United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
September 25, 2014
WILLIAM A. HIMCHAK, III, Plaintiff,
KATHLEEN KANE, Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al., Defendants.
CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER, District Judge.
AND NOW, this 25th day of September, 2014, upon consideration of the motion (Doc. 12) for reconsideration filed by pro se plaintiff William A. Himchak ("Himchak"), wherein Himchak seeks reconsideration of the court's order (Doc. 11) denying his motion (Doc. 10) for emergency injunctive relief, which asked the court to indefinitely continue the tax sale of his real property scheduled for September 22, 2014, pending resolution of the above-captioned litigation, and the court having concluded, based on the record evidence submitted by Himchak, that the tax sale pertains to a 2012 property tax assessment and not the appealed - property tax assessment, (see id. Ex. 1 (notice of appeal hearing for - tax assessment); Ex. 2 (correspondence from county director of tax services indicating that tax sale is the result of unpaid 2012 taxes)), and finding no indication in the record that Himchak has appealed or otherwise formally raised a legal challenge to the 2012 assessment, and the court emphasizing that the purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to present newly discovered evidence or to correct manifest errors of law or fact, see Max's Seafood Cafe v. Quinteros , 176 F.3d 669, 677-78 (3d Cir. 1999); Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki , 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985), and noting that the court possesses an inherent power to reconsider its orders "when it is consonant with justice to do so, " United States v. Jerry , 487 F.2d 600, 605 (3d Cir. 1973); Alea N. Am. Ins. Co. v. Salem Masonry Co. 301 F.Appx. 119, 121 (3d Cir. 2008), but that such relief is to be granted "sparingly, " Montanez v. York City, Civ. No. 12-CV-1530 , 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96521, at *20 (M.D. Pa. July 16, 2014) (quoting Continental Casualty Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc. , 884 F.Supp. 937, 943 (E.D. Pa. 1995)), and that a party may not invoke a motion for reconsideration as a means to relitigate matters already resolved by the court, see Boretsky v. Governor of N.J. , 433 F.Appx. 73, 78 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc. , 555 F.3d 949, 957 (11th Cir. 2007)), nor is a motion for reconsideration "an opportunity for a party to present previously available evidence or new arguments, " Federico v. Charterers Mut. Assurance Ass'n Ltd. , 158 F.Supp.2d 565, 577 (E.D. Pa. 2001); see also Harsco Corp. , 779 F.2d at 909, and it appearing that Himchak bases his motion on arguments identical to or expanding upon those previously raised before-and rejected by-the undersigned, and neither identifies nor substantiates a clear error of law in the court's prior decision,  and accordingly fails to satisfy the exacting standard of review applied to motions for reconsideration, it is hereby ORDERED that Himchak's motion for reconsideration (Doc. 12) of the court's order (Doc. 11) dated September 22, 2014 is DENIED.