United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, Jr., District Judge.
This is a pro se action for damages, asserting federal civil rights claims against the defendants, brought in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. In his amended complaint, plaintiff Aaron William Frantz alleges that the various defendants violated his constitutional rights in connection with state criminal proceedings against him. For the reasons stated herein, it is recommended that the amended complaint be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(i) and (ii).
This action was initiated when Frantz filed his original pro se complaint on February 25, 2015. (Doc. 1). On March 2, 2015, the Court ordered him to file an amended complaint because his original complaint failed to plead facts sufficient to show that his claim had substantive plausibility. (Doc. 5). See generally Johnson v. City of Shelby, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (per curiam); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). On March 9, 2015, Frantz filed his amended complaint. (Doc. 6). On April 8, 2015, Frantz was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (Doc. 8).
II. SECTION 1915(E)(2) STANDARD
A plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is subject to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which provides that a court "shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that... the action... is frivolous." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint is "frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). To determine whether it is frivolous, a court must "assess an in forma pauperis complaint from an objective standpoint in order to determine whether the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or clearly baseless factual contention." Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992)). This statutory provision further permits a court, in its sound discretion "to dismiss an in forma pauperis claim if it determines that the claim is of little or no weight, value, or importance, not worthy of serious consideration, or trivial." Deutsch, 67 F.3d at 1089; see also Denton, 504 U.S. at 33-34 ("[F]rivolousness is a decision entrusted to the discretion of the court entertaining the in forma pauperis petition.").
The in forma pauperis statute further mandates that a court "shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that... the action... fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). "The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)." Brodzki v. Tribune Co., 481 Fed.App'x 705, 706 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam). Rule 12(b)(6), in turn, authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). "Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiff's claims lack facial plausibility." Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen, Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). Although the Court must accept the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, it is not compelled to accept "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as "documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
Frantz appears to have asserted his federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See generally Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-46 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing a federal court's obligation to liberally construe the filings of pro se litigants). He has named the following defendants: (a) the Kingston Police Department; (b) Luzerne County; (c) the Luzerne County District Attorney's Office; (d) Detective Ed Palka; (e) Detective Richard Kotchick; (f) Officer John Anthony; (g) District Attorney Stefanie Salavantis; and (h) Assistant District Attorney Rebecca Reimiller. Frantz claims that these defendants violated various constitutional rights in connection with unspecified state criminal proceedings. In particular, he claims that he was held in pretrial custody on excessive bail, that his speedy trial rights were violated by the lapse of time between an initial arrest and his trial, that police secured his conviction by lying to the jury, that prosecutors failed to produce discovery materials until the day of his trial,  and that prosecutors failed to present the jury with evidence to support a "drug-free school zone" mandatory minimum sentence, instead waiting to present it at the post-verdict sentencing phase.
A. Failure to State an Excessive Bail Claim
In his amended complaint, Frantz claims that the Kingston Police Department lied to a state magisterial district judge at his bail hearing, characterizing Frantz as a "runner" (or flight risk). Other than this allegedly false testimony intended to influence the magisterial district judge's bail decision, no other culpable conduct by the defendants is alleged. But in Pennsylvania, it is a magisterial district judge, not the police, who sets bail for a criminal defendant. See Pa. R. Crim. P. 520; see also Pa. R. Crim. P. 103 (defining "Bail Authority"). Such police involvement- merely testifying at a bail hearing, even if the testimony is allegedly false-does not "manipulate' or help to shape' or exercise significant influence over'" the state court judge's bail decision sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment excessive bail claim. See James v. York County Police Dep't, 160 Fed.App'x 126, 133 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
B. All Other Claims Are Barred by Heck v. Humphrey
The rest of Frantz's claims seek damages for constitutional violations in connection with the criminal proceedings for which he was tried, convicted, and sentenced in -. Pursuant to the favorable termination rule articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Heck v. Humphrey, 51 U.S. 477 (1994), these remaining claims are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that, where judgment in favor of a plaintiff in a § 1983 action for damages would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff's criminal conviction or sentence, the plaintiff must first demonstrate "that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus [under] 28 U.S.C. § 2254." Id. at 486-87. In Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005), the Supreme Court reaffirmed this rule and broadened it to encompass equitable remedies as well, holding that "a state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)-no matter what the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the ...