United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
WILLIAM J. NEALON, District Judge.
Norman Shelton, an inmate currently confined in the United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, filed this pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1, petition). Petitioner challenges "the legality of numerous sanctions of loss of good time as grossly excessive in proportion to the offense for which it is imposed", resulting in "an atypical and significant hardship that constricts Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment totally subjecting Petitioner to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, violating his Eighth Amendment." Id . In his petition, Shelton references nine separate disciplinary hearings, in which he was found guilty of prohibited activity, and sanctioned to the loss of 27 days of good conduct time. He claims that "from December 22, 2009 to November 19, 2012, [he] has lost over 400 days total" in that Respondents' "took vested good time which is illegal" as "Petitioner only earns 54 days of good time a year." (Doc. 41, traverse). Petitioner argues that "prisoners are only allowed to lose what they have earned that year." Id . For relief, Petitioner seeks immediate reinstatement of all good time credit, as well as damages. Id.
On July 13, 1993, Shelton was sentenced in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 322 months for "Conspiracy to Commit Offense or to Defraud United States, " in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 371, "Bank Robbery and Incidental Crimes, " in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(A), "Armed Bank Robbery, " in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(D), and "Use of a Firearm in Relation to the Commission of a Crime of Violence, " in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(C)(1). (Doc. 16, Ex. A, Declaration of Dominick DeSanto, BOP Paralegal Specialist, ¶ 3). He has a projected release date of March 9, 2017, via good conduct time release. Id.
Record evidence demonstrates that in 2009, Shelton was found guilty of one 200-level, high severity prohibited act, and sanctioned to the loss of 27 days of good conduct time. See (Doc. 38, Att. 10, Discipline Hearing Officer Report). In 2010, Shelton was found guilty of six 200-level, high severity prohibited acts, three of which included a finding of guilt of a 300-level, moderate severity prohibited act. (Docs. 16, Att. 5 and Doc. 38, Atts. 15, 20, 25, 30, and 34, Disciplinary Hearing Officer Reports). For each of these misconducts, Petitioner was sanctioned a loss of 27 days good conduct time. Id . In 2011, Shelton was found guilty of five misconducts for 200-level, high severity prohibited acts, two of which included a finding of guilt of a 300-level, moderate severity prohibited act. (Doc. 38, Atts., 39, 44, 49, 54, and Ex. C, Att. 4). For each of these misconducts, Petitioner was sanctioned a loss of 27 days good conduct time. Id . In 2012, Shelton was found guilty of four 200-level, high severity prohibited acts, one of which included a finding of guilt of a 100-level, moderate severity prohibited act. (Doc. 38, Atts., 39, 44, 49, 54, and Ex. C, Att. 4). For each of these misconducts, Petitioner was sanctioned a loss of 27 days good conduct time. Id.
Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 541.3, the following sanction was available for a 200-level offense:
B.1 Disallow ordinarily between 25% and 50% (14-27 days) of good conduct time credit available for year (a good conduct time sanction may not be suspended).
Pursuant to the same regulation, the following sanction was available for a 300-level offense:
B.1 Disallow ordinarily up to 25% (1-14 days) of good conduct time credit available for year (a good conduct time sanction may not be suspended).
To the extent that Shelton argues that a loss of good conduct time constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation, his punishment did not reach that level of severity. Although the 27 day disallowance of good conduct time for each misconduct received may have been construed by Shelton as harsh punishment, it fell within the range of acceptable punishments outlined by the applicable regulations. See 28 C.F.R. § 541.13 and 28 C.F.R. § 541.3. Accordingly, the punishment did not violate the Eighth Amendment and was reasonable in light of the regulations guiding Discipline Hearing Officer punishment decisions.
Moreover, it is well-settled that not all restrictions which make "the prisoner's confinement more difficult to bear" violate the Eighth Amendment. Overton v. Bazzetta , 539 U.S. 126 (2003). The sanction imposed upon Shelton does not dramatically depart from accepted conditions of confinement, create inhumane conditions, or inflict pain, injury, or deliberate indifference to the risk that injury might occur. Consequently, the sanction is not sufficiently severe to implicate Shelton's Eighth Amendment rights. See Sandin v. Connor , 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995); Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 97 (1976); Rhodes v. Chapman , 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
Petitioner next challenges the total loss of good conduct time as exceeding the number of days of good conduct time he is eligible to receive each year. As such, he seeks the restoration of any good conduct time that was wrongfully disallowed. Because the record is unclear as to how Shelton's disallowance of good conduct time has been computed, Respondents will be directed to file a supplemental brief addressing the computation of Shelton's good conduct time as set forth, more fully, below.
Shelton's underlying offense, which was committed between November 1, 1987 and September 12, 1994, is governed by the Sentencing Reform Act ("SRA") of 1984. See Vitrano v. Marberry, 2008 WL 471642 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2008) ("[s]entences imposed [for offences committed] ...