United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARTIN C. CARLSON, District Judge.
I. Statement of Facts and of the Case
This is an action brought by Jose Hernandez-Tirado, a prisoner who is proceeding pro se. In his complaint, the plaintiff sued prison officials at the Pike County Correctional Facility, and alleged an array constitutional infractions relating to prison diet, medical services and other conditions of confinement at the county prison. (Doc. 1) Along with his complaint, the plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction which requested that the court order prison staff to avoid any "proximity" to the plaintiff while this case was pending. (Doc. 5.) The motion was not accompanied by any brief, as required by the rules of this court, and it is undisputed that Hernandez-Tirado is no longer housed in this prison. Instead, the plaintiff is now housed at the United States Penitentiary, Canaan. In consideration of these undisputed facts, this request for a preliminary injunction should be dismissed as moot.
A. The Plaintiff's Release from Custody at the Pike County Correctional Facility Renders Moot His Request For Injunctive Relief from Prison Officials at this Facility
In this case, we submit that the plaintiff's release from custody at the Pike County Correctional Facility renders moot his current motion for injunctive relief from the defendants, corrections officials at this county prison who formerly oversaw the conditions of the plaintiff's imprisonment at that particular facility. The mootness doctrine recognizes a fundamental truth in litigation: "[i]f developments occur during the course of adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff's personal stake in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be dismissed as moot." Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996). In this case, the plaintiff sought to enjoin prison officials from having any "proximity" to him while he was housed in the county prison, yet it is entirely undisputed that the plaintiff is no longer in the defendants' custody and, therefore, no longer has any contact with the prison official defendants named in this case.
This simple fact raises a threshold, and insurmountable, obstacle to this motion for a preliminary injunction against prison staff at a facility where the plaintiff is no longer incarcerated. Upon consideration, we conclude that the plaintiff's release from this facility renders his motion for injunctive relief moot, and that motion should be denied. In this setting, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed that, when addressing inmate requests for injunctive relief:
As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether the inmates' claims are moot because "a federal court has neither the power to render advisory opinions nor to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them." Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (quotations omitted); see also Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 206 (3d Cir.1993). An inmate's transfer from the facility complained of generally moots the equitable and declaratory claims. Abdul-Akbar, 4 F.3d at 197 (former inmate's claim that the prison library's legal resources were constitutionally inadequate was moot because plaintiff was released five months before trial).
Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003). See Griffin v. Beard, No. 09-4404, 2010 WL 4642961 (3d Cir. Nov. 17, 2010)(transfer from SCI Huntingdon renders inmate injunctive relief claim moot). Indeed, as this court has previously observed, in a case such as this, where an inmate seeks injunctive relief against his jailers but is no longer housed at the prison where these injunctive claims arose:
[H]is request to enjoin the defendants from interfering with his [rights] is academic. See Muslim v. Frame, 854 F.Supp. 1215, 1222 (E.D.Pa.1994). In other words, [the prisoner-plaintiff's] transfer to another institution moots any claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. See Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 206-07 (3rd Cir.1993); Weaver v. Wilcox, 650 F.2d 22, 27 (3rd Cir.1981).
Fortes v. Harding, 19 F.Supp.2d 323, 326 (M.D.Pa.1998).
These principles control here, and compel denial of this motion for preliminary injunction as moot since the plaintiff is no longer housed at the Pike County Correctional Facility.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction ...