JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR THE REGISTERED HOLDERS OF ABFS MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2001-2, MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES SERIES 2001-2, Appellee
MARLENE THROWER, Appellant
Appeal from the Order entered February 11, 2011, Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County, Civil Division at No. GD 2005-2907
BEFORE: MUSMANNO, DONOHUE and COLVILLE [*], JJ.
Appellant, Marlene Thrower ("Thrower"), appeals form the trial court's order denying her "Verified Emergency Petition to Strike Void Default Judgment Entered Without Jurisdiction" (hereinafter, the "Petition to Strike"). This Court originally decided this case by a memorandum decision dated January 30, 2012, reversing the trial court's order and remanding the case with instructions to strike the judgment and dismiss without prejudice the complaint in foreclosure of Appellee JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("Chase"). On January 3, 2014, subsequent to its decision in Beneficial Consumer Discount Co. v. Vukman, __ Pa. __, 77 A.3d 547 (2013), our Supreme Court vacated this Court's memorandum decision and remanded the case to this Court for consideration of Thrower's non-jurisdictional issues (previously unaddressed). After careful review, on remand we affirm the trial court's order denying the Petition to Strike.
In our January 30, 2012 memorandum decision, we summarized the procedural background of this case until that time as follows:
In November of 2005, [JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. ('Chase')] filed a complaint in mortgage foreclosure against [Thrower]. According to the complaint, [Thrower] owns a home subject to a mortgage. The complaint lists as the mortgagee 'American Business Mortgage Services, Inc.' The mortgagee assigned the mortgage to [Chase]. [Chase] averred that [Thrower's] mortgage was in default due to [Thrower's] failure to pay her monthly mortgage costs.
In July of 2006, a default judgment was entered in favor of [Chase]. [Thrower] eventually filed a document which she entitled [the Petition to Strike]. The trial court denied the petition, and [Thrower] appealed to this Court. In a memorandum opinion, this Court concluded that, in denying [Thrower's] petition, the trial court failed to consider all of the arguments [she] raised in her petition. The Court, therefore, vacated the trial court's order and remanded the matter in order to allow that court to consider [Thrower's] petition in full.
On remand, the trial court entertained arguments regarding [Thrower's] petition. Thereafter, the [trial] court again denied [Thrower's] petition. [Thrower] timely filed a notice of appeal.
JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Thrower, 347 WDA 2011, at 1-2 (Pa. Super. January 30, 2012) (unpublished memorandum).
On appeal, Thrower raised the following three issues for our review and consideration:
I. Whether [Chase's] Act 91 notice contained the statutory mandated notice contents that must be provided [Thrower] as a pre-condition to filing a foreclosure complaint? Is the default judgment void for lack of jurisdiction when:
i. The Act 91 notice written by the Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency (PHFA), a public corporation, and sent by the Servicer ("OCWEN") to [Thrower], failed to advise her of her right to meet with her lender in derogation of Act 91.
ii. The Act 91 notice sent by the Servicer to [Thrower] lacked the statutorily mandated information that [Chase] was required to provide [Thrower] about ...