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Rafaelle Mirarchi, Mba, Ccp, L.P v. Bernadette Mangan

January 3, 2013

RAFAELLE MIRARCHI, MBA, CCP, L.P.,
PLAINTIFF,
v.
BERNADETTE MANGAN, RN, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Goldberg, J.

Memorandum Opinion

Plaintiff, Rafaelle Mirarchi, initiated this action in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County against his former employer, Defendant St. Christopher's Hospital for Children ("SCHC"), several related corporate entities and SCHC employees. Defendants removed the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), claiming that certain references to federal law in Plaintiff's complaint provide this Court with subject matter jurisdiction over his claims. Plaintiff has moved to remand the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), arguing that the complaint asserts only state law claims, and that the references to violations of federal law in his complaint were intended only to support those state law claims.

Our examination of Plaintiff's complaint does not clarify why he chose to refer to federal law. Nonetheless, even if Plaintiff's complaint does state claims under federal law, those claims fail as a matter of law. Consequently, we will grant Plaintiff's motion and remand the matter to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.

I. Factual and Procedural History

Plaintiff's complaint alleges that he was retaliated against for reporting regulatory violations, and professional and ethical misconduct, that he observed while working as a cardiovascular perfusionist at SCHC. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of his reporting this misconduct, he was harassed at work, constructively discharged, and that certain employees spread false statements that damaged his professional reputation. The complaint sets forth four separate counts: violation of the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, 43 P.S. § 1421, et seq. (Count I); "Defamation - Slander" (Count II); "Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress" (Count III); and an untitled count that appears to state a claim for breach of a Corporate Integrity Agreement ("CIA") between Defendants and the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services (Count IV). (Compl., ¶¶ 211-231.) In addition, the introductory section of the complaint contains the following paragraphs:

19. Claim, on behalf of Plaintiff, is made under the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, 43 PS § 1422 et seq. (2007).

20. Claim, on behalf of Plaintiff, is made under the authority of the Medical Practice Act of 1985 and any violations thereof.

21. Claim, on behalf of Plaintiff, is made under the provisions of and violations of the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act of 2002.

22. Claim, on behalf of Plaintiff, is made under the provisions of and any violation of Federal Law, Title 4, Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986.

In their notice of removal, and in response to Plaintiff's motion to remand, Defendants assert that this Court has federal question jurisdiction through Plaintiff's claim in Paragraph 22 for a violation of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 ("HCQIA") and Count IV for breach of the CIA. Defendants also allege that supplemental jurisdiction exists over Plaintiff's state law claims. (Notice of Removal, ¶¶ 7-9.) Plaintiff responds that the "claims" identified in the introductory section of his complaint, including the HCQIA claim, were not intended as independent claims for relief, but were referenced merely as examples of wrongdoing that support his claim under Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law. Similarly, Plaintiff alleges that violations of the CIA are cited as support for his whistleblower claim, and that including a claim for breach of the CIA as Count IV was a "pleading error." (Motion, pp. 7-9.)

II. Legal Standard

In considering a motion to remand, the removing party bears the burden of demonstrating that removal was proper. Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990). Removal statutes "are to be strictly construed against removal and all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand." Boyer v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch and Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006, 1010 (3d Cir. 1987).

Here, removal was predicated on the existence of a federal question. As such, we must determine whether the complaint pleads a federal cause of action. See Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). A federal cause of action is present where: (1) federal law creates the cause of action; or (2) the plaintiff's right to relief depends on the resolution of a substantial question of federal law. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807 (1986). Under the "well-pleaded complaint rule" removal is only appropriate where a federal question appears on the face of the complaint. Franchise Tax Bd. of the State of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 ...


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