United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
August 21, 2014
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, a/s/o JOAN SONNEN, Plaintiff,
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff,
SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC USA, INC. f/k/a SQUARE D COMPANY, Third Party Defendant.
CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER, Chief District Judge.
AND NOW, this 21st day of August, 2014, upon consideration of defendant Metropolitan Edison Company's ("Met-Ed") motion for reconsideration (Doc. 91), wherein Met-Ed challenges the court's memorandum (Doc. 89) and order (Doc. 90) dated July 16, 2014, denying Met-Ed's motion in limine to exclude the testimony of USAA's expert witness, Ronald J. Panunto, P.E., C.F.E.I., C.F.C. (Doc. 56) and motion for summary judgment (Doc. 58),  and the court noting that denial of a motion for summary judgment is an interlocutory order, Bines v. Kulaylat , 215 F.3d 381, 384 (3d Cir. 2000), and that the court may reconsider an interlocutory order whenever it is "consonant with justice to do so, " United States v. Jerry , 487 F.2d 600, 605 (3d Cir. 1973); St. Mary's Area Water Auth. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. , 472 F.Supp.2d 630, 632 (M.D. Pa. 2007); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (An order that does not dispose of every claim in an action "may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities."), and the court emphasizing that the purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to present newly discovered evidence or to correct manifest errors of law or fact, see Max's Seafood Cafe v. Quinteros , 176 F.3d 669, 677-78 (3d Cir. 1999); Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki , 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985), but that such relief is to be granted "sparingly, " Montanez v. York City, Civ. No. 12-cv-1530, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96521, at *20 (M.D. Pa. July 16, 2014) (quoting Continental Casualty Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc. , 884 F.Supp. 937, 943 (E.D. Pa. 1995)), and that a party may not invoke a motion for reconsideration as a means to relitigate matters of disagreement with the court, see Boretsky v. Governor of N.J. , 433 F.Appx. 73, 78 (3d Cir. 2011); Ogden v. Keystone Residence , 226 F.Supp.2d 588, 606 (M.D. Pa. 2002), nor is a motion for reconsideration "an opportunity for a party to present previously available evidence or new arguments, " Federico v. Charterers Mut. Assurance Ass'n Ltd. , 158 F.Supp.2d 565, 577 (E.D. Pa. 2001); see also Harsco Corp. , 779 F.2d at 909, and it appearing that Met-Ed bases its motion on arguments identical to or expanding upon those raised in support of its motion in limine and motion for summary judgment, and that Met-Ed fails to identify or substantiate a clear error of law in the court's prior decision,  and accordingly fails to satisfy the exacting standard of review applicable to motions for reconsideration, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Met-Ed's motion for reconsideration (Doc. 91) of the court's memorandum (Doc. 89) and order (Doc. 90) dated July 16, 2014 is DENIED.
2. The request for a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) is DENIED.