CYNTHIA M. RUFE, J.
Plaintiff Elisha Smith, an employee of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"), filed suit alleging that she was denied a promotion to the position of Senior Single Family Housing Specialist because of her race and political affiliation. Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment, which Plaintiff opposes. For the following reasons, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
The following facts are either undisputed or viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party. Plaintiff, an African-American woman, has been employed by HUD as a Single-Family Housing Specialist in the Real Estate Owned ("REO") division of the Philadelphia Home Ownership Center ("HOC") since 1998. Her employment level is GS-12.In 2004, three vacancies were announced for the position of GS-13 Senior Family Housing Specialist in the REO division. Plaintiff was qualified for the positions, and applied. After the initial ranking of the applicants for the positions by Paula Lopez, the Human Resources Specialist charged with processing the applications, Plaintiff had the second-highest ranking on the Best Qualified List. After further review and interviews of those on the Best Qualified List, Cheryl Walker, the Director of the REO division, recommended Robert Contois (a White man who obtained the highest ranking on the Best Qualified List), Patricia Lawlor (a White woman), and Deborah Peacock (a White woman) for the three positions, and they were selected. The parties dispute whether Ms. Walker was aware of the rankings of the candidates on the Best Qualified List. Plaintiff does not challenge Mr. Contois's selection, based upon his level of experience in the division and his ranking on the Best Qualified List. Plaintiff contends, however, that the other two individuals were less qualified and had little or no prior experience working in the division.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Upon motion of a party, summary judgment is appropriate if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." A party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of supporting its motion by reference to admissible evidence showing the absence of a genuine dispute of a material fact or showing that there is insufficient admissible evidence to support the fact. Once this burden has been met, "the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument."
Summary judgment should be granted only if the moving party persuades the district court that "there exists no genuine issue of material fact that would permit a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party." A fact is "material" if it could affect the outcome of the suit, given the applicable substantive law. A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence presented "is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."
In evaluating a summary judgment motion, a court "must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, " and make every reasonable inference in that party's favor.Further, a court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations. Nevertheless, the party opposing summary judgment must support each essential element of his or her opposition with concrete evidence in the record. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted."
A. Claim of Racial Discrimination
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is "an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
In determining whether there has been an unlawful employment practice, the Court follows the familiar McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green  burden-shifting framework, where a plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. "The existence of a prima facie case of employment discrimination is a question of law that must be decided by the court but the prima facie test remains flexible and must be tailored to fit the specific context in which it is applied." If a plaintiff establishes her prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. . . . The plaintiff then must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's proffered reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination, and not the real motivation for the unfavorable job action."
A plaintiff may demonstrate pretext, and so defeat a motion for summary judgment, by either "(i) discrediting the proffered reasons, either circumstantially or directly, or (ii) adducing evidence, whether circumstantial or direct, that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse employment action." The Third Circuit has cautioned that "[ijssues such as intent and credibility are rarely suitable for summary judgment. . . . [because] discriminatory intent means actual motive, and is a finding of fact to be determined by the factfinder." "To discredit the employer's proffered reason, however, the plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer's decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent." "Rather, the non-moving plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherences, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence, . . . and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons."
Here, Defendant concedes that Plaintiff can establish & prima facie case. Defendant has proffered race-neutral reasons for the selection of Ms. Peacock and Ms. Lawlor instead of Plaintiff: Ms. Peacock is fluent in Spanish and has a law degree, and Ms. Lawlor is a licensed real estate appraiser, and Ms. Walker was impressed with their abilities as revealed through interviews and writing assignments. Defendant argues that summary judgment must be ...