The opinion of the court was delivered by: Conti, District Judge.
Pending before the court is a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct judgment of conviction by a person in federal custody, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (the "Motion" (ECF No. 453))*fn1 filed by petitioner Percy Travillion ("petitioner" or "Travillion"). Upon reviewing the Motion, petitioner's memorandum in support ("Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ("petitioner's Memorandum" (ECF No. 454))), the government's brief in opposition (Government's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255 ("government's Brief" (ECF No. 469)), and petitioner's reply ("Petitioner's Opposition to Government's Reply Motion Under Rule 5 To Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255" (ECF No. 505)). The court will DENY the Motion because, among other things, the record demonstrates that petitioner was not prejudiced by his trial counsel's actions.
On June 17, 2004, petitioner was named as a coconspirator in three counts of a nineteen-count indictment against eight individuals for federal drug trafficking offenses occurring in the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania area. Petitioner was charged in Count Nine with conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, in Count Ten with possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), and in Count Thirteen with conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of powder cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. (ECF No. 1). Petitioner pled not guilty to these charges and proceeded to a trial before a jury which commenced on November 7, 2006, and resulted in a verdict of guilty on all three counts on November 20, 2006. (ECF No. 299). After a presentence investigation report ("PIR") was prepared, objections to the PIR were submitted (ECF Nos. 355, 356), and a three-day sentencing hearing (ECF Nos. 367, 384), petitioner was sentenced by this court on January 24, 2008 to 188 months of imprisonment to be followed by a period of five years of supervised release on each count of the indictment, to be concurrently served. (ECF No. 385).
Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal of his conviction to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on January 29, 2008 (Criminal No. 08-1337 (ECF No. 386)). In his direct appeal petitioner alleged: (1) insufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's conviction; (2) improper jury instructions through this court's refusal to grant a corpus delicti instruction on Count Ten of the indictment, and the court's instructing the jury to take any stipulated facts as true; (3) a procedural error in calculating the sentencing guidelines through a two-point increase for obstruction of justice; and (4) lack of congressional authority to mandate petitioner supplying a DNA sample pursuant to the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000.*fn2 United States v. Travillion, 321 F. App'x 156, 157-59 (3d Cir. 2009). On April 7, 2009, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed this court's judgment and sentence and rejected all of petitioner's claims. (Id.).
On July 7, 2010, Travillion filed the instant Motion, in which he collaterally attacks his sentence by raising allegations of ineffective assistance of his counsel, David Chontos ("Chontos" or "petitioner's counsel"), in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights, and argues that as a consequence he is being held in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States. (See Mot. at 3 (ECF No. 453)). In the Motion, petitioner sets forth four specific grounds for the ineffective assistance of his counsel,*fn3 alleging: "(1) Trial Counsel failed to effectively investigate and cross-examine Government witnesses, (2) Trial Counsel failed to effectively investigate facts made known to him by Petitioner constituting Petitioner's only realistic defense, (3) Trial Counsel failed to adequately advise Petitioner of the risk in his testifying in his own behalf, and (4) Trial Counsel failed to adequately object to Petitioner's conviction on two separate counts that comprised the same conspiracy, thus exposing Petitioner to double jeopardy." (Pet'r's Mem. at 2 (ECF No. 454)). For the reasons set forth below, petitioner is not entitled to relief on any of those four grounds and accordingly petitioner's Motion must be denied.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a), a prisoner in federal custody may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct that sentence "upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A § 2255 motion seeks extraordinary habeas corpus relief; the statute provides with respect to remedies that "the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). Petitioner requests two particular remedies in his Motion (in combination with an omnibus prayer for any equitable remedies the court deems appropriate), moving this court to: "(a) Vacate Petitioner's conviction in this case; or (b) In the event that the Court does not grant the relief sought . . . correct Petitioner's sentence by adjusting the advisory Guidelines downward by two levels." (Mot. at 5 (ECF No. 453)).
A district court is required to hold an evidentiary hearing on a § 2255 motion, unless the motion, files, and records of the case conclusively show that the movant is not entitled to relief.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) ("Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall . . . grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto."); United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 545-46 (3d Cir. 2005). The threshold the petitioner must meet to obtain an evidentiary hearing is considered to be "reasonably low." Id. at 546. Despite consideration of this low threshold, after thorough review of the files and records of the case as well as petitioner's Memorandum and the government's Brief in opposition, the court finds the record conclusively shows that petitioner is not entitled to relief. The review of the record demonstrates that petitioner was not prejudiced by his counsel's actions. Therefore, petitioner's Motion will be denied without need for an evidentiary hearing.
a.Timeliness and Propriety of Petitioner's Motion
A § 2255 motion is subject to a one year statute of limitations. In the circumstances present here, that period began to run on "the date on which the judgment of conviction [became] final . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). Petitioner had a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which entered judgment affirming his convictions on April 7, 2009. (ECF No. 417). While petitioner did not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal, this is not dispositive of petitioner's Motion because "there is no procedural default for failure to raise an ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal." Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 503 (2003). Petitioner did not file a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States appealing the court of appeals' decision. As such, his time to petition for certiorari expired on July 6, 2009. (Mot. at 5 (ECF No. 453)). In establishing when petitioner's judgment becomes "final" for the purposes of filing a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the statute of limitations begins to run from "the date on which the defendant's time for filing a timely petition for certiorari review expires." Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 577 (3d Cir. 1999). Therefore, the one year statute of limitations for petitioner's Motion began to run on July 6, 2009, the date when his judgment became final, and expired one year thereafter.
Notice of petitioner's Motion was filed with the clerk of court on July 7, 2010 (ECF No. 453), which is past the one year limitations period. A federal court hearing a motion for habeas corpus relief may raise issues about the statute of limitations sua sponte. United States v. Bendolph, 409 F.3d 155, 164 (3d Cir. 2005). Petitioner's Motion is nonetheless timely because it: (1) was deposited in his confining correctional institution's internal mailing system on or before the last day for filing; and (2) sufficiently sets forth pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 a signed statement containing the date of deposit within the mail system (July 4, 2010) and certification that first-class postage has been prepaid. See FED. R. GOVERNING § 2255 CASES 3(d). Petitioner maintains this basis for timeliness in his Motion (Mot. at 5), and the government does not dispute this issue in its Brief in opposition. Therefore, petitioner's Motion is not barred by either his failure to litigate his ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal or by the one year statute of limitations.
A substantial portion of petitioner's Memorandum is devoted in essence to again attacking the sufficiency of the evidence against him to support his convictions, as well as the propriety of his two-point sentencing guidelines enhancement for obstruction of justice. Both issues, however, were already raised on direct appeal and found to be without merit by the court of appeals. See Travillion, 321 F. App'x at 156-59. Although petitioner presents his claim before the court in the form of a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, this court notes that given the substance of the underlying allegations within his Motion, petitioner essentially is attempting to relitigate these same issues yet again. This time his arguments, however, are couched in terms of his counsel's alleged deficiencies, rather than the deficiencies of this court (in giving its jury instructions and sentencing petitioner) or the trial jury (in weighing the evidence as presented). "A section 2255 petition is not a substitute for an appeal . . . nor may it be used to relitigate matters decided adversely on appeal. . . ." Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073, 1074-75 (3d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). While it is problematic that this court must parse petitioner's arguments in light of the inability of petitioner to reargue matters decided against him on appeal, this court will address the merits of the present Motion solely with respect to his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. He cannot relitigate any underlying arguments which were previously denied by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
b.Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
As a § 2255 motion is one for extraordinary habeas corpus relief, "the appropriate inquiry [is] whether the claimed error of law was 'a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice,' and whether 'it . . . present[s] exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent.'" Casper v. Ryan, 822 F.2d 1283, 1288 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)). In petitioner's Motion, he alleges that the error of law was his deprivation of effective assistance of counsel. (Mot. at 3-4 (ECF No. 453)).
In order to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, petitioner must satisfy the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
Petitioner's burden on the deficiency prong is to show that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390-91 (2000) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). The proper standard for evaluating objective reasonableness is, as a general guideline, "reasonably effective assistance" under "prevailing professional norms." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89. The Court in Strickland has explicitly declined any further specificity. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held (prior to Strickland) that these standards ensure "the exercise of the customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place." Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970). Petitioner is not entitled to a "perfect defense" in accordance with this standard and a "perfect defense" is not guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ("[T]he purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal representation. . . . The purpose is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial."); Diggs v. United States, 833 F.2d 439, 446 (3d Cir. 1987) ("In any event the right to effective assistance of counsel does not guarantee that an attorney will never err."); Moore, 432 F.2d at 736 ("Perfection is hardly attainable and certainly is not the general rule."); accord Wise v. Smith, 735 F.2d 735, 739 (2d Cir. 1984).
In evaluating whether a counsel's performance was deficient under these standards, the ultimate conclusion must be reached in light of the totality of the circumstances of counsel's performance as a whole. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. In reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the court must be "highly deferential" to counsel's assistance, without regard to the vantage of hindsight; it must consider the circumstances from counsel's perspective; and it must "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. . . ." Id. at 689. Considerable latitude is afforded to counsel in executing professional judgment under the circumstances in defending clients. "[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable." Id. at 690.
Petitioner's burden on the prejudice prong is to show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Williams, 529 U.S. at 391 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). The inquiry is not whether a different outcome could have been reached; rather, the question of prejudice hinges upon whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993); see Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986) ("The essence of an ineffective-assistance claim is that counsel's unprofessional errors so upset the adversarial balance between defense and prosecution that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict rendered suspect."). Where the evidence is overwhelming in support of the jury's verdict, notwithstanding alleged deficiencies of counsel, it is difficult to conclude that there is a showing of prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96; Buehl v. Vaughn, 166 F.3d 163, 181-82 (3d Cir. 1999); accord Allen v. Chandler, 555 F.3d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 2009) ("even if counsel's performance was deficient, [petitioner] was not prejudiced . . . because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming").
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has directed courts to examine the prejudice prong of the Strickland test before evaluating whether counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient. See McAleese v. Mazurkiewicz, 1 F.3d 159, 170 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Indeed, this Court has read Strickland as requiring the courts to decide first whether the assumed deficient conduct of counsel prejudiced the defendant.") (internal quotations and citations omitted). There is no need to address both prongs if petitioner cannot meet his burden of proof on the other. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. This court will evaluate each ground for ineffective assistance of counsel asserted by petitioner, following the direction of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to address the prejudice prong first, and will discuss the alleged deficiencies of counsel only to the extent necessary.
If petitioner can show prejudice within the meaning of Strickland, petitioner must then demonstrate that counsel's actions were both subjectively and objectively deficient under the circumstances. See Thomas v. Varner, 428 F.3d 491, 499 n.6 (3d Cir. 2005). In Thomas, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit discussed the objective andsubjective facets of the Strickland's deficiency standards:
We have previously considered the subjective and objective facets of the Strickland standard. Compare Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 105 (3d Cir.2002) ("[T]he task of the reviewing court is to take each of the claimed failures and measure them against counsel's stated rationale to determine whether the choices were objectively unreasonable."), with Buehl v. Vaughn, 166 F.3d 163, 176 (3d Cir.1999) (finding that the strategic presumption could not be overcome ...