The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. John E. Jones III
THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:
Presently pending before the Court is Defendant Daniel Hamm's pro se Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (doc. 136), filed on May 9, 2011.*fn1 The Government filed a Response and Brief in Opposition (doc. 139) on August 11, 2011. The Defendant filed a Motion (doc. 141) for an extension of time to file a reply brief, and the Court issued an Order (doc. 145) granting the Defendant's motion and extending the period for filing a response brief until January 31, 2012; however, the Defendant failed to file a reply brief. Thus, this matter is ripe for our review. For the reasons that follow, the Motion shall be denied.
On September 5, 2007, a multiple count Indictment was returned charging the Defendant, Daniel Hamm, ("Defendant" or "Hamm") and his wife, Darlene Hamm, with the following crimes: conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride and more than five (5) grams of a substance containing cocaine base (Count I, against both Hamm and his wife); distribution of and possession with intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride and more than five (5) grams of a substance containing cocaine base (Counts II and III, against Hamm and his wife, respectively); and felon in possession of a firearm (Count IV, against Hamm alone). Hamm pled guilty to Counts II and IV on March 18, 2008. (Doc. 57). Pursuant to the plea agreement (doc. 39), the Government moved to dismiss the remaining count against Hamm following sentencing.
The Court engaged in a careful and deliberate Rule 11 colloquy with Hamm during the plea proceeding. (Plea Transcript, Doc. 82, at 8:1-12:12). At that proceeding, Hamm was represented by court-appointed counsel, L. Rex Bickley, Esquire ("Bickley"). Hamm affirmed that he understood that the maximum sentence accompanying his guilty plea was thirty (30) years of imprisonment, and that the Court has discretion to sentence him up to and including that maximum sentence. (Id. at 9:22-10:2, 14:11-20, 18:2-9). Hamm stated that he understood that the Government's sentencing recommendations as outlined in the plea agreement are not binding upon the Court. (Id. at 13:9-23). He also stated that he understood that the Court would apply the Sentencing Guidelines, which, taking into account the Defendant's likely career offender designation, the nature and scope of his offense, and the recommended reduction for acceptance of responsibility, would yield a sentencing of approximately fifteen (15) years or 151 months. (Id. at 15:16-16:22). Hamm stated that he was satisfied with the representation he had received from Bickley and that he was entering the guilty plea of his own free will. (Id. at 5:10-13, 18:20-23).
Thereafter, on April 21, 2008, Hamm filed a pro se Motion to Remove Counsel (doc. 59). This Court granted said motion by Order (doc. 60) dated April 24, 2008, and appointed substitute counsel. Through counsel, Hamm then filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea (doc. 78) on August 20, 2008, but subsequently withdrew that motion on October 8, 2008 (see doc. 97). On November 19, 2008, this Court sentenced Hamm to a 170-month term of imprisonment. (Doc. 102). Hamm appealed this judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which upheld the sentence on May 5, 2010. (Doc. 117).
On May 9, 2011, Hamm filed the instant pro se Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (doc. 136). The Government filed a Response and Brief in Opposition (doc. 139) on August 11, 2011. Hamm filed a Motion (doc. 141) for an extension of time to file a reply brief, which the Court granting, extending the time for Hamm to reply until January 31, 2012. Despite this extension, Hamm has failed to file a reply.
In his Motion, Hamm raises ineffective assistance of counsel claims as his
sole ground for relief. His arguments are summarized as follows: that Bickley was ineffective for failure to challenge the constitutionality of the government's search and seizure; that Bickley coerced Hamm into pleading guilty by inaccurately predicting the guideline range and failing to advise of his probable career offender status; and that Bickley was ineffective for failure to challenge the trial court's jurisdiction over the crimes charged. (Doc. 137).
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Standard
In order to successfully demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must establish that (1) the performance of counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) the errors of counsel prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-92, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). The first prong of the Strickland test requires the defendant show that counsel's performance was actually deficient. Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 282 (3d Cir. 2001). A court "deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of the counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Counsel's conduct presumptively "falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance," and the defendant "must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Id. at 689-90 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 93, 76 S. Ct. 158, 100 L. Ed. 83 (1955)).
The second prong of the Strickland test requires the defendant show that the deficient performance so prejudiced the defense as to raise doubt as to the accuracy of the outcome of the trial or sentence. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94. The petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Jermyn, 266 F.3d at 282 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). A "reasonable ...