IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
December 20, 2012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF
DANIEL L. ALLGYER.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Stengel, J
Defendant, Daniel Allgyer, brings this motion for reconsideration of my February 3, 2012, Memorandum and Order. Because I write primarily for the parties, I need only recite the facts necessary for this discussion.
On April 19, 2011, the United States brought this action on behalf of the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") under the Public Health Services Act ("PHSA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 264 *fn1 and 271, *fn2 and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"), 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), *fn3 343(e)(1) and (i)(1), *fn4 against Mr. Allgyer for the unlawful sale of unpasteurized ("raw") milk across state lines. *fn5 On February 3, 2012, I granted the United States Motion for Summary Judgment and issued a permanent injunction against Mr. Allgyer. *fn6
On March 13, 2012, Mr. Allgyer filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Order of Permanent Injunction (Doc. No. 28), to which the United States responded on April 2, 2012 (Doc. No. 29). For the reasons stated below, I will deny the motion for reconsideration.
The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). Generally, a motion for reconsideration will only be granted on one of the following three grounds: (1) if there has been an intervening change in controlling law; (2) if new evidence, which was not previously available, has become available; or
A court may not grant a motion for reconsideration when the motion simply restyles or rehashes issues previously presented. Pahler v. City of Wilkes Barre, 207 F. Supp. 2d 341, 355 (M.D. Pa. 2001). A motion for reconsideration "addresses only factual and legal matters that the Court may have overlooked . . . . It is improper on a motion for reconsideration to ask the Court to rethink what [it] had already thought through rightly or wrongly." Glendon Energy Co. v. Borough of Glendon, 836 F. Supp. 1109, 1122 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (internal citation and quotes omitted). Because federal courts have a strong interest in the finality of judgments, motions for reconsideration should be granted sparingly. Rossi v. Schlarbaum, 600 F. Supp. 2d 650, 670 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
Mr. Allgyer argues the Injunction Order lacks clarity because it refers to Defendant, his business, and other entities through which he operates thereby violating his Constitutional Rights (Doc. No. 28 at 1). He contends the injunction is moot because Defendant has stated that he will voluntarily terminate all public sales (Doc. No. 28 at 1-2), but that he is operating in the "private domain" and his actions within that domain are not subject to regulation (Doc. No. 28 at 2-6, 13). Because the injunction subjects him to sanctions, he argues this a quasi-criminal matter, and criminal procedures with enhanced protections are necessary (Doc. No. 28 at 6-9). Mr. Allgyer goes on to argue that various government employees failed to take or file their oath of office (Doc. No. 28 at 9-11) and the FDA's actions, including failing to answer "Privacy Act Questions" and conducting administrative inspections, were unconstitutional (Doc. No. 28 at 11-12).
The United States contends that the motion should be denied as it is untimely, under Rules 59, 60 and Local Rule 7.1. *fn7 The United States argues the motion improperly raises arguments that were, or could have been, raised in response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, *fn8 and even considered on the merits, the motion should be denied because Mr. Allgyer does not demonstrate an intervening change in law, newly discovered evidence, or the need to correct an error of fact or law to prevent manifest injustice.
The majority of Mr. Allgyer's arguments in his motion for reconsideration were argued previously in his response to the United States motion for summary judgment. "A motion to reconsider judgment is not a 'means to reargue matters already argued and disposed of or as an attempt to relitigate a point of disagreement between the Court and the litigant." Ponisciak v. Astrue, 2012 WL 850099, at *1 (E.D. Pa. March 14, 2012) (quoting Ogden v. Keystone Residence, 226 F. Supp.2d 588, 606 (M.D. Pa 2002)).
Additionally, Mr. Allgyer's motion fails to make any of the requirements of a 60(b) motion.
Defendant makes no claim of any intervening change in the law nor does he cite or allude to any change in the law. Additionally, Mr. Allgyer has not presented new evidence for reconsideration purposes. See, e.g., Howard Hess Dental Labs. v. Dentsply Intern'l., Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251-52 (3d Cir. 2010) ("'new evidence,' . . . means evidence that a party could not earlier submit to the court because that evidence was not previously available.")
Defendant merely argues that the Court committed legal error in the Order of permanent injunction and reconsideration is required to prevent manifest injustice. *fn9 With regard to Mr. Allgyer's arguments previously raised in his response to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, I refer the parties to my ruling issued on February 3, 2012 (Doc. No. 26 at 9-11). *fn10
As to the Defendant's newly raised argument, an injunction binds the parties, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and other persons who are in active concert or participation with anyone described in Rule 65(d)(2)(A) or (B) as long as those individuals "receive actual notice of it by personal service or otherwise[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2). Additionally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 provides that an injunction covers affiliated individuals and entities, regardless of whether those individuals are named in the Order itself. See Marshak v. Treadwell, 595 F.3d 478, 486-87 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that the permanent injunction was not only enforceable against the parties to the original proceeding, but against those companies and employees connected to the defendant that had notice and continued the prohibited action after the issuance of the injunction); Jackson v. Gordon, 474 Fed. Appx. 852, 853-854 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2) provides that injunctions bind both named parties and those related to them in certain respects, such as their officers and agents and those in privity); Jackson Hewitt Inc. v. SEMO Tax Servs., Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9463 (D.N.J. Jan. 26, 2012) (same).
Defendant primarily reargues those issues raised in his motion in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Those arguments that are newly raised do not satisfy the requirements of a motion for reconsideration. Therefore, Defendant's motion is denied.
For the reasons discussed above, I will deny the Defendant's motion for reconsideration.
An appropriate Order follows.