The opinion of the court was delivered by: P. Kevin Brobson, Judge
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
Mount Vernon Cemetery Company (Petitioner) petitions for review of an order of Respondent State Real Estate Commission (Commission), which adopted a hearing examiner's proposed adjudication, thereby requiring Petitioner to register with the Commission as a "cemetery company" pursuant to the Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act (Real Estate Act)*fn1 and 9 Pa. C.S. §§ 101-312 (Burial Grounds Act). We now reverse.
After conducting an investigation, the Department of State, Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs (BPOA), initiated a disciplinary proceeding against Petitioner before the Commission. BPOA alleged that Petitioner qualified as a "cemetery company" under both the Real Estate Act and Burial Grounds Act.
BPOA further alleged that, as a cemetery company, Petitioner was required under the Burial Grounds Act to obtain a valid registration certificate from the Commission, which it failed to do. BPOA requested sanctions in the amount of $10,000 per year for each of the twenty-eight (28) years that Petitioner failed to register.
Following a hearing, a hearing examiner issued a proposed adjudication and order, which included findings of fact and conclusions of law. With the exception of a portion of a finding that Petitioner operated a "cemetery company" in the Commonwealth from 1856 to the present, the parties do not dispute the factual findings. (Finding of Fact (F.F.) no. 1.) As to the undisputed findings, the hearing examiner found that Petitioner was established by an act of the General Assembly in 1856 and has continuously operated from that year to the present. (F.F. no. 1, 3.) Petitioner sold its last lot in 1968 and has not sold or issued any deed of sepulcher since that time. (F.F. no. 5.) Petitioner's president is Joseph Murphy (Murphy), who has held that position since 1973, when he succeeded his father in that position and became the sole shareholder of Petitioner; since that time he has not offered any lots for sale. (F.F. no. 6, 7, 13.) The only burials in Petitioner's cemetery are authorized by deeds sold to private parties before 1969. (F.F. no. 9.) The operation is now limited solely to interring remains and cremains of persons holding deeds issued before 1968. (F.F. no. 17.) Petitioner never registered with the Commission because its president believed that it did not need to because it no longer sells lots. (F.F. no. 11, 12.) The hearing examiner concluded that, beginning in 1982 and continuing to the present, Petitioner was subject to the registration requirement of Section 304 of the Burial Grounds Act, because it engaged in the business of a cemetery during that period.
(Conclusion of Law no. 6.) The hearing examiner, however, recommended that no sanctions be imposed. The Commission adopted the proposed adjudication and order as its own final adjudication and order.
On appeal to this Court,*fn2 Petitioner essentially argues that the Commission erred in concluding that it was required under the Burial Grounds Act and Real Estate Act to register with the Commission. Petitioner contends that because it does not sell or offer to sell burial lots and has not done so since before the date of enactments regulating such activity, it is not a "cemetery company" within the meaning of those acts, and, therefore, it is not required to register with the Commission.*fn3 We agree.
When interpreting a statute, this Court is guided by the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa. C.S. §§ 1501-1991, which provides that "the object of all interpretation and construction of all statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly." 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(a). "The clearest indication of legislative intent is generally the plain language of a statute." Walker v. Eleby, 577 Pa. 104, 123, 842 A.2d 389, 400 (2004). "When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(b). Only "[w]hen the words of the statute are not explicit" may this Court resort to statutory construction. 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(c). "A statute is ambiguous or unclear if its language is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations." Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 676 A.2d 711, 715 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 546 Pa. 668, 685 A.2d 547 (1996). Moreover, "[e]very statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions." 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(a). It is presumed "[t]hat the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain." 1 Pa. C.S. § 1922(2). Thus, no provision of a statute shall be "reduced to mere surplusage." Walker, 577 Pa. at 123, 842 A.2d at 400. Finally, it is presumed "[t]hat the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable." 1 Pa. C.S. § 1922(1).
Both the Burial Grounds Act and the Real Estate Act define the terms "cemetery" and "cemetery company," as follows:
Cemetery: "A place for the disposal or burial of deceased human beings, by cremation or in a grave, mausoleum, vault, columbarium or other receptacle, but the term does not include a private family cemetery."
Cemetery company: "Any person who offers or sells to the public the ownership, or the right to use, any cemetery lot."
Section 101 of the Burial Grounds Act, 9 Pa. C.S. § 101 (emphasis added); Section 201 of the Real Estate Act, 63 P.S. ...