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In re E.N.M.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

October 25, 2013

IN RE: E.N.M., III, A MINOR APPEAL OF: E.M., JR., FATHER, Appellant IN RE: P.E.M., A MINOR APPEAL OF: E.M., JR., FATHER, Appellant IN RE: E.N.M., III, A MINOR APPEAL OF: T.C.B., MOTHER IN RE: P.E.M., A MINOR APPEAL OF: T.C.B., MOTHER, Appellant

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION

Appeal from the Decree February 6, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Orphans' Court at No(s): 436 of 2012, 438 of 2012, 438 of 2012.

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MUNDY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM

MUNDY, J.

Appellants, T.C.B. (Mother) and E.M., Jr. (Father), appeal from the February 6, 2013 decree involuntarily terminating their parental rights to their biological son, E.N.M., III, and their biological daughter, P.E.M, (Children). After careful review, we affirm.

The orphans' court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of this case as follows.

The [termination] [p]etition was filed on February 22, 2012, [by the Lancaster County Children and Youth Social Services Agency (CYA)] and notice, in accordance with the Adoption Act, was provided to the parents. The petition was served personally on March 14, 2012. Full termination hearings were held on August 28, 2012, and November 20, 2012.
[E.N.M., III] is a minor child born [in September 2007] in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. [P.E.M.] is a minor child born [in March 2009] in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.
[Mother] participated in the hearings via video conference as she was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution Muncy. Mother was represented by counsel.
[Father] participated in the hearings via video conference as he was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution Camp Hill. Father was represented by counsel.
This family first became known to [CYA] in 2008. The first referral was received December 22, 2008. The Lancaster City Police reported concerns after E.N.M, III, fell down a flight of stairs while in his stroller. While at the hospital, Mother seemed unconcerned and inattentive to E.N.M, III. Her answers to police questions were vague[, ] and it remained unclear if E.N.M., III, was knocked unconscious from the fall. The family was accepted for services, a voluntary [f]amily [s]ervice [p]lan (hereinafter "FSP") was put in place[, ] and the case was later closed.
The most recent referral was received April 29, 2010 when the police found both of the Children wandering the street around 4:00 a.m. When the police located Mother, her breath smelled of alcohol[, ] [and] she admitted that she had been drinking. Mother stated she had left the Children with a friend for approximately ninety minutes. When the police saw the home[, ] they found beer cans, apparent drug paraphernalia, and condoms on the floor. Mother refused to cooperate with the police and was arrested. The Lancaster City Police took protective custody of the Children[, ] and Mother was charged with child endangerment.
The following day, Mother was released on bail[, ] and another FSP was put in place. The Children were placed in the care of their paternal grandmother[, ] and Mother was not allowed to be alone with them. Mother was not in agreement with ongoing services and made minimal progress on her FSP. CYA had difficulty maintaining contact with Mother[, ] and she refused to sign releases for CYA to collect information from service providers.
On January 27, 2011, the Lancaster City Police were again called to Mother's home. Mother made arrangements to borrow a friend's car while he watched the Children. The friend contacted the police when Mother failed to return. He reported that Mother had stolen his car. The Children told police that Mother had left to obtain beer. The police reported that there was no heat in the home[, ] and it did not appear to have the appropriate necessities for the Children. The police again took protective custody of the Children. CYA was informed by police that Mother had a bench warrant for her arrest on a driving under the influence charge. CYA also determined the friend Mother had entrusted her Children to was not an appropriate caregiver under the FSP as he had recently been released from prison on assault charges.
Prior to taking custody of the Children, CYA offered Mother services through the Lancaster County Assistance Office, the Social Security Disability Office, the Lancaster County Council of Churches, Women-Infant-Children program, and the Lancaster Freedom Center. Mother was offered family group conferencing[, ] but she refused to participate.
Father had been incarcerated since October 30, 2008 and was not available to care for the Children. A shelter care hearing was held February 1, 2011. The adjudication/disposition hearing was held on March 1, 2011[, ] and a [c]hild [p]ermanency [p]lan (hereinafter "CPP") with a goal of reunification with the parents was approved.
Review hearing[s] were held on June 15, 2011; March 27, 2012; August 25, 2012; and January 29, 2013. Both parents were given a CPP with goals they needed to achieve in order to be reunited with their Children. The goals for Mother were: improved mental health, remain free from drugs and misuse of alcohol, remain crime free, to learn and use good parenting skills, to be financially stable, to maintain a home free and clear of hazards, and to maintain an ongoing commitment to her Children.
Mother completed an evaluation with T. W. Ponessa on May 18, 2010 but was later discharged from their program due to noncompliance. She had another intake with T.W. Ponessa on January 11, 2011. She was referred for a parenting capacity assessment with Dr. Gransee on April 11, 2011, but never completed the assessment due to her incarceration on April 11, 2011. Since being incarcerated[, ] she has not made any progress on her mental health goal.
Mother completed an evaluation at Lancaster Freedom Center in order to work towards her goal to remain drug free and from the misuse of alcohol. Intensive outpatient therapy was recommended[, ] but Mother seemed resistant to treatment. Mother was referred to the Family Alternatives Program on March 10, 2011. However, due to her incarceration she was unable to follow through with any of the recommendations. She has not made any progress on this goal since her incarceration. As far as remaining crime free, Mother is currently incarcerated serving a one to two year sentence for child endangerment and retail theft. She has completed a [v]iolence [p]revention [p]rogram while incarcerated; however, this goal remains incomplete. At the January [29], 2013 review hearing, it was indicated by Mother's counsel that she had served her time and was awaiting release.
Mother has not yet started on her parenting goal due to her incarceration, although she has taken a parenting workshop while incarcerated. Her housing and income remain incomplete as well due to her incarceration. Mother indicated she plans to reside with her grandmother upon her release. Mother has shown an ongoing commitment to her Children by remaining in touch with CYA caseworkers and regularly sending cards and letters to her Children. Prior to incarceration, Mother visited biweekly and attended medical appointments with the Children.
It is important to note, that while incarcerated, Mother has taken several workshops for self[-] improvement, including: violence prevention group, a 26 session weekly program; AOD, a 36 session biweekly program for drug and alcohol abuse and positive parenting; [and] a 15 session program that reviews better ways to be a better parent. It is commendable that Mother took the initiative to participate in these programs; however, these programs do not meet the CYA's requirements to be applied toward the completion of [FSP]. Only the violence prevention group was completed prior to March 14, 2012, the date the petition for termination was served.
Mother has not had any physical contact with her Children since her incarceration in April of 2010. Her visitation was suspended as prison visits were not suitable.
Father's [FSP] included the following goals: to remain free from drugs and misuse of alcohol, to remain crime free, to learn and use good parenting skills, to be financially stable, to maintain a home free and clear of hazards, and to maintain an ongoing commitment to his Children. Father was incarcerated prior to placement. He is serving a sentence of six to twelve years for possession of drugs with intent to deliver. His earliest release date is in 2014. He has not completed any of the goals on his plan.
At the time of Father's incarceration, [E.N.M. III], was just over a year old[, ] and [P.E.M.] was not yet born. Mother did bring the Children to the prison to visit Father, but he has not had physical contact with them since the CYA was granted custody. Father has attempted to have prison visits arranged, but prison visits were deemed not suitable[, ] and the [the trial c]ourt suspended visitation until his release from prison.

Orphans' Court Opinion, 2/6/13, 1-5.

Accordingly, on February 6, 2013, the orphans' court entered decrees involuntarily terminating Mother's and Father's parental rights to E.N.M., III, and P.E.M. On March 8, 2013, Mother and Father filed timely notices of appeal along with concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a)(2)(i).[1]

On appeal, Mother raises two issues for our review.

1. By adopting the policy of the Lancaster County Children and Youth Social Services Agency that remedial programs completed in prison will not count toward fulfilling any requirements of the Child Permanency Plan, did the [orphans'] court err by improperly creating a legal requirement that is not supported by statutory or case law[?]
2. In applying the holding of In re: Adoption of S.P., [] 47 A.3d 817 ([Pa.] 2012), did the [orphans'] court err by failing to consider the length of the remaining confinement and progress Mother made while incarcerated when addressing whether the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot and will not be remedied by the parent[?]

Mother's Brief at 4.

On appeal, Father raises three issues for our review.

1. Whether [the orphans'] court erred in finding that statutory grounds existed to terminate Father's parental rights where Father was incarcerated, however did everything within his power to maintain a relationship with his Children and had reasonable prospects for housing and employment upon his release from prison[?]
2. Whether the [orphans'] court abused its discretion in determining that upon his release from prison, Father would be incapable of providing essential parental care, control or subsistence for his Children and that the conditions and causes in incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or would not be remedied[?]
3. Whether the [orphans'] court erred in determining Father's parental rights where the Children had a relationship with Father[?]

Father's Brief at 4.

When reviewing a decree terminating parental rights, our standard of review is well settled.

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a trial court's determination of a petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. In re R.J.T., [], 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; [In re] R.I.S., [36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors Am[.], Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.
As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court's legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012).

Termination of parental rights is controlled by section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007), citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa.Super. 2009).

As Mother's and Father's issues are similar, we will address them concomitantly. First, Mother and Father challenge the orphans' court's determination that the evidence supported termination of their parental rights. This Court need only agree with the orphans' court's analysis as to any one subsection of section 2511(a) in order to affirm the termination of parental rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Instantly, the orphans' court terminated Mother's and Father's parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2), (8), and (b), which provide as follows.
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. Instantly, we review the orphans' court's analysis under section 2511(a)(2).

A review of the record reveals that Mother's goals were: to improve mental health; to remain free from drugs and misuse of alcohol; to remain crime free; to learn to use good parenting skills; to be financially stable; to maintain a home free and clear of hazards; and to maintain an ongoing commitment to the Children. N.T., 3/1/11, at 8. The orphans' court noted that the requirements of the plan are highly regulated "in order to allow for consistent and careful oversight by [CYA] and to ensure the parents are completing what is necessary to make them capable to once again care for their children." Orphans' Court Opinion, 3/26/13, 1-2.[2]

Competent evidence showed that in 2008, E.N.M., III, down a flight of stairs in his stroller. While at the hospital, Mother appeared unconcerned and inattentive to E.N.M., III. The record also showed that, in April 2010, the Lancaster City Police found the Children wandering the street at approximately 4:00 a.m. N.T., 8/28/12, at 53. When the police located Mother, her breath smelled of alcohol, and she admitted that she had been drinking alcohol, and that she left the Children with a friend for ninety minutes. The police found Mother's home littered with beer cans, drug paraphernalia, and condoms on the floor. N.T., 3/1/11, at 5. At the time, the police took protective custody of the Children, and Mother was charged with child endangerment. In January 2011, the police were again called to Mother's home, when Mother arranged to borrow a friend's car while he watched the Children. Id. at 13. Mother's friend reported that Mother had stolen his car, and the Children reported to the police that Mother had gone for beer. Id. The home had no heat or appropriate necessities for the Children. Id. at 4.

The police took the Children into protective custody. Id. at 4. CYA was also informed that Mother had a bench warrant for her arrest on a driving under the influence charge. Id. at 5. In addition, CYA determined that the friend to whom Mother had entrusted the Children was not an appropriate caregiver since he had recently been released from prison on assault charges. Id. Mother was later convicted of child endangerment and retail theft and was transferred on May 9, 2011, to CSI-Muncy. Mother has not had any contact with her Children since her incarceration. Her visitation was suspended as prison visits were not suitable for the Children. Orphans' Court Opinion, 2/6/13, at 2-3, 5.

A review of the record reveals that Father is currently incarcerated at CSI-Camp Hill for possession of drugs with intent to deliver, and is serving a sentence of six to twelve years. N.T., 8/28/12, at 56. His earliest release date is March 12, 2014. At the time of Father's incarceration, E.N.M., III, was just over a year old, and P.E.M. was not yet born. Father also attempted to have prison visits arranged, but the visits were deemed unsuitable. Orphans' Court Opinion, 2/6/13, at 5.

Our Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of involuntary termination while a parent is in prison.

Incarceration neither compels nor precludes termination. Instead, we hold that incarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a determinative factor, in a court's conclusion that grounds for termination exist under § 2511(a)(2) where the repeated and continued incapacity of a parent due to incarceration has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence and that the causes of the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.

In re Adoption of S.P., supra at 828 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Court went on to further articulate the appropriate standard.

[W]e now definitively hold that incarceration, while not a litmus test for termination, can be determinative of the question of whether a parent is incapable of providing "essential parental care, control or subsistence" and the length of the remaining confinement can be considered as highly relevant to whether "the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent, " sufficient to provide grounds for termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). See e.g. [In re] Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d [883, ] 891 [(Pa. 1986)] ("[A] parent who is incapable of performing parental duties is just as parentally unfit as one who refuses to perform the duties."); [In re] E.A.P., 944 A.2d [79, ] 85 [(Pa.Super. 2008)] (holding termination under § 2511(a)(2) supported by mother's repeated incarcerations and failure to be present for child, which caused child to be without essential care and subsistence for most of her life and which cannot be remedied despite mother's compliance with various prison programs). If a court finds grounds for termination under subsection (a)(2), a court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child, considering the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child pursuant to § 2511(b). In this regard, trial courts must carefully review the individual circumstances for every child to determine, inter alia, how a parent's incarceration will factor into an assessment of the child's best interest.

Id. at 830-831.

Accordingly, we review the orphans' court's determination that Mother and Father have "caused the [Children] to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for [their] physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot and will not be remedied by the [parents]." 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).

In this case, the orphans' court considered all of the programs that Mother participated in before being confined to prison, as well as the programs in prison. The orphans' court noted that Mother completed an evaluation intake with T.W. Ponessa on May 18, 2010, but was later discharged from their program due to non-compliance. N.T., 8/28/12, at 7. She had another intake with T.W. Ponessa on January 11, 2011, and was referred for a parenting capacity assessment with Dr. Gransee on April 11, 2011, but never completed the assessment due to her incarceration on April 13, 2011. Id. Since being incarcerated, Mother has not made any progress on her mental health goal. Orphans' Court Opinion, 2/6/13, at 4. Mother also completed an evaluation at Lancaster Freedom Center in order to work toward her goal to remain drug free and free from the abuse of alcohol. Intensive outpatient therapy was originally recommended, but Mother appeared to be resistant to treatment. Mother was then referred to Family Alternatives Program on March 10, 2010. However, due to Mother's incarceration, she was unable to follow through with any of the recommendations, and Mother was not able to follow through on the goal. With regard to Mother's goals of remaining crime free and addressing parenting, housing, and income concerns, the orphans' court determined that they also remain incomplete due to Mother's incarceration. Orphans' Court Opinion, 2/6/13, at 4.

The orphans' court noted that evidence revealed that Mother attempted to remain in touch with CYA caseworkers and by regularly sending cards and letters to the Children. The evidence also showed that, while incarcerated, Mother had taken several workshops for self-improvement including: "violence prevention group, a 26 session weekly program; AOD, a 36 session biweekly program for drug and alcohol abuse, and positive parenting; and a 15 session program that reviews better ways to be a better parent." Id. at 5. The orphans' court found it commendable that Mother took the initiative to participate in programs, but agreed with CYA that the courses do not meet its requirements. However, the orphans' court also noted that Mother admitted that only the violence prevention group program was completed prior to March 14, 2012, the date that the termination petitions were filed. Id.

With regard to Father, his goals, with the exception of mental health, are the same as Mother's goals. In reviewing the evidence, the orphans' court found that Father has not completed any of the goals in his plan. However, Father did show an ongoing commitment to the Children by maintaining contact with CYA caseworkers and sending letters and cards to the Children. N.T., 11/20/12, at 28. Father also completed a course while incarcerated named "Thinking of a Change." Id. at 26. The orphans' court determined that, like Mother's courses, Father's course does not go toward the completion of his plan. Orphans' Court Opinion, 2/6/13, at 5. In addition, the orphans' court found that Father is still in prison and is unsure of the exact date of his release. See id.

Thus, pursuant to In re Adoption of S.P., the orphans' court properly considered the history of the case, including Mother's and Father's present incarceration and the length of their remaining incarceration, and their plans, or lack thereof to care for the Children. Both parents have had limited contact and communication with the Children during their incarceration due to their young age. In fact, Father was imprisoned before P.E.M. was born. The record shows that the Children have been in foster care for twenty-four months, and that Mother and Father have been unable to provide appropriate housing or provide for the Children's daily needs. They have not even had supervised visitation during the period of their incarceration. Rather, the job has been left to their foster parents, who care for both Children by providing love and support for all of their needs. Evidence shows that the Children are thriving in the foster parents' care.

Therefore, we conclude that the orphans' court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother's and Father's parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2). Furthermore, we do not find the testimony of the CYA witnesses contradictory on the issue of Mother's and Father's completion of their goals and their lack of a capacity to parent the Children. As the competent evidence in the record supports the orphans' court's credibility and weight determinations, we discern no abuse of the orphans' court's discretion as to section 2511(a)(2).

Next, as to Mother's argument that the programs that she participated in prison fulfilled her goal, the orphans' court held that prison programs do not automatically fulfill the requirements of a plan. The orphans' court determined that "the requirements of these plans are highly regulated in order to allow for consistency and careful oversight by the agency and to insure the parents are completing what is necessary to make them capable to once again care for their Children." Orphans' Court Opinion, 3/26/13, at 2. The orphans' court also noted that the requirement to use Agency approved providers is the same for every parent, incarcerated or not." Id. Upon review, we conclude that Mother cites no precedential authority for her proposition. As a result, we deem this line of argument waived. See Keller v. May, 67 A.3d 1, 7 (Pa.Super. 2013) (stating, "issue on appeal is waived where appellant fails to develop argument of trial court error or provide pertinent supporting authority[]"), citing J.J. DeLuca Co, Inc. v. Toll Naval Assocs., 56 A.3d 402, 411 (Pa.Super. 2012).

Finally, we review Mother's and Father's issue challenging the evidence to support the termination of her parental rights under section 2511(b). We inquire whether termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1286-1287 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, C.M.S. v. D.E.H. Jr., 897 A.2d 1183 (Pa. 2006). "Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child." Id. at 1287 (citation omitted). "The court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond." Id. The focus in terminating parental rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the children pursuant to section 2511(b). In re Adoption of C.L.G., supra at 1008.

This Court has observed that no bond worth preserving is formed between a child and a birth parent where the child has been in foster care for most of the child's life and the resulting bond is attenuated. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 764 (Pa.Super. 2008). As noted, our review of the record, given the age of the Children, reveals no evidence of bond between the Children and Mother and Father. Instead, the record demonstrates that E.N.M., III, and P.E.M. are closely bonded with their prospective adoptive parents. See Orphans' Court Opinion, 2/6/13, at 10.

E.N.M., III, is currently in daycare and is involved in community sports. N.T., 8/28/12, at 12. He is also involved in play therapy through Pressely Ridge. Id. P.E.M. is a strong-willed girl, who is also involved in therapy. Id. at 13, 14. Evidence showed that the Children rarely speak of their parents. The Children have spent more time out of Mother's and Father's care than in it. The orphans' court held that Children deserve love, support, stability, and permanency from their parents every day. Orphans' Court Opinion, 2/6/13, at 10. As the competent evidence in the record supports the orphans' court's determinations, we discern no abuse of the orphans' court's discretion as to section 2511(b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., supra.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude the orphans' court's decision is supported by competent evidence, and it did not abuse its discretion when it involuntarily terminated Mother and Father's parental rights. Accordingly, the orphans' court's February 6, 2013 decree is affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.


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