RUTH MARIE TROXLER, Plaintiff.
MONEY GRAM INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THOMAS M. BLEWITT, Magistrate Judge.
On November 12, 2013, Plaintiff Ruth Marie Troxler, a resident at 515 Exeter, Apt. C4, San Antonio, Texas, filed, pro se, this instant civil RICO action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff also captioned her original Complaint as related to a pending criminal action in this Court namely, United States v. Money Gram International, Inc., 1:12-CR-0291, M.D. Pa. Plaintiff's original Complaint was a 3-page typed document. On December 3, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 5).
Plaintiff named as her sole Defendant Money Gram International, Inc., and she did not provide an address for this Defendant or state where this Defendant was incorporated and had its principal place of business. Plaintiff stated that Defendant was engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise and a pattern of racketeering activity under §1962 of RICO. Plaintiff further averred that for years she used Defendant's "services to send money to known fraudsters (sic), which [Defendant ] knew or should have known, were fraudulently obtained and the said funds were to be used for other purposes than what was stated in the documents used to obtain those funds, in violation of Title 18 USC [§] 1341, Mail Fraud." Plaintiff also alleged that she had transmitted at least $7, 500.00 to Defendant. As relief, Plaintiff sought $7, 500.00 plus treble damages under §1964 of RICO.
Plaintiff's original Complaint was difficult to understand and it was not a proper pleading. It was also not clear as to where Defendant was located and, where Plaintiff's claims accrued. The dates of each of Plaintiff's claims were not clear and there were insufficient allegations as to the actions of Defendant which constituted RICO violations.
Since Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 5), we screened her original Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2). See Henry v. Harrisburg Police Dept., Civil No. 1:13-CV-2740, M.D. Pa. ("[T]he screening requirements articulated in 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2) apply with equal force to poisoner and civilian litigants alike."). We found that Plaintiff's original Complaint was deficient and, we issued an Order on December 4, 2013, explaining the deficiencies in Plaintiff's pleading and directing Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint. (Doc. 6).
Plaintiff filed her 15-page typed Amended Complaint on December 26, 2013. (Doc. 7). We now screen Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.
In screening a Complaint, the Court uses the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss standard.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD.
In Reisinger v. Luzerne County, 712 F.Supp.2d 332, 343-344 (M.D. Pa. 2010), the Court stated:
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently set out the appropriate standard applicable to a motion to dismiss in light of the United States Supreme Court's decisions Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 433 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ____, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009). "[T]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true to state a claim that relief is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The Court emphasized that "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. at 1950. Moreover, it continued, "[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. (citation omitted). McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 530 (3d Cir.2009). The Circuit Court discussed the effects of Twombly and Iqbal in detail and provided a road map for district courts presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in a case filed just a week before McTernan, Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir.2009).
[D]istrict courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. [ Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.] Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more than allege a plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to "show" such an entitlement with its facts. See Philips [v. Co. of Allegheny], 515 F.3d [224, ] 234-35 [(3d Cir.2008)]. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, "[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not show[n]'-that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This "plausibility" determination will be "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id . Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
The Circuit Court's guidance makes clear that legal conclusions are not entitled to the same deference as well-pled facts. In other words, "the court is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'" Guirguis v. Movers Specialty Services, Inc., No. 09-1104 , 2009 WL 3041992, at *2 ...