The opinion of the court was delivered by: Magistrate Judge Carlson
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case presents another chapter in a three-year legal saga involving a putative class plaintiff in search of a class. This case comes before the court on a discovery motion filed by the Plaintiff, who alleges that he represents a class which he has not yet been able to define with precision after three years of litigation. Now pending before the court is Plaintiff Brian Tech's motion to compel the United States and four third-party companies to comply with an order of the district court that re-opened discovery in this putative class action. (Doc. 171) These discovery requests, while presented as both limited and targeted, are in fact the prelude to a massive cross check of very private information held in industry and government data bases pertaining to millions of individuals. Tech invites us to begin this burdensome and invasive process, with the goal of having these agencies and entities produce what would be essentially a mailing list for Tech to use in trying the identify his putative class of plaintiffs for his lawsuit. The motion is fully briefed and is ripe for adjudication.
For the reasons explained below, the motion will be denied because the discovery that the Plaintiff seeks to take is overly burdensome, implicates substantial privacy considerations of individuals having no relationship to this action, and is certain to lead to far greater, and more problematic discovery that the district court never contemplated when it permitted Tech to attempt "the limited discovery" that Tech requested. (Doc. 156) (original emphasis.) Moreover, it is clear that in order to have even theoretical relevance to class certification, the discovery Tech seeks would then have to rely upon the United States being compelled to take actions that either have no basis or would actually violate federal law. Because Tech's "limited" discovery is, in fact, far reaching, overly burdensome to parties and non-parties, contrary to law, and ultimately futile, we find that the Plaintiff's motion to compel should be denied.
This case is a putative class action brought by Plaintiff Brian Tech on behalf of himself and others allegedly similarly situated against the United States of America for the alleged failure to notify individuals who did not file a federal income tax return in 2006 about their entitlement to a refund of the federal excise tax ("FET") on telephone communication services. Tech contends that this alleged failure to give proper notice amounts to a due process violation. This litigation has now been ongoing for more than three years, and the Plaintiff has twice been rebuffed by the district court in his efforts to obtain class certification. (Docs. 103, 121) Plaintiff moved for clarification or reconsideration of the second of these orders, (Doc. 124), and the district court denied this motion on October 31, 2011. (Doc. 130)
Undeterred, on November 3, 2011, the Plaintiff moved the district court to reopen discovery for what he represented was the limited purpose of serving subpoenas on four major telephone carriers -- Verizon Wireless, AT&T Inc., T-Mobile, and Sprint Nextel (collectively the "Carriers"), all of whom are non-parties to this litigation -- for the purpose of learning whether these carriers maintained records relating to residential customers that might be utilized to identify potential class members.*fn1 (Doc. 131) In his brief in support of the motion, Tech requested that he be given a brief period of 60 days in which to conduct "this targeted discovery." (Doc. 132) In support of his motion, the Plaintiff provided the court with a draft subpoena that he claimed would enable him to discover sufficient information from the Carriers to support a third motion for class certification, and Tech represented that if he did not obtain sufficient or complete answers to the subpoena duces tecum, he would propose to take Rule 30(b)(6) depositions of the Carriers.
On February 7, 2012, the district court granted Tech "leave to conduct the limited discovery he proposes." (Doc. 156) (original emphasis.) In its order, the court authorized Tech to serve a subpoena duces tecum on each of the Carriers within ten days from the date of the order, and to notice Rule 30(b)(6) depositions if the information or documents produced in response to the subpoenas was incomplete. (Doc. 156) The district court also directed Tech to file a status report within 75 days of the date of the order. (Id.)
Tech served the carriers with subpoenas on or about February 9, 2012, and a series of intractable problems quickly emerged. Thus, on March 19, 2012, Plaintiff's counsel wrote to the district court to explain that the Carriers had expressed concerns with the discovery because it sought confidential business and customer information. (Doc. 158, at 2) Plaintiff's counsel endeavored to draft an acceptable confidentiality order that could be entered, but that gave rise to concerns on the part of the United States, whose counsel reportedly indicated it would not agree to such an order. (Id.) Plaintiff's counsel thus requested an opportunity for the parties to confer with the court to address the concerns of the Carriers and the United States, to have a confidentiality order entered, and to be given an additional 25 days in which to conduct the discovery. (Id.)
Recognizing the increasingly problematic nature of the Plaintiff's discovery requests, which were transmogrifying from "limited" and "targeted" discovery to a nationwide, multi-faceted, multi-party dispute that could potentially affect millions of individuals, on March 20, 2012, the district court referred this discovery dispute to the undersigned. (Doc. 159)*fn2 Promptly thereafter, counsel for the United States submitted a responsive letter to the court, explaining that the United States opposed Tech's proposed confidentiality order because: (1) the blanket protections that would be provided by the order were facially inappropriate; (2) good cause did not exist for protection of the subpoenaed documents; and (3) the proposed order contained provisions to which the United States simply could not agree, such as limitations on the United States' law enforcement function that might be exercised based upon information potentially obtained from the documents themselves. (Doc. 160)
In an effort to resolve the burgeoning dispute, the court convened a telephone conference with the parties and the Carriers on March 26, 2012. (Doc. 161) Following this conference, the court directed the parties to further consult with one another and to report back to the court by April 9, 2012, regarding the status of the discovery dispute. (Id.) On April 9, 2012, counsel for Verizon Communications Inc. wrote to inform the court that despite good faith efforts, a number of intractable disputes remained, and counsel represented that Verizon objected to the Plaintiff's requested discovery on the grounds that the discovery created an unacceptable burden on the carrier, and implicated issues of privacy, confidentiality, and corporate proprietary information. (Doc. 162) Furthermore, the Carrier expressed concern regarding how the Plaintiff's discovery requests would ultimately play out, as the discovery process now appeared certain to lead to even more serious disputes and much more problematic discovery proceedings. (Id.) Presented with this growing and cascading array of legal complications which were leading this discovery effort far afield from the "limited" and "targeted" approach initially authorized by the court, the district court referred the dispute outlined in Verizon's letter to this court for resolution. (Doc. 163)
Following the submission of additional letters from the parties (Doc. 165, 166), the court convened a second telephone conference with the parties and the Carriers on April 17, 2012, to discuss the impasse that had arisen in response to Tech's proposed discovery. (Doc. 170) Following this call, the court entered an order authorizing the Plaintiff to file a motion to compel if he could not negotiate a resolution with the Carriers by May 1, 2012. (Doc. 171)
As it turns out, the Plaintiff could not secure any agreement with the Carriers regarding their concerns with, and objections to, the discovery that had been propounded upon them. Accordingly, the Plaintiff filed a motion to compel compliance with the district court's February 7, 2012 order, which had reopened discovery in this case. (Doc. 172) On the same day, Tech filed a brief in support of the motion. (Doc. 173) The United States and each of the Carriers subsequently filed briefs opposing the motion. (Docs. 183, 184, 185, 186, 187) Tech filed a reply brief in further support of his motion on May 31, 2012. (Doc. 188) The motion is now ripe for adjudication, and for the reasons that follow the motion will be denied.
A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and 37
Tech has styled his motion as one seeking to compel compliance with the district court's February 7, 2012 order re-opening discovery for a limited period of time to permit Tech to propound discovery requests upon the third-party Carriers. Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery. The motion must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1).*fn3
Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defines both the scope and limitations governing the use of discovery in a federal civil action:
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense -- including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Tech's motion, and the United States' and Carriers' responses in opposition to this motion, call upon the court to exercise its authority under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure to regulate discovery in this case. Issues relating to the scope of discovery permitted under the Rules rest in the sound discretion of the court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). A court's decisions regarding the conduct of discovery will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983).
This far-reaching discretion extends to rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585 (D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , "courts in this district have determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an abuse of discretion standard." Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224 F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States, 943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate judge's discovery ruling "is entitled to great deference and is reversible only for abuse of discretion." Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999) (holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. Thus, at the outset, it is clear that Rule 26's broad definition of that which can be obtained through discovery reaches only "non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense." Therefore, valid claims of privilege still cabin and restrict the court's discretion in ruling on discovery issues. Furthermore, the scope of discovery permitted by Rule 26 embraces all "relevant information" a concept which is defined in the following terms: "Relevant information need not be admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
In addition, Rule 26(b)(2)(C) provides certain express limitations on discovery, even if the discovery is arguably relevant:
(C) When Required. On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or ...