Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Ritzer v. Colvin

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

May 5, 2014

SARA ELIZABETH RITZER, Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

OPINION

DONETTA W. AMBROSE, Senior District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings[1] and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 9 and 13). Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (ECF Nos. 10, 14 and 15). After careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth below, I am granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 9) and denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 13).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff has brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for supplemental security income ("SSI") pursuant to the Social Security Act ("Act"). According to Plaintiff, she filed an initial SSI application on June 24, 2008, alleging that she became disabled on October 22, 2007. (ECF No. 6-7, p. 2). That application was denied on October 16, 2008, and Plaintiff did not appeal. (ECF No. 6-4, pp. 2-3). She filed her second SSI application on January 20, 2009, alleging she had been disabled since October 22, 2007. (ECF Nos. 6-7, p. 5). Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), James Bukes, held two hearings on August 22, 2011, and December 16, 2011. (ECF No. 6-2, pp. 51-67 and 6-3, pp. 2-37). On December 28, 2011, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (ECF No. 6-2, pp. 13-23). After exhausting all administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed this action.

The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docket Nos. 9 and 13). The issues are now ripe for review.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this court has jurisdiction to review decisions to deny a complainant's application for benefits under the Act. This court, however, does not have jurisdiction to review "abuses of agency discretion in refusing to reopen claims for social security benefits." Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107-08 (1977); Coup v. Heckler, 834 F.2d 313, 317 (3d Cir. 1987) ("A decision of the Secretary declining to reopen a claim is not judicially reviewable."), abrogated on other grounds by Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002). Nevertheless, this Court may examine the administrative record to determine whether a de facto reopening occurred. Coup, 834 F.2d at 317. "A reopening... will be found where the administrative process does not address an earlier decision, but instead reviews the entire record in the new proceeding and reaches a decision on the merits....'" Id . (quoting Kane v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 1130, 1132 (3d Cir. 1985)).

When this court has jurisdiction to review a decision to deny an application for benefits under the Act, the standard of review is whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Commissioner's decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate." Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Additionally, the Commissioner's findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner's decision or re-weigh the evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if the court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however, the district court must review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. § 706.

To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he cannot engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).

The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use when evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The ALJ must determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment, whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P., appx. 1; (4) if the impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant's impairments prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by medical evidence that he is unable to return to his previous employment (steps 1-4). Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful activity (step 5). Id.

A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).

A. Whether the ALJ de facto Reopened Plaintiff's Prior Application[2]

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ de facto reopened her prior application. (ECF No. 10, pp. 12-14). Judicial review of final decisions on claims arising under the Social Security Act is limited by Sections 205(g) and (h) of the Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) & (h). "It is well settled that federal courts lack jurisdiction under § 205 to review the Commissioner's discretionary decision to decline to reopen a prior application or to deny a subsequent application on res judicata grounds." Tobak v. Apfel, 195 F.3d 183 (1999) (citing Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107-09 (1977) and Stauffer v. Califano, 693 F.2d 306, 307 (3d Cir. 1982)). Although a federal court has the ability to determine its own jurisdiction by examining whether res judicata has been properly applied, id. (citing McGowen v. Harris, 666 F.2d 60, 66 (4th Cir. 1981)), the decision not to reopen a prior claim is a discretionary decision afforded to the Commissioner and not subject to judicial review. Sanders, 430 U.S. at 108. There exist only two exceptions to this limit on judicial review: (1) where a de facto reopening has occurred, Coup v. Heckler, 834 F.2d 313, 317 (3d Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002), and (2) where a ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.