The opinion of the court was delivered by: Stengel, J.
Tyreek M. Maxwell brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Michael Nutter, the Mayor of Philadelphia; Charles Ramsey, its Commissioner of Police; and Officer William Moser, of the Philadelphia Police Department. The defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, I will grant the motion in part, deny it in part, and add the City of Philadelphia as a defendant.
The complaint alleges that on the evening of December 30, 2009, Philadelphia Police Officer William Moser shot Mr. Maxwell twice from behind. Officer Moser claimed that he was justified in shooting Mr. Maxwell because he claimed that Mr. Maxwell had pointed a gun at him. Mr. Maxwell allegedly was falsely arrested and charged with murder, attempted murder of a police officer, and aggravated assault of a police officer. Those charges were subsequently withdrawn.
Mr. Maxwell was taken to the hospital for treatment. Since then, he has suffered from "anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, panic attacks, severe stress, anxiety, severe depression, flashbacks, and insomnia." See Compl. at 3.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted examines the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The factual allegations must be sufficient to make the claim for relief more than just speculative. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss, a federal court must construe the complaint liberally, accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id.; see also D.P. Enters. v. Bucks County Cmty. Coll., 725 F.2d 943, 944 (3d Cir. 1984).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a plaintiff to plead in detail all of the facts upon which he bases his claim. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. Rather, the Rules require a Ashort and plain statement@ of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff=s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Id. The Acomplaint must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct.@ Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564. Neither Abald assertions@ nor Avague and conclusory allegations@ are accepted as true. See Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997); Sterling v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 897 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. Pa. 1995). The claim must contain enough factual matters to suggest the required elements of the claim or to Araise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of@ those elements. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Moreover, courts must liberally construe pro se complaints and "apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether [the] litigant has mentioned it by name." Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002). Thus, a plaintiff's complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to a less stringent standard than a formal pleading drafted by an attorney. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
The defendants argue that the claimsagainst Mayor Nutter and Commissioner Ramsey should be dismissed because: (1) the plaintiff has not asserted that these two defendants were personally involved in his arrest, and thus they cannot be sued in their individual capacities; and (2) if the claims can be construed as being against these two defendants in their official capacities, then the claims should have been brought as claims against the City of Philadelphia.
Title 42 of the United States Code § 1983 provides remedies for deprivations of rights established in the Constitution or federal laws. It does not, by its own terms, create substantive rights. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n.3 (1979). Section 1983 provides, in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Thus, in evaluating § 1983 claims against municipal actors, the Supreme Court has set forth two threshold inquiries: "(1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981); see also Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999) (same); Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995). A municipality can also be held liable for § 1983 violations when municipal employees, such as police officers, unconstitutionally apply an otherwise valid policy as a result of improper or inadequate training, or a "failure to train." See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989). In order for a municipality's failure to ...