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Newcomer v. Commissioner of Social Security

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

April 20, 2015

MELLONY LEE NEWCOMER, Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT

Donetta W. Ambrose U.S. Senior District Judge

SYNOPSIS

Pending before the Court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docket Nos. 9 and 11). Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (Docket Nos. 10 and 12). Plaintiff also filed a Reply Brief. (Docket No. 15). After careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth below, I am granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 11) and denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 9).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff has brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“Act”) and for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act. On or about August 9, 2011, Plaintiff applied for DIB, and, on or about August 16, 2011, she applied for SSI. (R. 106-116, 225-237). In both applications, she alleged that since February 28, 2011, she had been disabled due to bipolar disorder, ADHD, depression, hemiplegic migraines, and anxiety. (R. 124, 138, 321-322). Her last date insured is December 31, 2016. (R. 14). The state agency denied her claims initially, and she requested an administrative hearing. (R. 156-166). Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Marty Pillion held a hearing on January 15, 2013, at which Plaintiff was represented by counsel. (R. 48-85). Plaintiff appeared at the hearing and testified on her own behalf. Id. A vocational expert also was present at the hearing and testified. (R. 75-83). In a decision dated April 9, 2013, the ALJ found that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform and, therefore, that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (R. 14-41). Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s determination by the Appeals Council, and, on December 31, 2013, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (R. 1-5). Having exhausted all of her administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed this action.

The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docket Nos. 9 and 11). The issues are now ripe for my review.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Commissioner’s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). Additionally, the Commissioner’s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner’s decision or re-weigh the evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if the court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however, the district court must review the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. § 706.

To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that she cannot engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(A); Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).

The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use when evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The ALJ must determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment, whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1; (4) if the impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant’s impairments prevent her from performing her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of performing her past relevant work, whether she can perform any other work which exists in the national economy, in light of her age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by medical evidence that she is unable to return to her previous employment (steps 1-4). Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful activity (step 5). Id.

A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).

B. WHETHER THE ALJ ERRED BY FAILING TO EVALUATE THE EFFECTS OF PLAINTIFF’S MIGRAINE HEADACHES ON HER ABILITY TO WORK ON A REGULAR AND CONTINUING BASIS AND/OR ERRED IN HIS CREDIBILITY ANALYSIS

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had severe impairments, including cervicalgia, myofascial pain syndrome, migraines, spasm of the muscle, insomnia, anxiety disorder, depression, asthma, occipital neuralgia, bilateral hip pain, chronic sinusitis, neck strain, and left shoulder pain. (R. 17). He further found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), except that she could occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crawl and climb ramps and stairs but no climbing of ropes, ladders, or scaffolds, and no crouching. In addition, Plaintiff could occasionally reach overhead and frequently reach in other directions; and could frequently handle, finger, and feel. There should be no exposure to hazards such as heights or moving machinery. Plaintiff should have no exposure to flashing lights or lights brighter than that typically found in an indoor work environment such as an office setting or department store and no exposure to more than quiet noise intensity level as that noise intensity level is defined in the DOT. There should be no exposure to weather, extreme heat or cold, wetness, vibrations, or humidity; and no exposure to atmospheric conditions such as smoke, fumes, odors, dusts, gases, or poor ventilation in excess of that typically found in an indoor work environment such as an office setting or department store. She was limited to simple, routine repetitive tasks and to ...


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