United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
Donetta W. Ambrose United States Senior District Judge.
before the Court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF
Nos. 12 and 14). Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of
their Motions. (ECF Nos. 13 and 15). After careful
consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on
my Opinion set forth below, I am granting Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 12) and denying
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 14).
brought this action for review of the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (ACommissioner@) denying his
application for disability insurance benefits pursuant to the
Social Security Act (AAct@). Plaintiff filed his application
alleging he had been disabled since July 26, 2012. (ECF No.
8-5, p. 4. Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”),
David F. Brash, held a hearing on April 9, 2014. (ECF No.
8-2, pp. 39-68). On July 18, 2014, the ALJ issued an
unfavorable decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled under
the Act. (ECF No. 8-2, pp. 14-27).
exhausting all administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed the
instant action with this court. The parties have filed
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 12 and 14). The
issues are now ripe for review.
Standard of Review
standard of review in social security cases is whether
substantial evidence exists in the record to support the
Commissioner's decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881
F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence has been
defined as Amore than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate.@ Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d
Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 401 (1971). Additionally, the Commissioner's
findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive. 42 U.S.C. Â§405(g); Dobrowolsky v.
Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A district
court cannot conduct a de novo review of the
Commissioner's decision or re-weigh the evidence of
record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D.
Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported
by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings,
even if the court would have decided the factual inquiry
differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360
(3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported
by substantial evidence, however, the district court must
review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. Â§706.
eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that he cannot engage in substantial gainful
activity because of a medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. Â§423(d)(1)(A);
Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir.
Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential
analysis to use when evaluating the disabled status of each
claimant. 20 C.F.R. '404.1520(a). The ALJ must determine:
(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial
gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a
severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe
impairment, whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in
20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P., appx. 1; (4) if the impairment
does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the
claimant's impairments prevent him from performing his
past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of
performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform any
other work which exists in the national economy, in light of
his age, education, work experience and residual functional
capacity. 20 C.F.R. '404.1520. The claimant carries the
initial burden of demonstrating by medical evidence that he
is unable to return to his previous employment (steps 1-4).
Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the claimant
meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts to the
Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in
alternative substantial gainful activity (step 5).
district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm,
modify, or reverse the decision with or without remand to the
Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris,
745 F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).
Plaintiff Residual Functional Capacity
argues that the ALJ “made his [RFC] decision without
medical expert opinion regarding Plaintiff's bilateral
rotator cuff syndrome, resulting in a finding not supported
by substantial evidence.” (ECF No. 13, pp. 18-23). In
support of the same, Plaintiff argues that while the ALJ
found that Plaintiff had a severe impairment of bilateral
rotator cuff syndrome, he rejected all medical opinion
evidence regarding the same when formulating his RFC.
Id. As such, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's
decision is not supported by substantial evidence and remand
is appropriate. Id. After a review of the record, I
amount of weight accorded to medical opinions is
well-established. Generally, the ALJ will give more weight to
the opinion of a source who has examined the claimant than to
a non-examining source. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(1). In
addition, the ALJ generally will give more weight to opinions
from a treating physician, “since these sources are
likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a
detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant's] medical
impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the
medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective
medical findings alone or from reports of individual
examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief
hospitalizations.” Id. § 416.927(c)(2).
If the ALJ finds that “a treating source's opinion
on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of [a
claimant's] impairment(s) is well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and
is not inconsistent with the other ...