 2016. (Doc. 64). The matter
is now ripe for disposition.
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary
judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might
affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute of
material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence
“is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all inferences
“should be drawn in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, and where the non-moving party's
evidence contradicts the movant's, then the
non-movant's must be taken as true.” Pastore v.
Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994).
federal court should grant summary judgment “if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers
Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). In
making this determination, “a court must view the facts
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw
all inferences in that party's favor.”
Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d
Cir. 1994). The Court need not accept mere conclusory
allegations, whether they are made in the complaint or a
sworn statement. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife
Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). In deciding a
motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not
to make credibility determinations, weigh evidence, or draw
inferences from the facts. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249. Rather, the court must simply “determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson,
477 U.S. at 249.
avers that Red Mansion has admitted every necessary element
for a mortgage foreclosure action. “Upon default, the
holder of a mortgage can legally proceed to enforce the terms
of the mortgage either by foreclosure proceedings or by
obtaining judgment on the bond accompanying the mortgage and
issuing a writ of execution.” Cunningham v.
McWilliams, 714 A.2d 1054, 1056-57 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998)
(citing Elmwood Fed. Sav. Bank v. Parker, 666 A.2d
721, 724 n. 6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)). “In an action for
mortgage foreclosure, the entry of summary judgment is proper
if the mortgagors admit that the mortgage is in default, that
they have failed to pay interest on the obligation, and that
the recorded mortgage is in the specified amount.”
Cunningham, 714 A.2d at 1057 (citing Landau v.
W. Pa. Nat'l Bank, 282 A.2d 335, 340 (Pa. 1971)).
judgment can only be made upon a complaint establishing not
just the initial indebtedness but also with an itemized
statement of the amount due and demand for such. See Pa.
R. C. P. 1147(a)(5)-(6). As “[t]he sole purpose of
the judgment obtained through an action of mortgage
foreclosure is to effect a judicial sale of the mortgaged
property, ” the precise amount due on a mortgage is
“essential.” U.S. Bank, N.A. v.
Pautenis, 118 A.3d 386, 394 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015)
(quoting Meco Realty Co. v. Burns, 200 A.2d 869, 871 (Pa.
Mansion has admitted the necessary elements to a mortgage
foreclosure action and Hana provided adequate proof of the
precise amount due. Red Mansion admits that it has not paid
principal or interest since February 17, 2014. (Doc.
62-2, ¶ 19). Further, it admits the amount of the
mortgage indebtedness. (Doc. 62-2, ¶ 7-11).
While Red Mansion has advanced challenges to the amount owed
in answering the second amended complaint, the fact that it
does not admit the exact amount is immaterial. Red Mansion
admitted the initial value of the mortgage and has not
provided any evidence of attempted payments or specific
challenges to the accounting provided by Hana. Hana supports
its motion with the original mortgage (admitted by Red
Mansion), reflecting the value admitted, dated December 23,
2009. (Doc. 62-1, at 15). From there, Hana has
provided a detailed, sworn accounting that reflects payments,
interest, and credits, running from December 28, 2009, to
January 1, 2016. (Doc. 62-7). This accounting
matches the demand made in the second amended complaint.
(Doc. 41, at 3).
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided
in [Fed. R. Civ. P. 56], an adverse party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading,
but . . . set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 fn. 3 (1986). As noted in Red Mansion's brief in
opposition (Doc. 64), “[a]n issue is genuine only if
there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable
jury could find for the non-moving party, and a factual
dispute is material only if it might affect the outcome of
the suit under governing law.” Kaucher v. Cnty. of
Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986)). Red Mansion fails to go beyond the pleadings,
offering no evidence supporting its assertions resisting
summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper in a mortgage
proceeding, where only general denials are offered in
opposition. See New York Guardian Mortg. Corp.
v. Dietzel, 524 A.2d 951, 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
opposition, Red Mansion states that agents “may have
acted improperly in inducing” Red Mansion into the loan
transaction and that insurance payouts for a catastrophic
event did not occur, preventing Red Mansion from making the
mortgage payments. However, Red Mansion does not state even
basic facts supporting a fraudulent inducement claim, let
alone provide evidence to permit a jury finding of such.
Further, the insurance dispute with a third party does not
provide relief from ...