The opinion of the court was delivered by: Rochelle S. Friedman, Senior Judge
Submitted: August 31, 2012
BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE FRIEDMAN
Jerome A. Loach (Loach) petitions for review of the January 3, 2012, order of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board), which denied Loach's administrative appeal from the Board's decision recommitting him as a convicted parole violator. Loach also filed a motion to strike from the record the notice of charges dated August 26, 2011. We deny the motion to strike and affirm the Board's decision.
On June 20, 1991, Loach received a nine- to thirty-year sentence for third-degree murder and aggravated assault. (C.R. at 29.) The Board paroled Loach on January 10, 2008. (C.R. at 35.) On March 31, 2009, police arrested Loach for a first set of charges.*fn1 (C.R. at 53.) On April 1, 2009, the Board detained Loach pending disposition of the criminal charges. (C.R. at 47.) On January 4, 2010, authorities arrested Loach for a second set of charges.*fn2 (C.R. at 64.) On November 9, 2010, a municipal court judge dismissed the first set of charges. (C.R. at 62-63.)
On May 27, 2011, a municipal court judge found Loach guilty of criminal conspiracy to engage in robbery, one of the crimes contained in the second set of charges. (C.R. at 122.) Loach received a twenty-five- to fifty-year sentence. (C.R. at 146.) The Board held a parole revocation hearing on August 31, 2011, and recommitted Loach as a convicted parole violator to serve thirty months' backtime. (C.R. at 66, 135.)
Loach filed an administrative appeal on October 14, 2011. (C.R. at 136.) On January 3, 2012, the Board affirmed the decision. (C.R. at 144-45.) Loach filed a petition for review with this court.*fn3
First, Loach claims that the Board denied him due process by failing to hold a preliminary parole revocation hearing when the first set of charges was dismissed. A preliminary parole revocation hearing should be held within thirty days of the parolee's detention. See 37 Pa. Code §71.3(9) (incorporating procedures of 37 Pa. Code §71.2(1-8)). However, the procedures mandated by section 71.3 apply only to a parolee "not already detained after appropriate hearings for other criminal charges or technical violations." 37 Pa. Code §71.3; see also Jones v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 952 A.2d 710, 712 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (analyzing procedural requirements for a technical parole violation under 37 Pa. Code §71.2). "[A] preliminary [parole] revocation hearing need not be conducted if the parolee has been given a preliminary hearing on the charges for the offenses he allegedly committed while on parole." Gant v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 380 A.2d 510, 512 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1977).
Loach received a preliminary hearing pursuant to Pa. R. Crim. P. 543, establishing a prima facie case for the second set of charges on January 4, 2010, and was held for court. (C.R. at 64-65.) Loach did not post bail and he remained detained in the Philadelphia county prison. (C.R. at 61, 117.) The primary purpose of a preliminary parole revocation hearing is to prevent an unwarranted loss of liberty. See Leese v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 570 A.2d 641, 644 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990). A finding of probable cause at a preliminary hearing pursuant to Pa. R. Crim. P. 543 adequately protects against the possibility of an unwarranted loss of liberty. Because Loach received a preliminary hearing pursuant to Pa. R. Crim. P. 543 that addressed the merits of the charges, a preliminary parole revocation hearing would have been redundant and was not constitutionally required.
Additionally, a deficiency at a preliminary parole revocation hearing cannot be alleged after a final parole revocation hearing occurs. See Whittington v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 404 A.2d 782, 783 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979). Even if Loach should have received a preliminary parole revocation hearing, the subsequent final parole revocation hearing makes the issue "a wrong for which there is now no remedy." Id. at 783.
Second, Loach takes the position that, because his notice listed the wrong date of arrest and the wrong court of record, the notice did not meet minimum procedural due process requirements.*fn4 Adequate notice of a parole revocation hearing must be provided to satisfy due process. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (defining minimum requirements of due process for parole revocation). A notice must be clearly sufficient to enable a petitioner to prepare his defense. See 37 Pa. Code §71.4(2); see also Plair v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 521 A.2d 989, 991 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987) (finding notice adequate where it described the time, place, and circumstances of the violation).
The notice of charges received by Loach listed the wrong date of
arrest*fn5 and the wrong court of record;*fn6
however, the notice accurately stated the
appropriate date of conviction, convicted offense, date of sentence,
and bill and term number. Thus, the notice provided sufficient
information to enable Loach to prepare a defense. The mistakes did not
render the notice insufficient to meet procedural due process
Third, Loach argues that the Board did not hold a timely parole revocation hearing. When recommitting a parolee as a convicted parole violator, a parole revocation hearing must be held within 120 days of the date the Board receives official verification of the guilty verdict. See 37 Pa. Code §71.4(1); see also James v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 530 A.2d 1051, 1052 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987). If confined to a Pennsylvania county prison, the clock does not start ticking until "the official verification of the return of the parolee to a State correctional facility." 37 Pa. Code §71.4(1)(i); see Koehler v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 935 A.2d 44, 50 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
Here, Loach first returned to a state correctional facility on August 31, 2011. Loach's parole revocation hearing occurred the same day. (C.R. at 74.) Therefore, the Board satisfied the 120-day requirement. Loach's contention that the 120-day window should have opened on November 9, 2010, the date the first set of charges was dismissed, lacks merit because Loach remained in ...