United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DANIEL BINDERUP, Plaintiff.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General of the United States; and B. TODD JONES, Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Defendants.
ALAN GURA, ESQUIRE, DOUGLAS T. GOULD, ESQUIRE On Behalf of Plaintiff.
STUART F. DELERY, ESQUIRE, Assistant Attorney General, DIANNE KELLEHER, ESQUIRE, Assistant Branch Director, United States Department of Justice, DANIEL RIESS, ESQUIRE, Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice, LESLEY FARBY, ESQUIRE, Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice, ZANE DAVID MEMEGER, ESQUIRE United States Attorney, ANNETTA FOSTER GIVHAN, ESQUIRE Assistant United States Attorney, On Behalf of Defendants.
KNOLL GARDNER, District Judge.
This matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment filed February 20, 2014 ("Defendants' Motion"), and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment filed March 10, 2014 ("Plaintiff's Motion").
For the reasons expressed below, I grant Defendants' Motion in part, dismiss it as moot in part, and deny it in part. I grant Plaintiff's Motion in part and deny it in part. I grant summary judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff on Count One of the Complaint filed November 21, 2013. I grant summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendants on Count Two.
SUMMARY OF DECISION
Plaintiff Daniel Binderup brings this federal civil rights action pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, against defendant Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General of the United States, and defendant B. Todd Jones, Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.
In 1998, plaintiff pled guilty to one count of Corruption of minors in violation of section 6301 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301. Under Pennsylvania law, Corruption of minors is classified as a misdemeanor of the first degree. As such, it is punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than five years. 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 106, and 6301.
Under federal criminal law, it is a crime for a person "who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" to, among other things, "possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). This is colloquially referred to as the federal "felon-in-possession" offense.
In Count One of his Complaint, plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief barring defendants from enforcing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) against him because his prior Pennsylvania state conviction does not fall within the scope of § 922(g)(1)'s prohibition.
Because, as discussed further below, plaintiff was convicted of an offense "punishable by" - that is, subject to a maximum possible penalty of - five years imprisonment, he is subject to § 922(g)(1)'s prohibition notwithstanding the fact that Pennsylvania law labels Corruption of minors as a misdemeanor. Accordingly, I grant Defendants' Motion, deny Plaintiff's Motion, and enter summary judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff on the statutory claim in Count One. Therefore, I dismiss Defendants' Motion as moot to the extent it seeks to dismiss Count One.
In Count Two of his Complaint, plaintiff seeks a declaration that, as applied to him,  § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and, as in Count One, injunctive relief barring defendants from enforcing § 922(g)(1) against plaintiff.
As further discussed below, plaintiff distinguishes himself from those individuals traditionally disarmed as the result of prior criminal conduct and demonstrates that he poses no greater threat of future violent criminal activity than the average law-abiding citizen. Therefore, he prevails on his as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) on Second-Amendment grounds under the framework for such claims set forth by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v. Barton , 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011).
Accordingly, I grant Plaintiff's Motion, deny Defendants' Motion, and enter summary judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff on the constitutional claim in Count Two.
This court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because plaintiff's claims each present a substantial federal question.
Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(B) and (C) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, and plaintiff resides, in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, which located within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 118, 1391.
Plaintiff initiated this federal civil-rights declaratory action by filing his Complaint on November 21, 2013.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment was filed February 20, 2014.
On March 10, 2014 Plaintiff's Motion,  and Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition"), were each filed.
On April 10, 2014, with leave of court, Defendants' Combined Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss or For Summary Judgment ("Defendants' Combined Opposition and Reply Brief") was filed.
On June 6, 2014, plaintiff filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority concerning the Opinion of the United States Supreme Court issued on June 2, 2014 in Bond v. United States , 134 S.Ct. 2077, 189 L.Ed.2d 1 (U.S. 2014).
Oral argument on the within motions was held before me on June 16, 2014. At the close of oral argument, I took this matter under advisement. Hence this Opinion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to seek summary judgment with respect to a claim or defense, or part of a claim or defense. Rule 56(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); National Association for the Advancement of Colored People " NAACP" v. North Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue , 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 2012).
For a fact to be considered material, it "must have the potential to alter the outcome of the case." Id . (citing Kaucher v. County of Bucks , 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006)). Disputes concerning facts which are irrelevant or unnecessary do not preclude the district court from granting summary judgment. Id.
Where a party asserts that a particular fact is, or cannot be, genuinely disputed, the party must provide support for its assertion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56(c)(1) provides that a party may support its factual assertions by
(A) citing particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the district court must view the facts and record evidence presented "in the light most favorable to the non[-]moving party." North Hudson , 665 F.3d at 475 (quoting Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007)).
If the moving party shows that there is no genuine issue of fact for trial, "the non-moving party then bears the burden of identifying evidence that creates a genuine dispute regarding material facts." Id . (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).
Where a defendant seeks summary judgment, the plaintiff cannot avert summary judgment with speculation, or by resting on the allegations in his pleadings, but rather he must present competent evidence from which a jury could reasonably find in his favor. Ridgewood Board of Education v. N.E. for M.E. , 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir 1999); Woods v. Bentsen , 889 F.Supp. 179, 184 (E.D.Pa. 1995)(Reed, J.).
"Ultimately, [w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." North Hudson , 665 F.3d at 475 (quoting Matsushita Electric Industries Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986))(internal quotations omitted and alteration in original).
Upon consideration of the pleadings, record papers, exhibits, and declarations, the following facts are undisputed.
Plaintiff Daniel Binderup resides in Manheim, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. He is over the age of 21. He is not presently under indictment. He has never been convicted of a crime of domestic violence (felony or misdemeanor). He is not an unlawful user of, or addicted to, any controlled substance.
He has never been discharged from the armed forces under dishonorable conditions. He has never renounced his United States citizenship. He has never been subject to a restraining order related to an intimate partner. He has never been adjudicated a mental defective or committed to a mental institution.
Defendant Eric H. Holder, Jr. is the Attorney General of the United States. Defendant B. Todd Jones is the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives within the United States Department of Justice.
Facts Underlying Plaintiff's Claims
Mr. Binderup presently intends to purchase and possess a handgun and a long gun within his own home to defend himself and his family. However, sixteen years ago, on July 15, 1998, Mr. Binderup pled guilty and was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania of one count of Corruption of minors in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a).
Pennsylvania classifies the offense of Mr. Binderup's conviction as a misdemeanor of the first degree, which is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of five years. Mr. Binderup's offense of conviction did not carry a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 106(b)(6), and 6301(a). Mr. Binderup was sentenced to, and served, a term of three years' probation. He paid court costs and restitution, as required. He was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment for his conviction.
The charge and his conviction stemmed from a romantic affair that Mr. Binderup conducted with a seventeen-year-old employee of his bakery business. Mr. Binderup was 41 years old at the time of the relationship. Thus, Mr. Binderup (the employer) was 24 years older than his mistress (the employee).
Mr. Binderup acknowledges that what he did was wrong. His wife forgave him and they remain married. He currently owns and operates a plumbing business and has not been convicted of any further offenses.
On June 1, 2009, the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County granted a petition by Mr. Binderup pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(d) to remove his disqualification from owning or possession firearms which was imposed under Pennsylvania law as the result of his 1997 conviction for Corruption of minors.
Although his Pennsylvania state-law disqualification has been lifted and he desires to own and possess firearms for self-defense in his home, Mr. Binderup refrains from purchasing or possessing a firearm for that purpose because he fears arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment by federal authorities under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Moreover, the requisite form for the purchase of a firearm asks whether the prospective purchaser has been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. Mr. Binderup is unwilling to answer in the negative (for fear of prosecution for False statements to a federal firearms licensee). Should he disclose his conviction on such form, all federal firearms licensees will be prohibited from selling a firearm to him. Thus, Mr. Binderup is prevented from obtaining a firearm from a federally-licensed dealer.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
Defendants contend that plaintiff's claims should be dismissed or summary judgment should be entered in their favor because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) applies to plaintiff, and application of that statute to plaintiff does not violate his rights under the the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to summary judgment in his favor because § 922(g)(1) does not apply to him based upon his prior criminal conviction. He also argues, alternatively, that § 922(g)(1), as applied to him, violates the Second Amendment.
Plaintiff's Statutory Claim (Count One)
As noted above, in Count One of his Complaint, plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief barring defendants from enforcing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) against him because his prior Pennsylvania state conviction for Corruption of minors in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301 does not fall within the scope of § 922(g)(1)'s prohibition.
As it pertains to plaintiff, § 922(g)(1) provides that
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person -
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
* * *
to... possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
The term "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" is defined by the statute, in pertinent part, as follows:
(20) The term "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" does not include -
* * *
(B) any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.
What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).
Plaintiff claims that his prior Pennsylvania state conviction for Corruption of minors in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a) does not fall within the scope of § 922(g)(1)'s prohibition because it was for a "State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less" and, therefore, is excluded from § 922(g)(1)'s prohibition by the definition set forth in § 921(a)(20)(B).
The parties agree that Pennsylvania classifies the offense of Mr. Binderup's conviction as a Misdemeanor of the first degree and that the maximum possible punishment for such an offense is not more than five years imprisonment. Thus, the determinative question as to Count One is whether plaintiff's prior offense of conviction is "punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less". 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B).
As explained by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, § 922(g)(1) does not actually require a person to have been convicted of a felony. Rather, the statute requires a person to have been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, but that crime may not be a state-law misdemeanor which is punishable by imprisonment for a term of two years or less. United States v. Schoolcraft , 879 F.3d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1989)(citing § 922(g)(1) and § 921(a)(20)(B)).
Plaintiff contends that the phrase "punishable by" is subject to multiple interpretations. Plaintiff contends that the phrase "punishable by" can, and should, be interpreted to mean "capable of being punished [by]". As described further below, the interpretation of the phrase "punishable by" as used in § 922(g)(1) and § 921(a)(20) which has been applied by the courts takes "punishable by" to mean "subject to a maximum possible penalty of".
The Schoolcraft case involved a direct appeal from defendant Schoolcraft's conviction under § 922(g)(1). The prior conviction underlying that federal § 922(g)(1) charge was a Pennsylvania state-court conviction for Robbery. See Schoolcraft , 879 F.3d at 66. Under Pennsylvania law, the lowest classification for Robbery is as a felony of the third degree. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701. Third-degree felonies under Pennsylvania law are punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than seven years. 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 106, 1103.
In Schoolcraft, the Third Circuit rejected defendant's insufficient-evidence challenge to his conviction, which challenge was based on the argument that the government failed to prove at trial that he had a prior conviction which fell within § 922(g)(1)'s prohibition. Schoolcraft , 879 F.3d at 69.
In holding that the government provided sufficient evidence of defendant's guilt under § 922(g)(1), the Third Circuit concluded that defendant's prior Pennsylvania conviction for Robbery was a qualifying predicate conviction and that the government provided sufficient evidence defendant's guilt under § 922(g)(1). Schoolcraft , 879 F.3d at 70. Specifically, Third Circuit explained that
[t]he robbery Schoolcraft had been previously convicted of could not have been a misdemeanor, nor could it have been "punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less." We have reviewed the relevant Pennsylvania statutes, which show the crime of robbery as a felony and the maximum sentences ranging from seven to twenty years.... In sum, the testimony established that Schoolcraft had been convicted of a crime punishable for a term exceeding one year and that the crime was not a misdemeanor subject to a sentence of two years or less.
Id. (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1103, 3701)(emphasis added and internal citations omitted).
In other words, defendant Schoolcraft was not saved by § 921(a)(20)(B) - the same definitional exclusion relied on by plaintiff Binderup - both because Robbery (unlike Corruption of minors) is never classified as a misdemeanor under Pennsylvania law, and because the lowest maximum possible sentence for Robbery (that is, for Robbery as a third-degree felony) is a term of imprisonment of not more than seven years.
In sum, the Third Circuit in Schoolcraft looked to the maximum permissible sentence to determine whether defendant Schoolcraft's prior Robbery conviction was for an offense "punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less" for purposes of the § 921(a)(20)(B) exclusion. 879 F.3d at 69-70.
Subsequent to the Schoolcraft case, the Third Circuit, in United States v. Essig , 10 F.3d 968 (3d Cir. 1993), rejected the argument raised that the term "punishable" in § 921(a)(20) "means actually punished' by a year or more of incarceration." Essig , 10 F.3d at 972 (emphasis added). There, the Third Circuit stated that the United States Supreme Court "has clearly established that it is the potential sentence that controls and not the one actually imposed...." Id . At 973 (citing Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc. , 460 U.S. 103, 113, 103 S.Ct. 986, 992, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983))(emphasis added).
The Opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Logan v. United States , 552 U.S. 23, 128 S.Ct. 475, 169 L.Ed.2d 432 (2007) further confirms that the phrase "punishable by" in § 921(a)(20)(B) is to be interpreted by reference to the maximum possible punishment for the underlying offense.
In Logan, defendant-petitioner James D. Logan pled guilty to one count of possession of a firearm in violation of § 922(g)(1). Because of his criminal record, which included three Minnesota state-law misdemeanor convictions, Mr. Logan was subject to (and the district court imposed) a mandatory minimum fifteen-year term of imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)(hereinafter "ACCA"). Logan , 552 U.S. at 26, 128 S.Ct. at 478, 169 L.Ed.2d at 437.
Mr. Logan appealed the district court's application of the ACCA sentence enhancement, contending that none of his Minnesota misdemeanor convictions qualified as a predicate "violent felony", because those convictions did not cause the loss of his civil rights. Logan , 552 U.S. at 29, 128 S.Ct. at 480-481, 169 L.Ed.2d at 439. The Supreme Court upheld the application of the ACCA sentence enhancement to Mr. Logan based upon his three prior Minnesota misdemeanor convictions.
The statutory definition provided by § 921(a)(20) of the term "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" applies to both § 922(g)(1)(the substantive felon-in-possession offense) and § 924(e)(the ACCA sentencing enhancement). Thus, the misdemeanor exception at issue here is the same misdemeanor exception discussed by the Supreme Court in Logan.
The sentence enhancement provided for by the ACCA applies only to certain predicate offenses, including "violent felon[ies]". See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). As the Supreme Court in Logan explained:
Congress defined the term "violent felony" to include specified crimes "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." § 924(e)(2)(B)(2000 ed.). An offense classified by a State as a misdemeanor, however, may qualify as a "violent felony" for ACCA-enhancement purposes (or as a predicate for a felon-in-possession conviction under § 922(g) ) only if the offense is punishable by more than two years in prison. § 921(a)(20)(B).
Logan , 552 U.S. at 27, 128 S.Ct. at 479, 169 L.Ed.2d at 437-438 (emphasis added).
The Court further stated that § 921(a)(20)(B) "places within ACCA's reach state misdemeanor convictions punishable by more than two years imprisonment" and "[a]n offender would fall within ACCA's reach if his three prior convictions carried potential prison terms of over two years...." Logan , 552 U.S. at 34-35, 128 S.Ct. at 483, 169 L.Ed.2d at 442.
Moreover, the Court in Logan noted that Minnesota state law had subsequently been amended to reduce the maximum term of imprisonment for misdemeanors to a maximum of two years and "thus [Minnesota] no longer has any misdemeanors that qualify as ACCA predicates" - that is, all Minnesota misdemeanors fall within the misdemeanor exception because none is subject to a maximum term of imprisonment of greater than two years. Logan , 552 U.S. at 29, 128 S.Ct. at 483, 169 L.Ed.2d at 442.
The Opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Logan confirms what was established by reading the Opinions of the Third Circuit in Schoolcraft and Essig together. Namely, that the phrase "punishable by" in § 921(a)(20)(B) concerns the maximum potential punishment for the state-law misdemeanor ...