United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARTIN C. CARLSON, Magistrate Judge.
I. Statement of Facts and of the Case
This social security disability appeal comes before us for consideration of a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security. In this motion, the defendant asserts that the complaint filed by the plaintiff, an unsuccessful social security disability claimant, is barred by the statute of limitations that is applicable to such cases.
With respect to this statute of limitations claim, the pertinent facts are largely undisputed. On November 3, 2011, Pearson filed an application for disability insurance benefits (DIB). In this application Pearson alleged that he was disabled, in part, due to a mental health disorder. Specifically, Pearson asserted that he suffered from a major depressive disorder. On February 13, 2012, the Commissioner denied Pearson's application, and the plaintiff filed a timely request for a hearing on February 29, 2012. On November 21, 2012, an administrative law judge (ALJ) held a hearing on Pearson's application and on February 12, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision denying Pearson's application for supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits. The ALJ decision denying benefits to Pearson nonetheless acknowledged that he suffered from significant mental health challenges in the form of a major depressive disorder. (Doc. 9, ALJ Decision.) Indeed, the ALJ characterized these mental health concerns as severe, and recited that at least one health care provider had assessed Pearson and found his global assessment of function (GAF) score to be 50. (Id.)
Pearson timely sought Appeals Council review of this adverse decision, but on May 13, 2014, the Appeals Council denied Pearson's request to review this ALJ decision. The Appeals Council mailed its denial notice to Pearson at the address he had provided to Social Security and in its May 13, 2014, denial notice Social Security informed Pearson of his right to commence a civil action within 60 days from the date of receipt of the notice. In addition, the Appeals Council's denial letter instructed Pearson that if he could not file his Complaint within 60 days of receipt of the notice, he could request that the Appeals Council extend the time in which he could commence a civil action. The denial notice also indicated that the Appeals Council would presume plaintiff received a copy of the notice within 5 days of the date of the notice. Given this notice, in order to be timely Pearson needed to file this civil action on or before Thursday, July 17, 2014.
It is undisputed that Pearson, who apparently had been consistently timely in his prior filings before the agency, failed to meet this particular filing deadline and instead filed his complaint two working days after July 17, on Monday July 21, 2014. (Doc. 1.) A combination of emotional, economic, legal and logistical factors seem to have accounted for this brief delay in filing this complaint. At the outset, Pearson's significant emotional impairments may have contributed to this delay in filing his complaint. In addition, Pearson and his counsel both attest without contradiction by the Commissioner that Pearson's indigency contributed to this filing delay. As the filing deadline approached Pearson endeavored unsuccessfully to find the personal resources to pay the filing fee. When he was unable to do so as the filing deadline approached, his counsel suggested that Pearson file his complaint and seek leave to proceed in forma pauperis, a course which Pearson ultimately followed.
In order to move for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, counsel instructed Pearson to collect information describing his financial situation and set that information forth in an application to be submitted to the Court. Pearson completed this task, but was only able to forward this information to his counsel on July 17, the filing deadline in this case. (Doc. 2, facsimile header.)
At this juncture it appears that logistical considerations then conspired to frustrate a timely filing by Pearson. By the time Pearson had amassed and submitted this information, his counsel was out of the office on July 18, 2014, attending to other legal matters in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 12-2.) Upon returning to the office on Monday July 21, 214, counsel promptly filed a complaint and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on Pearson's behalf. (Docs.1 and 2.) Pearson's Counsel also endeavored to secure an extension of time in which to file the complaint, nunc pro tunc, from the Appeals Council on July 22, 2014, (Doc. 12-3.), but never received a response to this request. (Id.)
It is against this factual backdrop that the Commissioner moves to dismiss this complaint as time-barred. (Doc. 7.) This motion is fully briefed by the parties (Docs. 8, 9 and 12.) and is, therefore, ripe for resolution.
For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that this motion be denied, since Pearson would appear to qualify for brief equitable tolling of the statute of limitations on the unique facts of this case.
A. Motion to Dismiss-Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is the proper vehicle of challenging the timeliness of the filing of a social security appeal under the statute of limitations. Raffinee v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 367 F.Appx. 379, 380 (3d Cir. 2010). Indeed, case law permits a limitations defense to be raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "[when] the time alleged in the statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has not been brought within the statute of limitations'" Frazier v. Colvin, No. CIV.A. 13 28, 2013 WL 1891351, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2013) quoting Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir.2002). Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The moving party bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated, Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005), and dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting all of the facts alleged in the complaint as true, the plaintiff has failed to plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, " Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (abrogating "no set of facts" language found in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The facts alleged must be sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555.
In undertaking this task, the court generally relies only on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider "undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, "documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered." Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also, U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that "[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered ...