United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, District Judge.
Before this Court are several motions to dismiss filed by the twenty-five (25) named Defendants (collectively, "Defendants") pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules) 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), which seek the dismissal of the claims asserted against them. [ECF 5, 6, 9, 10, 14]. Plaintiff Joseph Osmond Danihel ("Plaintiff"), acting pro se, has opposed the motions. [ECF 15, 18]. The motions to dismiss are ripe for disposition.
For the reasons stated herein, each motion to dismiss is granted, and all claims against Defendants are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
On March 5, 2014, Plaintiff filed a fifty-five (55) page complaint containing more than five hundred (500) numbered paragraphs. [ECF 1]. When construed liberally, the complaint purports to assert claims against Defendants for violating the "takings" clause of the Fifth Amendment (Count 1), the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment (Counts 2 and 3), and for discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. In considering these motions to dismiss, this Court must accept, as true, all well-pleaded relevant and pertinent factual allegations in the complaint. These allegations are summarized as follows:
Sometime in 1987, the City of Philadelphia and/or the Office of the Mayor of Philadelphia released a plan to demolish homes in an area commonly known as "The Logan Triangle, " because the homes were sinking. (Comp. ¶¶ 1-3, 94). Among these slated properties was a house Plaintiff purchased in February 1991, ( Id. at ¶¶ 12, 27, 46-47), located at 1038 West Wyoming Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. ( Id. at ¶ 45).
Plaintiff alleges the Defendants were each aware of "The Logan Triangle" plans in 1987, but that he did not become aware of the plans until 1993. ( Id. at ¶¶ 5-24, 31). In October 1993, Plaintiff reached an agreement with the "Logan Assistance Office" to vacate his property in exchange for $80, 000. ( Id. at ¶¶ 70-72). Plaintiff moved out of the house in February 1994 and turned over the keys to a Housing and Urban Development representative in March 1994. ( Id. at ¶¶ 72-74). Sometime in 1995, Defendant City of Philadelphia ("City") sealed the 1038 West Wyoming Avenue property and demolished it in 1996. ( Id. at ¶¶ 87-89).
Ten years later, in 2005, Defendant City of Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority ("RDA") approached Plaintiff about purchasing the land parcel, but no agreement was reached. ( Id. at ¶¶ 105-122). In December 2012, the RDA filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County a "Declaration of Taking" with respect to the property. ( Id. at ¶¶ 139-40).
Plaintiff alleges that the RDA paid other property owners in The Logan Triangle unspecified amounts of compensation for their land, but that he has not received any payment. ( Id. at ¶¶ 327-329, 415, 422-23).
Plaintiff also alleges that he had communications with each Defendant and/or their respective office's representative regarding the situation with the 1038 West Wyoming Avenue property, but that each Defendant failed to prevent the "taking" of this property without just compensation to him. ( Id. at ¶¶ 76-86, 111-19, 129-38, 142-53, 158-76, 183-209, 211-14, 222, 224-317, 336, 345-46, 357-58, 368-69, 380, 384).
A motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. As the party invoking this Court's jurisdiction. Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the requisite jurisdictional requirements are met. Development Fin. Corp. v. Alpha Housing & Health Care, Inc., 54 F.3d 156, 158 (3d Cir. 1995); Packard v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1045 (3d Cir. 1993). "[W]hen there is a fact question about whether a court has jurisdiction, the trial court may examine facts outside the pleadings... [b]ecause at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court's jurisdiction - its very power to hear the case.'" Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1021 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). Therefore, this Court is free to consider evidence outside the pleadings to resolve any factual issue bearing on the jurisdictional issue. See Gotha v. United States, 115 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 1997).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court "must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). The court must determine "whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for relief.'" Id. at 211 ( quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). The complaint must do more than merely allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief; it must "show such an entitlement with its facts." Id. (citations omitted). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n]' - that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)) (alterations in original). "a claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by ...