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[U] D.M. v. D.M.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

February 4, 2014

D.M., D.M.M. AND V.B.
v.
D.M.
v.
APPEAL OF: D.M. AND D.M.M.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION

Appeal from the Order January 15, 2013 in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Civil Division at No.: 06-14183

BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., OTT, J., and PLATT, J. [*]

MEMORANDUM

PLATT, J.

D.M. and D.M.M. (Maternal Grandparents)[1], appeal pro se from the final custody order entered January 15, 2013, which awarded D.M. (Mother) sole legal and primary physical custody of C.H. (Child), who was born in October of 2004, and awarded Maternal Grandparents partial physical custody of Child one weekend per month, on a weekend of Mother's choosing. Mother has filed a motion to quash the appeal for Maternal Grandparents' failure to serve her with a copy of the reproduced record, and Maternal Grandparents have filed a motion to compel Mother to serve them with her objections to their praecipe to attach. We deny those motions, and we affirm the trial court's order.

The record supports the trial court's summary of the lengthy and protracted facts and procedure of this case in the Amended Findings of Fact and Discussion of March 28, 2013.[2] We quote that summary here at length because it aptly captures the posture and tenor of this case. In the first part of its summary, the trial court recounts the history that led to the current appeal:

This most recent custody trial is the latest chapter in the long saga of a very contentious child custody dispute between Maternal Grandparents and Mother. Father is deceased.
Paternal Grandmother and Mother long ago have amicably resolved Paternal Grandmother's partial custody rights and have demonstrated that they are more than capable of cooperation and communicating with each other in a reasonable manner. On the other hand, Mother and Maternal Grandparents have been locked in a contentious, [vitriolic] dispute for over six years. When the Child was approximately two-and-a-half years old, Maternal Grandparents were granted primary custody of the Child. At that time, Mother was permitted to be at Maternal Grandparents' residence at all times and Father was awarded periods of partial custody as agreed to between Father and Maternal Grandparents. In 2008 this order was modified, upon petition of Maternal Grandparents, to limit Mother's access to Maternal Grandparents' residence. Maternal Grandparents filed a Petition to Modify and eventually a custody order was entered in 2009 wherein Maternal Grandparents retained primary physical custody of the Child, but Mother was granted partial custody Monday, Wednesday and Friday evenings, as well as every weekend from Saturday to Sunday, and Thursday evenings if her work schedule changed to allow for that. Eventually, Mother married, moved into her marital home, and sought primary custody of the Child.
On March 14, 2011, Mother filed a Petition to Modify the current custody order, seeking primary custody of the Child. The Custody Master recommended that Mother have primary custody and that Maternal Grandparents should have regular periods of partial custody. Maternal Grandparents filed Exceptions to the Master's Recommendation, which brought the case to th[e c]ourt's docket for the first time. [The court] held a pretrial conference on August 5, 2011, at which time Maternal Grandparents and Mother were each represented by counsel. Paternal Grandmother was pro se. Following an off-the-record, in-chambers conference with counsel for the parties, (Paternal Grandmother did not participate as her rights of partial custody were not impacted), counsel consulted with their respective clients. After conferring with their clients, counsel informed the [c]ourt that all parties had reached an amicable agreement. Counsel for the parties, in open court and in the presence of their clients, stated the agreement on the record and all parties, under oath, stated on the record that they agreed to the terms outlined by counsel. The agreement provided that Mother would have primary custody and Maternal Grandparents would have partial custody on alternating weekends. Paternal Grandmother would have partial custody two weekends per year and two weeks in the summer. The [c]ourt adopted the parties' agreement as an order of [c]ourt (this is the August 5, 2011 Custody Order referred to above in the Findings of Fact).
Four days later, on August 9, 2011, Maternal Grandparents hired a new lawyer who filed a document entitled "Petition to Recant the Oral Agreement" essentially alleging that despite being competently represented in court and consenting to the agreement on the record, Maternal Grandparents were somehow forced into agreeing to the August 5, 2011 Custody Order. The [c]ourt denied the petition without a hearing and Maternal Grandparents filed a pro se appeal to the Superior Court. Several days later, while the appeal was still pending, Maternal Grandparents' new counsel filed a Petition to Modify the agreed-upon order, which th[e c]ourt held in abeyance pending the outcome of the appeal.[a]
[a] The filing of the Notice of Appeal divested [the trial court's] jurisdiction during the pendency of appeal.
On appeal, Maternal Grandparents alleged that th[e c]ourt improperly coerced them into agreeing to the terms placed on the record in open court. They alleged that th[e c]ourt "showed anger and resentment towards Maternal Grandparents". They alleged that the [c]ourt engaged in such scandalous behavior as "yelling and screaming" and stating "I don't care what the evidence will show . . .". Of course[, ] their allegations are not supported by the record and are refuted by Mother's counsel who was present during all the proceedings, on and off the record. [The trial court] likewise den[ies] these preposterous allegations.
Maternal Grandparents further alleged that they only agreed on the record to the terms outlined by counsel because they "panicked" when informed by their counsel of Mother's allegations of sexual abuse against Maternal Grandfather.
[The court notes] that throughout these proceedings, Maternal Grandparents have been consumed by how this litigation is affecting them, rather than demonstrating to the [c]ourt that they are concerned for the welfare of the Child. To wit, their Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal raises a myriad of issues, the overwhelming majority of which have nothing to do with the best interests of the Child, but rather concern the perceived harm caused to Maternal Grandparents' reputation by Mother's revelations about being abused as a child. [The court] further note[s] that because there was no hearing, there was no testimony regarding any such allegations. In fact, Maternal Grandparents' appeal and also their pending litigation in civil court against Mother for defamation have done far more to draw attention to the allegations against them than anything in our courtroom on the day the agreement was entered. In their 2011 Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, Maternal Grandparents complain that th[e c]ourt abused its discretion by "not acknowledging the potential damage to the reputations and livelihoods of (Maternal Grandparents) if these allegations were left unaddressed;" in "not acknowledging that (Maternal Grandparents) are Licensed Therapeutic Foster Parents and these allegations, left unaddressed, could affect that position." They were also concerned with their "right to confront their accuser".
Ultimately the Superior Court affirmed th[e c]ourt's ruling wherein we denied Maternal Grandparents' "Petition to Recant Oral Agreement" and remanded the case. Following remand, Maternal Grandparents moved forward with their Petition to Modify, which had been theretofore held in abeyance. The matter proceeded in due course to a conciliation conference with the Custody Master. Following the conference, the Custody Master (again) recommended that Mother retain primary custody of the Child.[b]
[b] Following remand of record from Superior Court, Maternal Grandparents were represented by the same counsel who filed the "Petition to Recant Oral Agreement." This attorney also filed the Contempt Petition and represented them at the Contempt Petition hearing and at the "Sanctions" hearing.

(Amended Findings, 3/28/13, at 6-9).

When the appeal of the trial court's denial of Maternal Grandparents' petition to recant was resolved and the trial court resumed jurisdiction of the matter, the trial court again turned to the consideration of the subject of the current appeal, Maternal Grandparents' petition to modify. The trial court also had to rule on a petition for contempt that Maternal Grandparents had filed during the pendency of the prior appeal:

Maternal Grandparents again filed Exceptions to the Master's Recommendation. During the pendency of Maternal Grandparents' Petition to Modify, Maternal Grandparents filed a Petition for Contempt alleging that Mother and Paternal Grandmother conspired to deny them their regularly-scheduled, partial custody weekend because Paternal Grandmother chose to exercise one of her two weeks of partial custody over summer vacation on what would normally be Maternal Grandparents' regular weekend. Th[e c]ourt denied the Contempt Petition on the grounds that Paternal Grandmother followed the terms and provisions of the August 5, 2011, Custody Order, and in fact she went above and beyond the requirements by giving all parties advance notice of her choice of weeks and even deferred to all other parties' summer schedules before planning her vacation with the Child. It is important to note that Paternal Grandmother is entitled to only two weekends per year and two weeks per year of partial custody of the Child. Maternal Grandparents, on the other hand, enjoy partial custody two weekends per month, and also extended vacation. With respect to Maternal Grandparents' complaint that Paternal Grandmother usurped one of their weekends of custody, [the court] point[s] out that Paternal Grandmother is entitled to two consecutive or non-consecutive weeks, which by its terms clearly anticipates that she could have custody over a weekend that would otherwise be Maternal Grandparents' (or a weekend period would otherwise be Mother's). There is nothing in the order requiring Paternal Grandmother to defer to Maternal Grandparents' weekends. In fact, [the court] believe[s] Paternal Grandmother could have selected two, non-consecutive weeks of vacation, both of which could fall on weekends where the Child would otherwise be with Maternal Grandparents, and she would still not have run afoul of the Order by its terms. The Order does not require Paternal Grandmother to notify Maternal Grandparents of her selected weeks of custody. Mother has sole legal custody of the Child and there is no reason that Mother cannot consent to whatever two weeks she feels is appropriate for the Child to spend with Paternal Grandmother. To suggest that Paternal Grandmother was in contempt for exercising the meager custody time she enjoys, especially given her courteous and reasonable behavior in selecting her vacation time, is absurd.
Following a full hearing on Maternal Grandparents' Petition for Contempt, which required Paternal Grandmother to travel several hours in ill health to defend herself and Mother to employ counsel to respond and attend the hearing, [the court] found the petition to be baseless and frivolous and denied it accordingly.
Counsel for Mother filed a "Petition to Impose Sanctions" alleging that Maternal Grandparents' contempt petition was obdurate, vexatious and filed in bad faith entitling Mother and Paternal Grandmother to Attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §5339.
On the 20th day of November, 2012, th[e c]ourt held a hearing to address the petition for sanctions. Following the hearing, [the court] found that Maternal Grandparents' contempt petition was indeed obdurate, vexatious and filed in bad faith and [it] awarded Mother $1, 300 in counsel fees incurred in defending the contempt petition and [it] awarded Paternal Grandmother $438 to compensate her for her travel expenses incurred as a result of the filing of the contempt petition.
In response, Maternal Grandparents filed a Petition for Reconsideration on November 26, 2012, based on the fact that the [c]ourt had not considered Maternal Grandparent's ability to pay the contempt sanction. [The court] held an evidentiary hearing on the 27th day of December, 2012[, ] to consider the merits of this petition. At this hearing, Maternal Grandparents presented little evidence to support their position, but rather attempted to re-litigate the underlying contempt issue by insisting that their reading of the August 5, 2011[, ] Custody Order was reasonable and that therefore their contempt petition was also reasonable. The only evidence presented at the hearing regarding the parties' finances indicated that they have spent tens of thousands of dollars on legal fees[c] and other services, such as privately-administered lie-detector tests, psychological examinations, court costs and the like, all as part of their ongoing crusade against Mother. Following the hearing, the petition for reconsideration was denied.
[c] Maternal Grandfather testified that he paid over $20, 000 in legal fees in 2012 alone. During the pendency of the Maternal Grandparents['] Petition to Modify, Maternal Grandparents filed a defamation suit against Mother which is pending before another Judge of this [c]ourt.
Maternal Grandparents' litigious behavior is appalling and causes [the court] genuine concern over its traumatic impact on Mother (and by extension, the Child). No mother or child should be forced to endure such conduct and behavior as demonstrated by Maternal Grandparents. It is indicative of their priorities that Maternal Grandparents filed their Contempt Petition very shortly before Mother gave birth to her youngest child. They demonstrated a callous disregard for the impact of the stress that being dragged into court would have on the health of Mother (who is, after all, their own daughter) and also the impact on their unborn grandchild. Maternal Grandparents have expressed no remorse for their actions nor do they even seem to grasp the harm that their course of conduct has had on Mother and the Child.
Maternal Grandparents fail to understand or appreciate that it is healthy and natural for Mother to have primary custody of the Child. Rather than celebrating the fact that Mother has grown and matured into a competent and capable parent, Grandparents persist in their steadfast belief that the Child should still be with them. [The court] recognize[s] that at one point in time, Maternal Grandparents had primary custody of the Child and that they may have a strong (if not healthy) bond with him. However, Maternal Grandparents have not demonstrated to th[e c]ourt why, now that Mother is mature, stable and prepared to care for the Child, the Child should be removed from her care.

(Id. at 9-13 (emphasis in original)).

The trial court held a hearing on Maternal Grandparents' exceptions to the Master's custody recommendations on December 5 and 7, 2012, and entered its custody order January 15, 2013. Maternal Grandparents filed their notice of appeal and statement of errors complained of on appeal on February 11, 2013. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Maternal Grandparents present the following questions for our determination:

1. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when it permitted information that was not part of the record to influence its decision; and when it denied the existence of information that was entered in the record[?]
2. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when it,
A) allowed hearsay testimony against objections to said testimony, and
B) refused to allow appellants to call their witness to the stand for questioning, even when said witness was on Appellant's witness list[?]
3. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when it did not consider the best interest of [C]hild, as directed by the [S]uperior [C]ourt of Pennsylvania in its memorandum decision on June 13, 2012 and where the statutory factors in 23 PA C.S. (A) 5328 [sic] do not support the change in custody?
4. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err as a matter of law when it[] allowed its extreme prejudice against Maternal Grandparents to influence its opinion[?]
5. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err as a matter of law when it based its decision on unfounded, unsubstantiated child abuse reports and ignored information and an expert witness that were part of the record?
6. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err and abuse its discretion when [it] made many inconsistent statements in its opinion?

(Maternal Grandparents' Brief, at 4-5).

In custody cases, our standard of review is as follows:
In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type and our standard is abuse of discretion. We must accept findings of the trial court that are supported by competent evidence of record, as our role does not include making independent factual determinations. In addition, with regard to issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must defer to the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand. However, we are not bound by the trial court's deductions or inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, the test is whether the trial court's conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions of the trial court only if they involve an error of law, or are unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.

C.R.F. v. S.E.F., 45 A.3d 441, 443 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation omitted). We have stated:

[t]he discretion that a trial court employs in custody matters should be accorded the utmost respect, given the special nature of the proceeding and the lasting impact the result will have on the lives of the parties concerned. Indeed, the knowledge gained by a trial court in observing witnesses in a custody proceeding cannot adequately be imparted to an appellate court by a printed record.

Ketterer v. Seifert, 902 A.2d 533, 540 (Pa.Super. 2006) (quoting Jackson v. Beck, 858 A.2d 1250, 1254 (Pa.Super. 2004)).

We must accept the trial court's findings that are supported by competent evidence of record, and we defer to the trial court on issues of credibility and weight of the evidence. If competent evidence supports the trial court's findings we will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result. In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003).

The parties cannot dictate the amount of weight the trial court places on evidence. Rather, the paramount concern of the trial court is the best interest of the child. Appellate interference is unwarranted if the trial court's consideration of the best interest of the child was careful and thorough, and we are unable to find any abuse of discretion.

S.M. v. J.M., 811 A.2d 621, 623 (Pa.Super. 2002) (quoting Robinson v. Robinson, 645 A.2d 836, 838 (Pa. 1994)).

Before we begin our analysis, we must dispose of Mother's motion to quash this appeal for what Mother claims is Maternal Grandparents' "deliberately malicious, frivolous, obdurate and vexatious" failure to serve her with a copy of the reproduced record. (Motion to Quash, 8/07/13, at ¶ 15). Mother asks that we quash the appeal and award her the sum of $1, 500.00 dollars in attorney fees for the time and effort expended in attempting to secure the reproduced record from Maternal Grandparents, in preparing her motion, and for having to prepare a brief in the absence of a reproduced record.

Rule 2187 provides, in pertinent part, "Each party shall serve [two] copies of its definitive brief and reproduced record on every party separately represented." Pa.R.A.P. 2187. In Rosselli v. Rosselli, 750 A.2d 355 (Pa.Super. 2000), appeal denied, 764 A.2d 50 (Pa. 2000), this Court considered a case in which appellee moved to quash an appeal where the appellant failed to designate the contents of the reproduced record, see Pa.R.A.P. 2154, filed a reproduced record that failed to include items relevant to this Court's review, and included items not of record. We quashed the appeal because of appellant's "disregard for many of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, coupled with attempts to misdirect this Court's review to documents not of record[.]" Rosselli, supra at 359-60. In the case before us, Mother has demonstrated that Maternal Grandparents have ignored our rules by failing to serve the reproduced record properly. There is not, however, any indication that Maternal Grandparents have attempted to "misdirect this Court's review." Id. We find, therefore, that, while Maternal Grandparents may have knowingly, even obdurately withheld a copy of the reproduced record from Mother, their behavior does not rise to the level of the appellant in Rosselli, particularly as we have determined that the record before us permits appellate review of the issues Maternal Grandparents have raised. Therefore, we deny Mother's motion to quash, and we deny her request for attorney fees.

Subsequently, on November 22, 2013, Maternal Grandparents filed a "Praecipe to Attach" a series of documents to the record in this case. By per curiam order, we denied this application on December 4, 2013. (See Order, 12/04/13). Mother then filed an objection to the praecipe to attach, which, on December 23, 2013, we dismissed as moot because of our previous order. (See Order, 12/23/13). Thereafter, Maternal Grandparents filed a "Motion to Compel Compliance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure" on January 7, 2014, objecting to Mother's counsel's apparent failure to serve them with her objection by email. (See Motion to Compel, 1/07/14, at unnumbered page 2). In light of our order dismissing Mother's objection as moot, we also deny Maternal Grandparents' motion to compel.

We begin our analysis by noting that Maternal Grandparents' fourth, fifth, and sixth questions presented are not included in their statement of errors complained of on appeal, and that the issues they raise there are therefore waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); Yates v. Yates, 963 A.2d 535, 542 (Pa.Super. 2008).

In their first issue, Maternal Grandparents claim that the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted information that was not part of the record to influence its decision, and when it denied the existence of information that was in the record. This is the entirety of Maternal Grandparents' argument on this issue:

Unknown to Maternal Grandparents at the time of trial, [the trial court] obtained evidence not presented at trial, [sic] that was used to form his opinion. Absent knowledge of the origin of this information, or the source of this information, Maternal Grandparents were denied an opportunity to address any issues presented or cross examine [sic] the source of the information. Maternal Grandparents believe this constituted an abuse of discretion.

(Maternal Grandparents' Brief, at 15).

Maternal Grandparents do not tell us what evidence the trial court obtained that was not presented at trial, or how that evidence might have affected the trial court opinion. Maternal Grandparents' so-called "argument" is no more than a general accusation of wrongdoing on the part of the trial court. (See id.). We also note that Maternal Grandparents' "argument" contains no citation to any legal authority. They make no effort whatsoever to link the facts of this case to the law to develop a coherent legal argument. "The failure to develop an adequate argument in an appellate brief may result in waiver of the claim under Pa.R.A.P. 2119." Commonwealth v. Beshore, 916 A.2d 1128, 1140 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citation omitted). "[A]rguments which are not appropriately developed are waived. Arguments not appropriately developed include those where the party has failed to cite any authority in support of a contention." Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 29-30 (Pa.Super. 2006) (internal citations omitted); see also Chapman-Rolle v. Rolle, 893 A.2d 770, 774 (Pa.Super. 2006) ("It is well settled that a failure to argue and to cite any authority supporting an argument constitutes a waiver of issues on appeal.") (quoting Jones v. Jones, 878 A.2d 86, 90 (Pa.Super. 2005)). Thus, Maternal Grandparents have waived their first issue.

In the first part of their second issue, Maternal Grandparents complain that the trial court improperly admitted two instances of hearsay testimony. (See Maternal Grandparents' Brief, at 15-16). Paternal Grandmother made the first statement complained of when Mother's counsel asked her about statements Child might have made to her:

[Mother's counsel]: Do you know—we talked about your son, [R.], dying. Do you know if [Maternal Grandparents] ever said something to [Child] about that, about how he died or who caused him to die?
[Paternal Grandmother]: Yeah, [Child] told me that
[Maternal Grandparents] told him that it was his [Mother's] fault that [his father] died.

(N.T., 12/05/12, at 63). The context in which this statement was elicited is a line of questioning in which Mother's counsel was attempting to establish that contact with Maternal Grandparents is detrimental to Child's wellbeing. (See id.). Neither Mother's counsel, nor anyone else, raised the question of how Child's father died, or who was responsible for his death.

Rule 801 of our Rules of Evidence defines hearsay as a statement not made as testimony at the current trial that "a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement." Pa.R.E. 801(c)(2). Paternal Grandmother offered her statement to demonstrate a detrimental aspect of the relationship between Maternal Grandparents and Child, not to prove the truth of the assertion that Mother was responsible for the death of Child's Father. (See N.T., 12/05/12, at 63). The first statement complained of is not hearsay.

Child's stepfather made the second statement complained of when he was questioned by Mother's counsel:

[Mother's counsel]: Can you describe [Mother] as a mother?
[Child's Stepfather]: [Mother] is a very good mother. She's very loving. They play, they nurture, they go to the playground.

(Id. at 138). We fail to understand why Maternal Grandparents objected to what is clearly a statement of opinion, not hearsay, and they fail to develop this argument meaningfully in their brief on appeal. (See Maternal Grandparents' Brief, at 15); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119.

Therefore, the trial court did not err when it overruled Maternal Grandparents' objections to these two statements on the grounds of hearsay. The first part of Maternal Grandparents' second issue is without merit.

In the second part of their second issue, Maternal Grandparents complain that the trial court did not permit them to recall Mother to testify after they had the opportunity to cross-examine her after her counsel questioned her on direct examination. (See Maternal Grandparents' Brief, at 16-17). In their brief, Maternal Grandparents state, "It is Maternal Grandparents' understanding that, Cross-examination [sic] is generally limited to questioning only on matters that were raised during direct examination. Maternal Grandparents placed Mother on their witness list because they had questions that were unrelated to opposing counsel's questions." (Id. at 17). Maternal Grandparents misapprehend our law. An adverse party in a civil proceeding:

may be compelled by the adverse party to testify as if under cross-examination, subject to the rules of evidence applicable to witnesses under cross-examination, and the adverse party calling such witnesses shall not be concluded by his testimony, but such person so cross-examined shall become thereby a fully competent witness for the other party as to all relevant matters whether or not these matters were touched upon in his cross-examination.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5935. In other words, once Mother took the stand to testify on her own behalf, Maternal Grandparents were free to examine her "as to all relevant matters" in the case. Id. The fact that they did not do this because they were not aware of our law is a risk a pro se litigant must face. Maternal Grandparents, as pro se litigants, are not entitled to any particular advantage because they lack legal training. As this Court has explained, "any layperson choosing to represent [himself] in a legal proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk that [his] lack of expertise and legal training will prove [his] undoing." O'Neill v. Checker Motors Corp., 567 A.2d 680, 682 (Pa.Super. 1989) (citations omitted). Maternal Grandparents had the opportunity to examine Mother on any issue relevant to their case. The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion when it refused to permit them to recall Mother to testify.

Maternal Grandparents address their third argument, that an examination of the statutory factors does not support an award of custody to Mother, by claiming that the trial court's findings are in error and asking us to reexamine the evidence and reach a different conclusion. (See Maternal Grandparents' Brief, at 17-20). This we may not do. We must accept the trial court's findings that are supported by competent evidence of record, and we defer to the trial court on issues of credibility and weight of the evidence. If competent evidence supports the trial court's findings we will affirm, even if the record could also support the opposite result. See In re Adoption of T.B.B., supra at 394.

The parties cannot dictate the amount of weight the trial court places on evidence. Rather, the paramount concern of the trial court is the best interest of the child. Appellate interference is unwarranted if the trial court's consideration of the best interest of the child was careful and thorough, and we are unable to find any abuse of discretion.

S.M., supra at 623 (citation omitted).

In addition, Maternal Grandparents' argument on this issue contains no citation to any relevant legal authority, and they make no effort to develop a coherent legal argument. Beshore, supra at 1140; Lackner, supra at 29-30; Chapman-Rolle, supra at 774. Maternal Grandparents have waived their third issue regarding the best interest of Child by asking this Court to act as fact-finder and in failing to develop a coherent legal argument in defense of their claim.

Moreover, we have read the trial court's analysis of the statutory custody factors contained in its Amended Findings of Fact and Discussion in light of the record, and conclude that the record fully supports the trial court's decisions regarding custody. (See Amended Findings, 3/28/13, at 14-22). Maternal Grandparents' third issue is without merit.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we affirm the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County entered January 15, 2013, and deny Mother's motion to quash and Maternal Grandparents' motion to compel.

Order affirmed.

Motions denied.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.


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