United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
IN RE MAUREEN H. GISONDI, Appellant,
GENE E.K. PRATTER, District Judge.
In this bankruptcy appeal, Appellant Maureen Gisondi claims that the Bankruptcy Court erred when it found that she failed to rebut the presumption that she received two copies of the notice of right to cancel, in violation of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), and when it found that she failed to present evidence that Wells Fargo had an interest in Ms. Gisondi's loan. Appellees Wells Fargo and Countrywide Bank oppose Ms. Gisondi's appeal and argue that the Bankruptcy Court's decision was correct. The Court agrees that the Bankruptcy Court applied the appropriate legal standard in deciding that Ms. Gisondi failed to rebut the presumption that she received copies of the notice of right to cancel and accepts the findings of fact of the Bankruptcy Court on that issue. In upholding the Bankruptcy Court's decision on this first issue, the Court need not reach Ms. Gisondi's second ground for appeal.
Ms. Gisondi owns a home at 2561 Skippack Pike, Lansdale, PA. In 2006, when she found herself facing financial difficulties, Ms. Gisondi sought to refinance the mortgage on her home. She employed the services of a mortgage broker. The broker arranged for a loan from Countrywide Bank. Ms. Gisondi closed on the loan at her home on August 10, 2006.
As time passed, Ms. Gisondi's financial situation worsened, and she could no longer afford the loan. On July 21, 2008, Ms. Gisondi filed an adversary action in her bankruptcy proceeding, seeking, in part, to rescind the loan and claiming that she never received copies of the notice of right to cancel, as required by the TILA.
At the summary judgment stage, the Appellees/Defendants presented a signed acknowledgment ostensibly by Ms. Gisondi of receipt of her notices of right to cancel, as well as deposition testimony from Countrywide employee, Lanisa Jenkins, and the closing agent, Ralph Lewis. Ms. Jenkins testified that Countrywide's policy was to require that borrowers receive a copy of all closing documents at closing. Mr. Lewis testified that it was his practice to always leave a copy of all closing documents with the borrower at closing. He also testified that he recalled that he and Ms. Gisondi were the only people present for the closing and that Ms. Gisondi specifically asked for a copy of her loan file so that she could provide it to her attorney. In opposition, Ms. Gisondi proffered an affidavit that stated that she did not receive any closing documents. More specifically, she contradicted Mr. Lewis's testimony by stating that she and Mr. Lewis were not the only people at the loan closing - her nephew, James Catania, was also present at the closing, and Ms. Gisondi further stated that "most of the discussions which took place at the settlement were between the two men." She also averred that she did not have an attorney at the time of the closing, and that therefore she definitely would not have made any statement to that effect to Mr. Lewis. The Bankruptcy Court denied summary judgment, and the case eventually went to trial in May, 2013.
At trial, Ms. Gisondi testified again that although she signed an acknowledgment of receipt of the notices of right to cancel, she did not recall actually receiving those documents. She further testified that she has a filing cabinet in which she keeps important documents and that she was unable to find any documents relating to the loan in question in that cabinet. She also conceded at trial that she did have an attorney at the time of the closing - a lawyer who was representing her in a lawsuit against MBNA in which she blamed MBNA, in part, for her inability to obtain financing. She also admitted that while Mr. Catania was at her house when Mr. Lewis arrived for the closing, she did not recall whether Mr. Catania stayed for the closing. Mr. Catania, meanwhile, testified that he left before the closing began.
The Bankruptcy Court ultimately found that Ms. Gisondi's testimony was not credible. In particular, the Bankruptcy Court noted that Ms. Gisondi provided "inconsistent and self-serving testimony" on details surrounding the closing, including whether she was represented by counsel at the time of the closing and whether her nephew was present for the entirety of the closing. See In re Gisondi, Bankr. No. 08-1444, Adversary No. 08-00170, Docket No. 177 (E.D. Pa. Bankr. Aug. 14, 2013). Because it found that her testimony was not credible, the Bankruptcy Court held that Ms. Gisondi had not rebutted the presumption of receipt of the notices of right to cancel and granted judgment in favor of Countrywide and Wells Fargo. Id.
Ms. Gisondi timely appealed the Bankruptcy Court's decision to this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
Upon appeal of a ruling from bankruptcy court, this Court reviews the Bankruptcy Court's legal conclusions de novo, its factual findings for clear error, and its exercise of discretion for abuse thereof. See In re Goody's Family Clothing, Inc., 610 F.3d 812, 816 (3d Cir. 2010).
Pursuant to Fed.R.Bankr.P. 8013, a bankruptcy court's findings of fact, whether based on testimonial or documentary evidence, may not be set aside by a reviewing court unless those findings are "clearly erroneous, " and deference must be given to the bankruptcy court's determination of the credibility of witnesses. See In re Trans World Airlines, 322 F.3d 283, 287 (3d Cir. 2003); see also In re Jones, 308 B.R. 223, 228 (E.D. Pa. 2003). Furthermore, a bankruptcy court's findings of fact must be upheld unless the reviewing court "is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985).
The Truth in Lending Act and its implementing regulations require, among other things, that lenders provide borrowers with two copies of a notice of right to cancel. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a); 12 C.F.R. 226.23(b). A borrower may rescind a transaction covered by the statute within three days of settlement or within three days of receipt of the notices of right to cancel, whichever is later. See id.; see also 12 C.F.R. 226.23(a)(3). If the notices of right to cancel are ...