United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
JOSEPH D. CRONIN, Plaintiff,
THOMAS G. OAKES, II, and ECKERT, SEAMANS, CHERIN & MELLOTT, LLC, Defendants.
JAN E. DuBOIS, District Judge.
Plaintiff Joseph D. Cronin sued defendants Thomas G. Oakes, II and Eckert, Seamans, Cherin & Mellott, LLC, for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d and 1692e. Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. Plaintiff has failed to respond to the Motion notwithstanding the Court's grant of additional time to do so. For the reasons that follow, the Motion to Dismiss is granted.
This case concerns defendants' attempts to recover a debt from plaintiff. In the Complaint with attached exhibits, plaintiff alleges the following facts: On or about June 25, 2012 and November 21, 2012, Thomas G. Oaks Associates, LLC, provided court reporting services to plaintiff, who is an attorney and operates as the Cronin Firm, in the matter of Norris v. Kent. The total alleged debt arising out of those services amounted to $331.41, including interest and finance charges. There was no written contract between plaintiff and Thomas G. Oaks Associates, LLC, for the services rendered. On or about February 10, 2014, defendants informed plaintiff that they were retained by Thomas G. Oakes Associates, LLC, to attempt to collect the alleged debt.
On April 15, 2014, defendants sent plaintiff a letter stating that they would report him to the local bar association for professional misconduct if he did not pay the balance owed for the services rendered within fifteen business days. On April 24, 2014, plaintiff sent a letter and an accompanying check to defendants, satisfying the alleged debt amount in full. In response, defendants sent another letter containing accusations and alleged misrepresentations to plaintiff.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, in response to a pleading, a defense of "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" may be raised by motion to dismiss. To survive a motion to dismiss, a civil plaintiff must allege facts that "raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In deciding a motion to dismiss, courts generally consider "the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record." Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). To satisfy the plausibility standard, a plaintiff's allegations must show that defendant's liability is more than "a sheer possibility." Id . "Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Id . (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
In Twombly, the Supreme Court used a "two-pronged approach, " which it later formalized in Iqbal. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Under this approach, a district court first identifies those factual allegations that constitute nothing more than "legal conclusions" or "naked assertions." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557. Such allegations are "not entitled to the assumption of truth" and must be disregarded. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The court then assesses "the nub' of the plaintiff['s] complaint - the well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegation[s]" - to determine whether it states a plausible claim for relief. Id.
In his Complaint, plaintiff asserts two claims against defendants under the FDCPA. First, plaintiff alleges that defendants have engaged in conduct, the natural consequence of which was to harass, oppress, or abuse plaintiff in violation of § 1692d. Second, plaintiff alleges that defendants made false, deceptive and misleading statements in connection with the collection of a consumer debt in violation of § 1692e.
Defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint. By Order dated August 25, 2014, the Court instructed plaintiff to file and serve a response to defendants' Motion to Dismiss by September 15, 2014, and provided in the Order that in the event plaintiff failed to respond or request additional time for doing so on or before that date, the Court would decide the Motion to Dismiss on the then present state of the record. See E.D. Pa. Local Civil Rule 7.1(c) ("In the absence of timely response, [a] motion may be granted as uncontested except that a summary judgment motion, to which there has been no timely response, will be governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)."). Notwithstanding that Order, plaintiff failed to respond to the Motion.
Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the FDCPA because the alleged debt arose from a business transaction, i.e. the provision of court reporting services, as opposed to a transaction "primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." Defendant contends that because the FDCPA does not cover business or commercial debts, the alleged debt is not subject to the protections and remedies under the FDCPA. The Court agrees.
"A threshold requirement for application of the FDCPA is that the prohibited practices are used in an attempt to collect a debt.'" Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Grp., 834 F.2d 1163, 1167 (3d Cir. 1987). The FDCPA defines the term "debt" as "any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for ...