United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DONALD GLISTA and WILLIAM L. ORR
NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY
THOMAS N. O'NEILL, Jr., District Judge.
Plaintiffs sued Norfolk Southern Railway Company, their former employer, pursuant to the Federal Railroad Safety Act. Presently before me is Norfolk Southern's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or in the alternative to transfer venue to the Western District of Pennsylvania. For the following reasons I will deny defendant's motion to dismiss and will grant defendant's motion to transfer venue.
Plaintiffs brought this action against defendant after they were fired for "conduct unbecoming an employee" and for making "false and conflicting statements" in connection with an accident in which they were involved and injuries they sustained in the accident. Dkt. No. 11 at 2. Plaintiffs contend that their dismissals were retaliation for reporting these work-related injuries. Id. at 2-3.
The FRSA requires adjudication of employment retaliation claims before the Department of Labor. 49 U.S.C. § 20109(d)(2). The statute also provides for de novo review by the federal district courts and for appellate review of a final order of the Secretary of Labor by the federal courts of appeals. 49 U.S.C. § 20109(d)(3)-(4). FRSA retaliation claimants may seek de novo review from a district court if "the Secretary of Labor has not issued a final decision within 210 days after the filing of the complaint and if the delay is not due to the bad faith of the employee." Id. at § 20109(d)(3). Alternatively, "any person adversely affected or aggrieved by an order may appeal to the Court of Appeals." Id. at § 20109(d)(4).
The Department of Labor has promulgated federal regulations to govern the adjudication of FRSA claims after the completion of an OSHA investigation. The regulations state that any party may appeal OSHA's findings to an administrative law judge and then may appeal decisions by an ALJ to the Department of Labor's Administrative Review Board. 29 C.F.R. § 1982.110. The decision of an ALJ becomes a final order of the Secretary of Labor unless a petition for review is filed with and accepted by the ARB within 30 days. Id. at § 1982.110(a). Either appealing to the ARB or filing for de novo review in a federal district court after the passage of 210 days without a final decision effectively prevents an ALJ's order or OSHA's preliminary findings from becoming a final order of the Secretary. See 75 C.F.R. 1982.106; 1982.110.
Plaintiffs filed timely complaints with OSHA on September 20, 2010 which, after its investigation, determined that there was probable cause to believe that defendant had unlawfully retaliated against plaintiffs for reporting their injuries and seeking medical care. Id. at 3. On February 25, 2013 OSHA found for plaintiffs and ordered defendant to pay Glista $620, 523 and Orr $297, 985 in damages. Id. at 3; Dkt. No. 11-7 at 1. Defendant and both claimants objected to OSHA's determinations and timely appealed to an ALJ. Dkt. No. 11-6 (Collins Dep.) at ¶ 8; Dkt. No. 5-2 at 8. A hearing was scheduled before ALJ Richard Morgan for July 9, 2013. On April 22, 2013 the parties agreed to a stay of proceedings in order to attempt resolution of the claims in mediation. Dkt. No. 11-7 at 23. Therefore, the July 9, 2013 hearing was cancelled. Id. at 23. On June 3, 2013 in compliance with 29 C.F.R. § 1982.114 plaintiffs filed with the ALJ a notice of intention to file an original action in a U.S. district court. Id. at 4. On June 12, 2013, ALJ Morgan issued an order to show cause by July 8, 2013 why plaintiffs' claims should not be dismissed. Plaintiffs did not respond to this order and the ALJ dismissed their complaint with prejudice on July 16, 2013. Id. at 4. On August 12, 2013 plaintiffs filed the instant action in this Court.
Defendant argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction to conduct de novo review of plaintiffs' claims because under 29 C.F.R. § 1982.110 the ALJ's dismissal order became a final order of the Secretary of Labor on July 30, 2013, nearly two weeks before plaintiffs filed this action. Defendant contends that once there is a final order of the Secretary, even if it is rendered more than 210 days after a complaint is filed, the federal district court lacks jurisdiction to conduct de novo review of the claim. Conversely, plaintiffs argue that the plain language of the statute makes it clear that the district court has jurisdiction so long as there was no final decision within 210 days or bad faith on the part of the claimant. Plaintiffs contend that the ALJ's dismissal order should be viewed as a relinquishment of his jurisdiction that was filed in response to his receipt of plaintiffs' notice of intention to file in district court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
I. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A motion under Rule 12(b)(1) may be treated as either a facial attack on the complaint or a factual challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States , 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). A court reviewing a facial attack may consider only the allegations of the complaint and any documents referenced therein or attached thereto in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id . In reviewing a factual attack, a court may consider evidence outside the pleadings. Id.
Plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion when subject matter jurisdiction is challenged, but the legal standard for surviving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is a low one. Kehr Packages v. Fidelcor, Inc. , 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991). "A claim may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) only if it clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction' or is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.'" Gould , 220 F.3d at 178. Nevertheless, "dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not appropriate merely because the legal theory alleged is probably false, but only because the right claimed is so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.'" Kulick v. Pocono Downs Racing Ass'n , 816 F.2d 895, 899 (3d Cir. 1987), quoting Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida , 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974).
II. Motion to Transfer Venue
The FRSA authorizes venue in "the appropriate district court of the United States." 49 U.S.C. § 20109(d)(3). When a claim is filed in an improper district the Court must either dismiss the action or transfer it to a district in which it could have been brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1406. Additionally, 28 U.S.C. § 1404 provides for the transfer of venue to another district for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice. In evaluating a motion to transfer venue I may consider, inter alia, the residence of potential witnesses, the location of the events giving rise to the claim, the locality's interest in having a local dispute decided at home and the "undesirability of burdening this district's jurors ...