Appeal from the Judgment entered December 7, 2012, Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Civil Division at No. 1874 February Term, 2010.
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J., DONOHUE and MUSMANNO, JJ.
Beverly Knight ("Knight") appeals from the December 7, 2012 judgment entered by the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County. Upon review, we reverse the decision of the trial court, vacate the judgment entered and remand for further proceedings before the trial court.
This case arises out of the sale of a used Hyundai Sonata to Knight on February 19, 2008 by Springfield Hyundai ("Hyundai"), through its employee, George Mavroudis ("Mavroudis") (the two parties collectively, "Dealer"), and financed by Drive Financial Services ("DFS") (all three parties collectively, "Appellees"). At the time of purchase, Knight signed a Buyer's Order, which generally set forth the details of the sale, and a Retail Installment Sales Contract ("RISC"), which delineated the details of the sale and the financing agreement. The Buyer's Order also contained an arbitration clause on the reverse side of the document, which stated:
16. Arbitration Agreement: Upon the occurrence of a claim or dispute by or between Dealership and Customer arising from or relating to the sale, purchase or lease of the above-described motor vehicle or the relationship of the parties, regardless of the theory of liability asserted, either party may elect to submit the claim or dispute to resolution through arbitration and, thereafter, such arbitration shall be administered by the American Arbitration Association ('Association') under its Commercial Arbitration Rules. It is the intention of the parties that the claims or disputes subject to arbitration hereunder shall be construed as broadly as permitted by applicable law and shall include, but are not limited to, those arising from or relating to the enforceability of this agreement, the terms and provisions of the sale, lease, or financing agreements, the purchase of insurance, extended warranties, service contracts or other products purchased as an incident to the sale, lease or financing of the vehicle, the performance or condition of the vehicle, or any other aspects of the vehicle and its sale, lease or financing, including, without limitation, claims based upon state and/or federal statutes, contract claims, tort claims, fraud claims, damage claims and/or misrepresentations. Arbitration shall be held before a single arbitrator appointed by the Association. The decision or award of a majority of the arbitrators shall be final and binding upon the parties. Any decision or award rendered by the arbitrators may be entered as a judgment or order in any court having jurisdiction, The Dealership shall advance all of the arbitrators' fees and any arbitration filing fees, which, upon the conclusion of the arbitration proceeding, may be assessed against the non-prevailing party in accordance with applicable law. Attorneys' fees and other costs and expenses may also be assessed in accordance with applicable law. The parties to the agreement further agree that except as set forth hereinabove, each party hereby waives its right to any judicial proceedings. This waiver, and the obligations concerning arbitration set forth above, shall not apply to any small claims action, an action to obtain possession of a vehicle, or to any action to obtain a deficiency judgment after repossession. A 'small claims action' shall be any civil action at law which is covered by the State of Small Claims Rules and as defined in accordance therewith. This agreement is binding upon and inures to the benefit of Customer and Dealership, as well as their successors, assigns and transferees, and to the officers, employees, agents and affiliates of each of them. This agreement will survive payment of Customer's obligations, and any termination, canceling or performance of the transactions between Customer and Dealer. If any part of this agreement to arbitrate is deemed invalid under applicable law, all other parts will nevertheless remain enforceable.
Amended Complaint, 4/5/10, at Exhibit B. The RISC contained no such provision. The RISC did, however, contain an integration clause, which stated: "This Contract contains the entire agreement between you and us relating to this contract." Amended Complaint, 4/5/10, at Exhibit A.
Following her purchase, Knight learned, inter alia, that the car had previously been part of a rental fleet, it had multiple prior owners, the mileage of the car as reported to her was inaccurate, and it had previously been in an accident and sustained damage. Knight also learned after the purchase that Dealer did not send the necessary taxes and fees for the recordation of the title and registration in her name, as Mavroudis assured her he would.
In early February 2009, Knight advised DFS that she was canceling the RISC because of Dealer's misconduct, but would retain possession of the vehicle as security against the amounts owed her. According to Knight, sometime in February 2009, DFS nonetheless repossessed the vehicle without notice or warning.
On February 16, 2010, Knight filed a Complaint in the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County. Dealer filed Preliminary Objections to the Complaint on March 15, 2010. Knight then filed an Amended Complaint on April 5, 2010, raising against Appellees the following claims: (I) fraud; (II) breach of contract; (III) negligence; (IV) negligent misrepresentation; (V) breach of fiduciary duty; (VI) violation of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"); (VII) conversion; (VIII) violations of the Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act ("FCEUA"); and (IX) violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL") and the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act ("MVSFA"). Appellees filed Preliminary Objections to Knight's Amended Complaint on April 22 and May 4, 2010, respectively. Therein, Appellees asserted, inter alia, that all claims must be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the agreement in the Buyer's Order; Knight is not entitled to damages for emotional distress; paragraphs detailing similar course of conduct engaged in by Hyundai with other purchasers of the same vehicle is scandalous and impertinent and must be stricken from the Amended Complaint; Knight's UTPCPL claims are barred by the economic loss doctrine and gist of the action doctrine; there is no fiduciary relationship between Knight and DFS, so this count must be dismissed; and Knight is limited to recovering from DFS the amounts she paid pursuant to the RISC.
Knight filed Answers to Appellees' Preliminary Objections on May 4 and 12, 2010, respectively. Therein, she conceded the propriety of dismissing her claims for breach of fiduciary duty and for emotional distress other than for Count I (fraud). Knight opposed Appellees' Preliminary Objections in all other respects. On May 28, 2010, the trial court entered orders sustaining Appellees' Preliminary Objections and transferred the matter to binding arbitration. The trial court further struck with prejudice the paragraphs relating to Hyundai's conduct relating to other purchasers of the vehicle and Counts III (negligence), IV (negligent misrepresentation), V (breach of fiduciary duty), and IX (UTPCPL) of the Amended Complaint, and barred Knight from recovering from DFS more than she paid under the terms of the RISC. On June 8, 2010, Knight filed a motion for reconsideration, which, according to the docket, the trial court marked as moot on July 1, 2010.
The case proceeded to arbitration. On December 29, 2011, the arbitrator entered an award in favor of Knight and against Appellees jointly and severally in the amount of $971.41, which included $2, 985.70 in payments that Knight made after the sale of the vehicle less $2, 014.29, representing the costs incurred by Hyundai for repairs made after repossessing the vehicle. The arbitrator further required that Appellees pay the costs and fees associated with the arbitration, including reimbursement of Knight jointly and severally for the $375.00 that she had already paid.
Knight filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award on January 30, 2012. Appellees filed a reply in opposition on February 21, 2012. The trial court denied the motion to vacate on September 27, 2012.
On October 24, 2012, Knight filed three notices of appeal to this Court from the trial court's May 28, 2010 orders granting Appellees Preliminary Objections and its September 27, 2012 order denying her motion to vacate the arbitration award. She timely complied with the trial court's request for a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On December 6, 2012, this Court issued an Order Per Curiam requiring, inter alia, Knight to file with the Superior Court's Prothonotary within 10 days of the Order a certified copy of the record reflecting the entry of judgment. Knight timely complied, submitting proof that she filed a praecipe to enter judgment on December 7, 2012. She acknowledged, however, that the judgment was inaccurate, as it "contain[ed] a mathematical error." Response to Rules to Show Cause, 12/13/12, at ¶ 4. She indicated that she would be filing a petition to revise and amend the judgment within 10 days. On December 24, 2012, this Court entered an Order Per Curiam quashing Knight's appeals of the May 28, 2010 trial court orders as duplicative and unnecessary. The trial court filed its written opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on February 13, 2013.
On appeal, Knight raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt commit an error of law and abuse of discretion by finding that there was a valid arbitration agreement and compelling arbitration where the forced arbitration provision was not contained within the subject [RISC] in violation of the [MVSFA], was not referenced within the RISC, was excluded by necessary implication by the RISC's reference to and incorporation of the Window Sticker, and the RISC was integrated[?] [A]nd where the arbitrator refused to reconsider said ruling, did said error of law and abuse of discretion deprive [Knight] of a full and fair hearing of her claims, which resulted in an irregularity, which resulted in an inequitable, unjust and/or unconscionable award in derogation of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7341?
2. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt commit an error of law and abuse of discretion by compelling arbitration pursuant to a forced arbitration provision, and therefore ceding jurisdiction, but then reserving jurisdition [sic] to dismiss several of [Knight's] claims, including her [UTPCPL] claims[?] [A]nd where the arbitrator refused to reconsider said dismissed claims, did said error of law and abuse of discretion deprive [Knight] of a full and fair hearing of her claims, which resulted in an irregularity, which resulted in an inequitable, unjust and/or unconscionable award in derogation of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7341?
3. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt commit an error of law and abuse of discretion by compelling arbitration pursuant to a forced arbitration provision, and therefore ceding jurisdiction, but then reserving jurisdiction to dismiss several of [Knight's] claims, including capping [DFS's] assignee liability[?] [A]nd where the arbitrator refused to reconsider said assignee liability, did said error of law and abuse of discretion deprive [Knight] of a full and fair hearing of her claims, which resulted in an irregularity, which resulted in an inequitable, unjust and/or unconscionable award in derogation of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7341?
4. Did the arbitrator commit an error of law and abuse of discretion in awarding Appellees a set-off or deficiency, where Appellees admitted to repossessing and reselling the subject vehicle, but either failed and/or refused to disclose the proceeds of said sale[?] [A]nd did said error of law and abuse of discretion deprive [Knight] of a full and fair hearing of her claims, which resulted in an irregularity, which resulted in an inequitable, unjust and/or unconscionable award in derogation of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7341?
5. Did the arbitrator commit an error of law and abuse of discretion in refusing to award statutory damages under UCC Section 9625, where Appellees admitted to repossessing and reselling the subject vehicle and failed and/or refused to disclose the proceeds of said sale[?] [A]nd did said error of law and abuse of discretion deprive [Knight] of a full and fair hearing of her claims, which resulted in an irregularity, which resulted in an inequitable, unjust and/or unconscionable award in derogation of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7341?
Knight's Brief at 6-7.
Knight's first three issues address the trial court's decision relating to Appellees' Preliminary Objections. Knight asserts that the trial court erred by finding that a valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate existed, as the arbitration was included solely in the Buyer's Order, not the RISC, and thus was a violation of the MVFSA. Id. at 13-19. If a valid arbitration agreement existed, Knight asserts that the trial court improperly granted Appellees' remaining Preliminary Objections, as it was without jurisdiction to do so. Id. at 19, 26. Further, Knight argues that even with jurisdiction, the trial court erred by dismissing her UTPCPL claims and limiting DFS's assignee liability. Id. at 20-28.
The trial court found that Knight entered into a valid arbitration agreement, as the Buyer's Order and RISC "operate in unison to explain the rights and obligations of the parties." Trial Court Opinion, 2/13/13, at 4. It further found that the RISC pertained only to the financing of the vehicle, and thus its integration clause only superseded any additional agreement relating to the financing of the vehicle. Id. at 5. Although not addressed in its written opinion, the record reflects that despite its determination regarding the enforceability of the arbitration agreement, the trial court nonetheless dismissed certain paragraphs and Counts from the Amended Complaint. Trial Court Orders, 5/28/10.
We review a trial court's decision sustaining or overruling preliminary objections for an error of law. O'Donnell v. Hovnanian Enterprises, Inc., 29 A.3d 1183, 1186 (Pa.Super. 2011). In so doing, we employ the same standard as the trial court, to wit, all material facts set forth in the Amended Complaint and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom are admitted as true. Id. "Preliminary objections which seek the dismissal of a cause of action should be sustained only in cases in which it is clear and free from doubt ...