United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
WILFREDO ARROYO, Plaintiff.
DOCTOR LI, ET AL., Defendants.
RICHARD P. CONABOY, District Judge.
Wilfredo Arroyo, an inmate presently confined at the State Correctional Institution, Frackville Pennsylvania (SCI-Frackville) initiated this pro se civil rights action pursuant 40 42 U.S.C. § 1983. An Amended Complaint (Doc. 60) was subsequently filed.
By Memorandum and Order dated August 15, 2014, Defendants Sterling and Palmigiano's joint motion to dismiss was granted. An August 25, 2014 Memorandum and order denied a motion to dismiss by Defendant Psychiatrist Doctor Ingrid Li. The other remaining Defendant is SCI-Frackville Health Care Administrator V. Stanishefski. Presently pending is a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint filed by Stanishefski. See Doc. 66.
According to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff developed a "brain disabling" drug induced condition called tardive dyskinesia because of the Defendants' deliberate indifference. Doc. 60 ¶ IV. Specifically, Arroyo states that Doctor Li ignored a prior diagnosis that the Plaintiff had tardive dyskinesia but admittedly did refer the inmate to the prison medical staff in order to rule out that condition.
PA Palmigiano and Doctor Sterling allegedly agreed with Doctor Li, and expressed the allegedly erroneous opinion that Plaintiff's tardive dyskinesia was concocted by the inmate or resulted from his previously diagnosed mental health problems. Arroyo asserts that filed a grievance with Health Care Administrator Stanishefski regarding his dissatisfaction with his care. The Amended Complaint also generally contends that the moving Defendant "interfered with medical orders and treatments." Doc. 60, p. 4, ¶ 6. In addition, Stanishefski allegedly put Plaintiff in a suicide watch cell, "because I could not walk because of severe pain on 3-5-11." Id.
After three (3) outside neurologists and four (4) other physicians diagnosed him with tardive dyskinesia Plaintiff purportedly underwent treatment with botox injections and medications.
Defendant Stanishefski claims entitlement to entry of dismissal on the grounds that: (1) the claims against her in her official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (2) Plaintiff has not adequately alleged personal involvement by the moving Defendant; and (3) a viable claim of deliberate indifference has not been set forth. See Doc. 69, p. 4.
Standard of Review
As previously discussed by this Court's earlier rulings in this matter, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must "accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Kanter v. Barella , 489 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2007)(quoting Evancho v. Fisher , 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005)). A plaintiff must present facts that, if true, demonstrate a plausible right to relief. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(stating that the complaint should include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief"); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This requirement "calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of" the necessary elements of the plaintiff's cause of action. Id . at 556.
A complaint must contain "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678. Legal conclusions must be supported by factual allegations and the complaint must state a plausible claim for relief. See id. at 679.
"Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Twombly, at 555. The reviewing court must determine whether the complaint "contain[s] either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory." Id . at 562; see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny , 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008)(in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege in his complaint "enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal ...