The opinion of the court was delivered by: McVerry, J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Now pending before the Court are three*fn1 related appeals from a Memorandum Opinion and Order issued by United States Bankruptcy Judge Bernard Markovitz on February 7, 2012. The genesis of the underlying dispute was the dissolution of the law firm of Titus and McConomy ("T&M"), and the resulting breach of its commercial lease over a dozen years ago. The debtor in this bankruptcy case, Thomas Arbogast, was a partner at T&M and is subject to a judgment in favor of the lessee ("Trizec"). In an attempt to enforce its judgment, Trizec filed a fraudulent transfer action against Arbogast and his wife Mary Clair Arbogast ("Mrs. Arbogast") (collectively "the Arbogasts") on April 23, 2007 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania (the "Fraudulent Transfer Action"). Arbogast filed a Chapter 7 petition in January 2010; the Fraudulent Transfer Action was removed to the Bankruptcy Court; and the Bankruptcy Trustee was substituted for Trizec as the Plaintiff. After lengthy proceedings, Judge Markovitz ultimately entered judgment in favor of the Trustee and against the Arbogasts in the amount of $143,389.10. Both sides have filed appeals.
Factual and Procedural Background
The procedural history of this matter is complicated but the parties agree that the underlying facts are not in dispute. Arbogast was a partner at T&M. When that firm dissolved, Arbogast began working at the law firm of Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis, LLP ("Schnader"). His compensation from Schnader was directly deposited into a checking account that Arbogast held jointly with his wife as tenants by the entireties.
After prolonged litigation in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, Trizec obtained a $2.7 million judgment against Arbogast and other former partners of the T&M law firm. In April 2007, Trizec filed the Fraudulent Transfer Action against the Arbogasts in an effort to enforce the judgment. The gravamen of the Fraudulent Transfer Action was that each direct deposit of Arbogast's salary income into the joint checking account constituted an actual or constructive fraudulent transfer pursuant to the Pennsylvania Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("PUFTA"), 12 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101 et seq. Trizec's judgment against Arbogast was subsequently reversed by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. In response, Trizec voluntarily discontinued the Fraudulent Transfer Action without prejudice.
In 2009, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court and reinstated Trizec's judgment against Arbogast. On January 15, 2010, Arbogast filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 7 relief in bankruptcy. On February 3, 2010 -- in violation of the automatic stay in bankruptcy -- Trizec obtained an order from the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County to re-activate the Fraudulent Transfer Action.*fn2 On February 23, 2010 Arbogast removed the Fraudulent Transfer Action, and it became an Adversary Proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court. The Trustee was substituted as a party-plaintiff in June 2010 and the case was assigned to former Bankruptcy Judge M. Bruce McCullough (since deceased).
There was considerable wrangling over the burden of proof and scope of the evidence, including a motion for sanctions. In a pretrial ruling, Judge McCullough precluded the Trustee from introducing evidence of each payment into the joint checking account. Instead, he ordered the Trustee to identify the transfers out of the joint checking account which were alleged to be improper. Eventually, the Trustee identified five such groups of disbursements which totaled approximately $900,000. Presently at issue are two of these groups of disbursements -- sums applied in payment for memberships in three different country clubs, and disbursements relating to a second home in Florida. A two-day hearing was held in October 2010 before Judge McCullough. Unfortunately, Judge McCullough died before a decision was rendered.
The case was re-assigned to Judge Markovitz, who determined that a retrial was necessary. It is apparent that the parties disagree as to the scope of the retrial and/or the continued effect of "stipulations" or understandings the parties had reached with respect to the original trial conducted by Judge McCullough. Judge Markovitz conducted an evidentiary hearing in April 2011. On February 7, 2012, he issued a 74-page Memorandum Opinion and Order of Court.
There are five issues raised in the consolidated appeals. In Civil Action No. 12-353, the Trustee appeals two discrete legal issues: (1) the length of the "look-back period"; and (2) who bore the burden of proof as to whether the funds were used to purchase necessities. Separate, but identical, appeals were filed by the Arbogasts at Civil Action Nos. 12-401 and 12-402 because Judge Markovitz's Order resolved both the Fraudulent Transfer Action and objections to exemptions claimed in the underlying bankruptcy proceeding. The Arbogasts appeal three aspects of Judge Markovitz's decision: (1) the test for determining what expenditures constitute fraudulent transfers; (2) whether the expenditures on country club memberships were properly determined; and (3) whether the expenditures on a Florida second-home were properly determined. The Court will address these issues seriatim.
The Trustee argues on appeal that because the state court complaint alleged a continuing violation and sought injunctive relief into the future, the Trustee is able to recover all fraudulent transfers made from April 2003 through trial (i.e., a seven-year period). The Arbogasts contend that Judge Markovitz applied the correct look-back period and that the Trustee limited her claim at trial.
The Court agrees with the Arbogasts on the ground that the Trustee limited her claim to the 2003-2007 time period. The original state court complaint in the Fraudulent Transfer Action did allege a continuing violation and did seek to enjoin further transfers of funds by Arbogast. However, at the outset of the trial before Judge McCullough on October 14, 2010, there was a specific discussion of the time period covered by the Trustee's claims in this case. Judge McCullough asked whether anyone disputed that a four-year period was at issue. Counsel for the Trustee agreed. Judge McCullough then confirmed: "So, we're dealing with four years back from the date of the filing of the complaint? Is that right?" Counsel for the Trustee responded: "Correct, your Honor. And that would be four years back from the date of the filing would be April 23rd of 2003, which is why you see that date on some of Mr. Venetia's exhibits." Thus, the Trustee clearly limited its claims to the 2003-2007 time period -- she did not seek damages beyond 2007, as she now maintains. The Court and opposing party proceeded based on that representation and premise.
There is no evidence that the Trustee expanded the scope of its claim during the retrial. Before Judge Markovitz, the Trustee continued to advocate a look-back period from April 2003-April 2007, while the Arbogasts objected and advocated a look-back period from January 2006-January 2010.*fn3 Judge Markovitz observed that the period proposed by the Trustee was actually more favorable to the Arbogasts and deemed the dispute "largely academic." Opinion at 16-17, 20. He implemented the 2003-2007 look-back period. In sum, ...