The opinion of the court was delivered by: Stengel, J.
Plaintiff, CGL purchased a parcel of property from the bankruptcy estate of VistaCare Group, which is administered by Defendant, Mr. Schwab, as Chapter 7 Trustee. VistaCare Group owned a piece of real estate known as Parkside Manor Retirement Community ("Parkside"). The parcel contained 45 lots, 44 of which were zoned and subdivided for mobile homes. The forty-fifth lot ("Lot 45") contained a retirement and assisted living facility.
On July 25 2008, the Trustee filed a motion in the bankruptcy court seeking authorization to sell Parkside Manor, either as one parcel or as two separate parcels. The court granted this motion on August 21, 2008. On September 27, 2008, after a public auction, CGL entered into an agreement for the purchase of Lot 45 free from a restriction located in the subdivision plan (Restriction No. 1).*fn1
At the time, the remaining 44 lots were all subject to Restriction No. 1. The Trustee concluded that his administration of the estate required liquidating the remaining 44 lots in the parcel. The bankruptcy court approved the sale of these lots in an order issued August 21, 2008. Before such sales could be made, the Trustee discovered that some lot owners had permanently affixed mobile homes to the debtor's property. The Trustee filed adversary actions against these homeowners. The parties resolved these actions by agreeing that the lots could be sold to the homeowners in violation of Restriction No. 1. The estate sold all but one of these lots to the residents after providing separate notice to all necessary parties, including CGL. Subsequently, On December 14, 2009Mr. Schwab and East Cocalico Township abrogated the deed restrictions in the subdivision plan of the remaining lots and Mr. Schwab sold them to approximately thirty (30) individuals. Though CGL received notice of the sale and an opportunity to object, CGL did not do so. During bankruptcy proceedings, CGL and its attorney admitted they were aware of the pending sale and did not attempt to restrict it.
GCL alleges that the sales of individual lots in violation of Restriction No. 1 were unlawful and caused damage to CGL's property interests in Lot 45, and the agreement between the Trustee and the Township was an attempt to deprive CGL of its property rights without notice and without due process of law.
On July 30, 2010, after these sales, CGL filed a Motion for Leave in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, seeking to file a suit against Mr. Schwab, which was granted. Thereafter, Mr. Schwab appealed that decision, which was affirmed by Judge Munley of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Mr. Schwab then appealed Judge Munley's Decision to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The Third Circuit affirmed the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court permitting suit against Mr. Schwab.
Pending a ruling by the Third Circuit, CGL filed this suit in the Lancaster Court of Common Pleas and Mr. Schwab removed the case on July 21, 2011. Mr. Schwab then filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Stay the Action filed in this court. (Doc. No. 3). That motion was granted without prejudice so that Plaintiff could join necessary parties to the action. After Plaintiff joined necessary parties in an Amended Complaint, Plaintiff filed leave to Amend its Complaint. Defendant then filed this motion to dismiss the case, or in the alternative, to stay the case pending resolution of the Third Circuit Appeal.*fn2
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted examines the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The factual allegations must be sufficient to make the claim for relief more than just speculative. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss, a federal court must construe the complaint liberally, accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id.; see also D.P. Enters. v. Bucks County Cmty. Coll., 725 F.2d 943, 944 (3d Cir. 1984).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a plaintiff to plead in detail all of the facts upon which he bases his claim. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. Rather, the Rules require a "short and plain statement" of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Id. The "complaint must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564. Neither "bald assertions" nor "vague and conclusory allegations" are accepted as true. See Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997); Sterling v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 897 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. Pa. 1995). The claim must contain enough factual matters to suggest the required elements of the claim or to "raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of" those elements. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Mr. Schwab alleges that CGL's complaint should be dismissed based on immunity grounds. He argues that CGL was aware of the pending sales and did not object. CGL also knew that the Trustee sought to remove the restriction from the 44 lots and did not object. Moreover, the bankruptcy court approved the Trustee's actions ...