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Hancuff v. Colvin

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

March 19, 2014

JENNIFER LYNN HANCUFF, Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

OPINION

DONETTA W. AMBROSE, Senior District Judge.

Pending before the Court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 11 and 14). Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (ECF Nos. 11 and 15). After careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth below, I am denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 11) and granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 14).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff has brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income pursuant to the Social Security Act ("Act"). Plaintiff filed her application for disability insurance benefits on June 23, 2010, alleging she had been disabled since March 1, 2008. (ECF No. 5-5, p. 4). Plaintiff filed her application for supplemental security income on June 23, 2010, alleging she had been disabled since April 1, 2009. (ECF No. 5-5, p. 11). Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), Tom Duann, held a video hearing on October 24, 2011. (ECF No. 5-2, pp. 52-78). On January 9, 2012, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (ECF No. 5-2, pp. 32-47). After exhausting all administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed this action.

The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docket Nos. 11 and 14). The issues are now ripe for review.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Commissioner's decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate." Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Additionally, the Commissioner's findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner's decision or re-weigh the evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if the court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however, the district court must review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. §706.

To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he cannot engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).

The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use when evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a). The ALJ must determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment, whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P., appx. 1; (4) if the impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant's impairments prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520. The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by medical evidence that he is unable to return to his previous employment (steps 1-4). Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful activity (step 5). Id.

A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).

B. Residual Functional Capacity (RFC)[1]

Plaintiff essentially argues that the ALJ's RFC finding is not supported by substantial evidence. (ECF No. 11, pp. 7-13). Specifically, Plaintiff submits that "in finding the plaintiff capable of light work, the ALJ mischaracterizes key medical evidence, fails to grant proper weight to the opinion of the plaintiff's treating physician, and does not adequately consider the non-exertional limitations posed by Plaintiff's mental impairments and chronic pain." Id. at p. 8. As such, Plaintiff argues that the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert (VE) does not contain the essential factors of her RFC. Id. at p. 7. Therefore, Plaintiff contends that the opinion of the ALJ is not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed. Id. at pp. 7-13. After a review of the evidence, I find that each of these arguments lack merit.

With regard to mischaracterizing key medical evidence relating to Plaintiff's interstitial cystitis, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in stating Plaintiff had "few follow up examinations" and complained of only urinary frequency on one occasion and only occasional discomfort on another occasion. (ECF No. 11, p. 8). According to Plaintiff, she "consistently sought treatment for this condition through Floyd Csir, MD beginning on June 24, 2009[2].... These records include multiple visits and documented procedures for plaintiff's impairment; not ...


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