Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of April 5, 2012, in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Criminal Division at No. CP-22-CR-0001076-2011
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of May 7, 2012, in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Criminal Division at No. CP-22-CR-0001242-2011
BEFORE: PANELLA, SHOGAN and COLVILLE [*] , JJ.
These are consolidated pro se direct appeals from judgments of sentence. Appellant raises eight issues for our review; however, he fails to adequately develop them. In general, the arguments consist of litanies of facts, largely unsupported by citation to the record, and conclusions of law, largely without citation to legal authority; little to no analysis is provided. For instance, in one issue related to the execution of a search warrant, the argument, in its entirety, provides, verbatim, as follows:
Search Warrant identified Items to be Seized as; A GREEN CAMOUFLAGE JACKET, A BLACK ZIPPERED UP FRONT PUFFY JACKET VEST, AND ALL DOCUMENTS AND OR PHOTOGRAPHS CONTAINING FRIENDS AND
"THE REQUIREMENT THAT WARRANTS SHALL PARTICULARLY DESCRIBE THE THINGS TO BE SEIZED, MAKES GENERAL SEARCHES UNDER THEM IMPOSSIBLE AND PREVENTS THE SEIZURE OF ONE THING UNDER A WARRANT DESCRIBING ANOTHER.
AS TO WHAT IS TO BE TAKEN, NOTHING IS LEFT TO THE DESCRETION OF THE OFFICER EXECUTING THE WARRANT" (MARRON V. UNITED STATES 275 US. 192, 196; 48 S.Ct. 74, 76, 72 L.Ed. [521 Pa.297] 231 (1927).
Artile 1 section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, like it's Federal conterpart, secures the right to be free from unreasonalble searches: (see GROSSMAN at 889).
Appellant's Brief at 12-13.
Even a generous reading of this argument fails to reveal the nature of Appellant's complaint or the relief he seeks. We simply cannot conduct meaningful appellate review in this appeal. We remind Appellant:
Although this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon the appellant. To the contrary, any person choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, ...