MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, Magistrate Judge.
It is respectfully recommended that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Petitioner, Brennan McGough, be denied.
Petitioner is a federal inmate who is incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution, McKean. He contends that the Bureau of Prisons (the "Bureau" or the "BOP"), which is the agency responsible for implementing and applying federal law concerning the computation of federal sentences, see, e.g., United States v. Wilson , 503 U.S. 329, 331 (1992), erred in computing his federal sentence.
The dispute in this case centers upon the date the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole ("the Parole Board") released Petitioner to a federal detainer. The BOP has determined that Petitioner was paroled to the federal detainer on March 7, 2012, and, therefore, has calculated his federal sentence to have commenced on that date. Petitioner maintains that he was paroled on May 25, 2011, and, therefore, he should receive credit against his federal sentence for all time he served from that date forward. To understand why the date the Parole Board released him is so important in this case, it is helpful first to briefly review the relevant statutes and BOP polices that govern the way in which it calculates an inmate's federal sentence.
A. Relevant Statutes and Policies
Two statutes are relevant to this case. The first is 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), which governs a federal sentencing court's authority to order that a federal sentence be served concurrently with a state sentence. The second is 18 U.S.C. § 3585. Paragraph (a) of § 3585 governs the date upon which a federal sentence commences, and Paragraph (b) governs the amount of sentencing credit that an inmate may receive for time served in official detention prior to the commencement of his federal sentence. The BOP's policies regarding sentence computation are set forth in Program Statement 5880.28, Sentence Computation Manual ("PS 5880.28"). Also relevant to this case is Program Statement 5160.05, Designation of State Institution for Service of Federal Sentence ("PS 5160.05"). BOP Program Statements are internal agency guidelines, and in many cases the policies set forth therein are "akin to an interpretive rule." Reno v. Koray , 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995). The BOP policies at issue in this case are not published in any federal regulation, and thus are not subject to public notice and comment before adoption. Therefore, they are not entitled to the deference described in Chevron U.S.A. v. National Resources Defense Council , 467 U.S. 837 (1984). They are, however, entitled to "some deference" from this Court so long as they set forth "a permissible construction of" the statutes at issue. Blood v. Bledsoe , 648 F.3d 203, 207-08 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Reno , 515 U.S. at 61), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1068 (2012).
1. The determination of whether a federal sentence is concurrent with, or consecutive to, a state sentence
18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) provides, in relevant part:
[I]f a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms may run concurrently or consecutively.... Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run consecutively unless the court orders that the terms are to run concurrently.
In applying § 3584(a), the BOP presumes that federal and state sentences are to be served consecutively unless the federal sentencing court orders that the sentences are to be served concurrently. See PS 5880.28, Chapt. 1, Pages 31-33; PS 5160.05, Pages 2-7. In this case, the federal district court that imposed Petitioner's federal sentence did not order that his sentence was to be served concurrent with any state sentence. Therefore, the BOP has calculated Petitioner's federal sentence to run consecutive to his state sentence. Petitioner does not challenge that decision.
2. Calculation of the date upon which a federal sentence commences
18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) governs the date upon which a federal sentence commences. It provides:
(a) Commencement of sentence. - A sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.
18 U.S.C. § 3585(a).
The BOP, and not the federal sentencing court, determines the date upon which a federal sentence commences. See, e.g., Ruggiano v. Reish , 307 F.3d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 2002), superseded on other grounds by U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) cmt. n.3(E) (2003). Because the statute provides that a sentence commences when an inmate is produced or received for service of his federal sentence, the BOP will not commence a sentence earlier than the date it is imposed, even if made concurrent with a sentence already being served. PS 5880.28, Chapt. 1, Page 13 ("In no case can a federal sentence of imprisonment commence earlier than the date on which it is imposed."). See, e.g., Rashid v. Quintana , 372 F.Appx. 260, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) ("a federal sentence cannot begin to run earlier than on the date on which it is imposed.") (citing Unites States v. Labeille-Soto , 163 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 1998)).
When an inmate is only facing service of a federal sentence, the application of § 3585(a) is straightforward. The BOP will designate the inmate to a federal detention facility and it will calculate the federal sentence to have commenced on the date it was imposed. PS 5880.28, Chapt. 1, Page 12. Oftentimes, however, as in the instant case, an inmate is subject to multiple sentences, e.g., at the time his federal sentence is imposed he is or will soon be subject to a state sentence. In that case, the federal and state governments must resolve where and/or in what order the inmate will serve his multiple sentences. At common law the "primary custody" doctrine developed to assist the sovereigns in making these determinations and to provide an orderly method by which to prosecute and incarcerate an individual that violated the law of more than one sovereign. Ponzi v. Fessenden , 258 U.S. 254 (1922). See, e.g., Bowman v. Wilson , 672 F.2d 1145, 1153-54 (3d Cir. 1982); George v. Longley, 463 F.Appx. 136, 138 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012). In relevant part, the doctrine provides that the sovereign that first arrests an individual has primary custody over him. That sovereign's claim over the individual has priority over all other sovereigns that subsequently arrest him. The sovereign with primary custody is entitled to have the individual serve a sentence it imposes before he serves a sentence imposed by any other jurisdiction, regardless of the chronological order of sentence imposition. See, e.g., Bowman , 672 F.2d at 1153-54. Primary custody remains vested in the sovereign that first arrests the individual until its sentence expires and it releases the inmate, or until it relinquishes its priority through some other act, such as granting bail, dismissing the charges, or releasing the individual on parole. George, 463 F.Appx. at 138 n.4.
The BOP has incorporated the common law primary custody doctrine into its policies, which provide:
1. If the federal government has primary custody of an inmate on the date his federal sentence is imposed, it is entitled to have that inmate serve his federal sentence upon imposition. In such a case, the BOP will designate the inmate to a federal detention facility for service of the federal sentence and will calculate that sentence to have commenced on the date the federal sentencing court imposed it, even ...