The opinion of the court was delivered by: O'neill, J.
Plaintiff Jemill Bantum filed her pro se amended complaint against defendants Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., MERSCORP, Merscorp Meritor Savings Bank, Meritor Financial Inc., First American Title Insurance Company, Mellon Mortgage Company, Mellon Bank N.A., Credit Based Asset Servicing and Securitization, LLC (C-BASS), Litton Loan Servicing, LP,*fn1 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,*fn2 C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2002-CB1 (U.S. Bank, N.A. Trustee), PHH Mortgage Services, U.S. Bank National Association, CitiMortgage, LSR Processing, DOCX and Lender Processing Services. Bantum seeks damages based on three claims: (1) breach of contract, (2) "promissory note" and (3) tortious interference with contractual relationship. Jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship.
I have before me six motions to dismiss, which were filed by: Litton and U.S. Bank; Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and MERSCORP; CitiMortgage; LSR Processing; Lender Processing Services and DOCX; and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., First American Title Insurance Company, Mellon Bank N.A., Mellon Mortgage Company, PHH Mortgage Services, Golbeck McCafferty & McKeever and Joseph A. Goldbeck, Jr.*fn3 Also before me are plaintiff's response to the motions and LSR Processing's reply. For the reasons that follow I will dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint.
On November 15, 1991, plaintiff entered into a mortgage contract with Meritor Savings Bank. Am. Compl., General Factual Allegations, ¶ 1.*fn4
The mortgage contract contained the following applicable provision:
The Note or a partial interest in the Note (together with this Security Instrument) may be sold one or more times without prior notice to Borrower. A sale may result in a change in the entity (known as the "Loan Servicer") that collects monthly payments due under the Note and the Security Instrument. There also may be one or more changes of the Loan Servicer unrelated to a sale of the Note.
Pl.'s Ex. 6, Mortgage ¶ 19. From approximately 1993 to 2002, plaintiff's mortgage was transferred to many of the defendants in a series of transactions. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4-14. As a result, most of the defendants had some interest in plaintiff's mortgage during this time period.
However, plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting that CitiMortgage, First American Title Insurance Company, LSR Processing, Lender Processing Services and DOCX held any interest in plaintiff's mortgage. In fact, notwithstanding the case caption, these five defendants are not mentioned in plaintiff's amended complaint. Although her allegations are unclear, it appears that plaintiff contends that the transfers and assignments of her mortgage were improper. She avers, "[a]s a direct result of the . . . lack of management in transferring and purchasing of plaintiff's mortgage, plaintiff incurred judgments, liens, and bad credit against her property and name." Am. Compl., General Factual Allegations ¶ 19.
Plaintiff brings three claims based on these alleged improper assignments of her mortgage. First, she contends that defendants breached the mortgage contract causing plaintiff to suffer "substantial money damages." Am. Compl., Count One ¶¶ 5-6. Second, she alleges that defendants owe her money based on a promissory note, causing her to lose the "secured promissory note and title to her property." Am. Compl., Count Two ¶¶ 6, 9. Finally, plaintiff contends that "[d]efendants intentionally, without justified procurement and without jurisdiction interfered with plaintiff's relationship with her original Lender by assigning themselves directly to her mortgage." Am. Compl., Count Three ¶ 6.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss all or part of an action for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Typically, "a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations," though plaintiff's obligation to state the grounds of entitlement to relief "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. (citations omitted). The complaint must state "'enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary element." Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 321 (3d Cir. 2008), quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. The Court of Appeals has made clear that after Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1955 (2009), "conclusory or 'bare-bones' allegations will no longer survive a motion to dismiss: 'threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.' To prevent dismissal, all civil complaints must now set out 'sufficient factual matter' to show that the claim is facially plausible." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009), quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. The Court also set forth a two-part analysis for reviewing motions to dismiss in light of Twombly and Iqbal: "First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a 'plausible claim for relief.'" Id. at 210-11, quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. The Court explained, "a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to 'show' such an entitlement with its facts." Id., citing Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2008). "Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged--but it has not 'show[n]'--'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
Where, as here, the plaintiff has filed her complaint pro se, courts will apply "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Notwithstanding the requirement of liberal construction, a pro se plaintiff must still state a claim upon which relief can be ...