United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS LOCAL UNION NO. 98 HEALTH & WELFARE FUND, et al.
LMI ELECTRIC INC., et al.
STEWART DALZELL, District Judge.
We consider here defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' second amended complaint. We have jurisdiction pursuant to the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e), and the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
Plaintiffs are the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers ("IBEW") Local Union No. 98 Health & Welfare Fund (the "Health Plan"), IBEW Local Union No. 98 Pension Plan (the "Pension Plan"), IBEW Local Union No. 98 Profit Sharing Plan, also known as the Local Union 98 Deferred Income Plan (the "Profit Sharing Plan"), the Electrical Workers Joint Apprenticeship and Training Trust Fund (the "Apprenticeship Fund"), the National Electrical Benefit Plan (the "NEBF"), the National Electrical Industry Fund (the "NEIF"), Local Union No. 98 Vacation Plan (the "Vacation Plan"), the Labor Management Cooperative Committee (the "LMCC"), and Local Union 98 of the IBEW ("Local 98"). Second Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 3-8. Defendants are LMI Electric Inc. ("LMI"), Gina Console, and Anthony Console. Id. at ¶¶ 11-13.
Plaintiffs allege LMI failed to submit the full amount of contributions and deductions owed to the Health Plan, Pension Plan, Profit Sharing Plan and Apprenticeship Fund (collectively the "Funds"), Vacation Plan, NEIF, LMCC, NEBF, and Local 98 for the period of August 1, 2012 through August 31, 2014. Id. at ¶¶ 19, 26. The Funds also allege that Gina Console and Anthony Console breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA and are personally liable for the outstanding contributions and deductions. Id. at ¶¶ 41, 44-48.
Defendants move to dismiss both counts of the second amended complaint.
II. Standard of Review
A defendant moving to dismiss under Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) bears the burden of proving that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); see also, e.g., Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a facially plausible claim to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
As the Supreme Court stresses, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action... do not suffice." Id. Courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
In the wake of Twombly and Iqbal, our Court of Appeals laid out a two-part test to apply when considering a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6):
First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for relief.'
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). In deciding a motion to dismiss, we may consider "the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record, " and any "undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document." Pension Benefits Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
We recite the facts as they appear in the second ...