The opinion of the court was delivered by: Tucker, J.
Presently before this Court is Defendant Cephalon, Inc.'s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's March 23, 2011 Order, or, in the Alternative, for Certification of that Order for Interlocutory Appeal Under 28 U.S.C. §1292 (Doc. 276), Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition thereto (Doc. 280), Defendant Cephalon, Inc.'s Notice of Supplemental Authority Regarding Cephalon's Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 323), Plaintiffs' Response thereto (Doc. 325), and correspondence from both parties concerning the above motion. Upon consideration of the parties' motions with exhibits and declarations, this Court will deny Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's March 23, 2011 Order, or, in the Alternative, for Certification of that Order for Interlocutory Appeal.
The above-captioned matter concerns Defendant Cephalon Inc.'s, ("Cephalon") off-label marketing of its drug, Actiq, intended and approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") for the treatment of pain in late stage cancer patients. Plaintiffs at issue, the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission ("PTC") and Indiana Carpenters WelfareFund (ICWF), initiated this class action pursuant to the Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL") 28 U.S.C.§1332, and the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act ("IDCSA") 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(1)(B), seeking to recover damages for Cephalon's alleged violations of these state consumer protection laws through its off label sales and marketing efforts surrounding Actiq, a highly addictive drug. A more detailed description of the factual background is available in this Court's Memorandum Opinion, dated March 23, 2011. In re Actiq Sales & Mktg. Practices Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30749 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2011).
Although the UPTCPL and the IDCSA both allow private individuals to bring suit against an offending individual or entity, there is a requirement of reliance that must be fulfilled. On June 28, 2010, Defendant Cephalon filed motions for summary judgment against Plaintiffs PTC and ICWF. (Docs. 231, 232). In said motions, Defendant Cephalon argued that Plaintiffs' UTPCPL and IDCSA claims failed as a matter of law, and that no genuine issue of material fact remained, arguing the following (1) Plaintiffs failed to show reliance on misrepresentation made by Defendant; (2) the record lacked evidence of a cognizable injury due to Defendant's conduct; (3) Plaintiffs failed to satisfy additional state consumer protection statutory requirements; and (4) as a result of the unsustainable state consumer protection claims, Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claims must also fail.
On March 23, 2011, after reviewing the records, the Court entered an Order and accompanying Memorandum Opinion denying Defendant Cephalon's summary judgment motions. (Docs. 274, 275). The Court found that under the applicable state laws of Pennsylvania and Indiana, there remained genuine issues of material fact concerning whether Defendant's off label marketing efforts rose to a level that caused the inappropriate prescribing of Actiq, and resulting payments by Plaintiffs for such prescriptions. Subsequently, on April 7, 2011, Cephalon filed the instant motion for reconsideration, or in the alternative, interlocutory appeal. (Doc. 276).
In its motion for reconsideration, Cephalon argues that the Court committed error by: (1) failing to address Cephalon's argument that Plaintiffs' assertions that Defendant's mere acts of off-label marketing or FDA regulatory violations are unsupportable under the IDCSA or the UTPCPL; (2) overlooking the fact that Plaintiffs offered no evidence proving reliance by an individual on a false or misleading statement made by Cephalon concerning Actiq; and (3) misinterpreting the appropriate standard for third party payors to prove economic injury due to payments for prescription drugs. Alternatively, Cephalon requests that if this Court declines reconsideration of its denial of Cephalon's motion for summary judgment, that the Court certify this matter for interlocutory appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b).
"A motion for reconsideration is a device of limited utility." Dougherty v. Farmers New Century Ins. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26058 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2007). The purpose of a motion for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or present newly discovered evidence. Mash v. Twp. of Haverford Dep't of Codes Enforcement, No. 06-4479, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67265, at *6 (E.D. Pa. 2007). Therefore, a motion for reconsideration will be granted if the moving party can demonstrate one of the following: 1) an intervening change in the controlling law; 2) the availability of new evidence that was not available previously; or 3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact to prevent manifest injustice. Max's Seafood Cafe v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reins. Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)). However, motions for reconsideration should be granted sparingly "because courts have a strong interest in the finality of judgments." Douris v. Schweiker, 229 F. Supp. 2d 391, 408 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (quoting Cont'l Casualty Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 884 F. Supp. 937, 943 (E.D. Pa. 1995)).
The Supreme Court has held that a finding of clear error requires a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). To show clear error or manifest injustice, the moving party "must base its motion on arguments that were previously raised but were overlooked by the Court." United States v. Jasin, 292 F. Supp. 2d 670, 676 (E.D. Pa. 2003). However, "parties are not free to relitigate issues that the Court has already decided." Id. (citing Smith v. City of Chester, 155 F.R.D. 95, 97 (E.D. Pa. 1994)). See also Glendon Energy Co. v. Borough of Glendon, 836 F. Supp. 1109, 1122 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Rottmund v. Cont'l Assurance Co., 813 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 (E.D. Pa. 1992). "It is improper on a motion for reconsideration to ask the court to rethink what it has already thought through -- rightly or wrongly." Lischner v. Upper Darby Twp, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54528, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (citing Glendon Energy Co. v. Borough of Glendon, 836 F. Supp. 1109, 1122 (E.D. Pa. 1993)).
A. Intervening Change in Controlling Law
Defendant Cephalon, in undocketed communications with this Court, avers that the Third Circuit's ruling in the case of In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, No. 10-3046 and 10-3047, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9832 (3d Cir. May 16, 2012) serves as controlling law in this instance. The Third Circuit, in Schering Plough, analyzes the standing of third party payors and individual patient consumers in their putative class action claims, pursuant to federal and state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") laws, and other state laws, against Defendant, a manufacturer of pharmaceuticals, for off-label marketing of drugs. Id. at *1. However, this Court finds that Schering Plough fails to qualify as an intervening change in controlling law, as its disposition was narrow and inapplicable to the facts at hand. To be certain, the Court notes that the Third Circuit, in its affirmation of the District Court of New Jersey's decisions, addressed the district court's grant of motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and the substance of Amended Complaints submitted by third party payor plaintiffs and one individual consumer plaintiff. Id. at *11-14. The ...