Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Miriam Rovner, Individually and By and v. Keystone Human Services Corporation

May 24, 2012


The opinion of the court was delivered by: (Judge Conner)


Presently before the court is the motion of defendants (Doc. 43) Keystone Human Services Corporation, Dennis W. Felty, Charles J. Hooker, III, Janet K. Kelley, Ann H. Moffitt, Michael Powanda, Patricia Sipe, Ann Marie Mellett, and Jolene Fogelsanger (collectively, "Keystone"), filed April 20, 2012, to seal the entire record in the above captioned matter, and to further require that all future filings in this case be filed under seal. (Id. at 1). Plaintiff Miriam Rovner, by and through her parents and Next Friends Neil and Nina Rovner, has submitted a brief in opposition to this motion (Doc. 56), filed May 9, 2012. With the filing of Keystone's reply brief (Doc. 59), filed May 15, 2012, the matter is fully briefed and is ripe for decision. Rovner also requests the unsealing of certain documents entered into evidence at the sealed hearing on Rovner's motion for a preliminary injunction. For the reasons stated herein, the court will deny Keystone's motion to seal the record, and deny as moot Rovner's request to unseal exhibits introduced at the injunction hearing.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This motion arises out of a complaint (Doc.1) filed by Rovner against Keystone for violation of Rovner's rights under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 795 (2006), and Titles II and III of the Americans with Disabilitites Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. Rovner also brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Rovner moved for a preliminary injunction against Keystone (Doc. 3) on December 19, 2011, asking the court to enjoin Keystone from discharging Rovner from the group home in which she lives. The court held a hearing on this motion on March 22, 2012 (Doc. 29). The hearing and any exhibits entered therein were held under seal in order to protect confidential information -- medical or otherwise -- of nonparty residents at Keystone's group home.

In the instant motion, Keystone asks this court to seal the entire record in the above captioned matter, and to require "the filing of all future documents" to be under seal. (Doc. 48 at 1). In support of their position, they posit that the "pleadings, motions, hearing transcripts, exhibits, and other documents in this case contain confidential personal information about Plaintiff Miriam Rovner and other individuals who reside in her group home," and particularly, that these items may contain confidential medical information protected by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 29 and 42 U.S.C.) (hereinafter HIPAA).

They further aver that, at the March 22, 2012 hearing on Rovner's motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 29), the court explicitly ordered the sealing of the record. (See Doc. 48 at 2) ("[T]he Court ordered the record and the exhibits sealed."); (id. at 3) ("During the testimony of Donna Gaffney, a Keystone employee, Ms. Gaffney indicated that she felt uncomfortable talking about one of the residents of the home. . . . The Court assured Ms. Gaffney that the record is sealed.").

Keystone argues that sealing the record to protect confidential HIPAA information is wholly appropriate; that defendants are not public entities; and that there exist no public health or safety issues in this case that would counsel against limiting public access to the court proceedings. (Id. at 4-5). Further, they posit that they have relied upon the court's representation that the record would be sealed and "spoke freely about sensitive and confidential information that they otherwise would not have." (Id. at 5). And finally, they express surprise that Rovner has "inexplicably" not concurred in their motion to seal, "despite having previously requested that the Court seal the proceedings." (Doc. 43 ¶ 13).

Rovner disagrees with Keystone's characterization of the court's directive at the March 22 hearing, maintaining that the court's statements referred only to sealing the hearing transcript and any exhibits entered therein. (See Doc. 56 at 1-2) ("[T]he proceedings today should be subject to a sealing order . . .") (quoting Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing, Doc. 29 at 18) (statement of the court); (id. at 2) ("We'll seal the order, and obviously that would incorporate the exhibits as well.") (quoting Doc. 29 at 19) (statement of the court). Rovner maintains that, "at all times, Plaintiffs and their counsel operated under the impression that the hearing and the exhibits entered at the injunction hearing were the only documents subject to sealing." (Doc. 56 at 4) (emphasis in original).

Rovner does not dispute that the preliminary injunction hearing and the exhibits entered therein are sealed. (Doc. 56 at 7). However, Rovner observes that four of her exhibits were previously subject to public view because they were attached as part of Rovner's initial Complaint (Doc. 1).*fn1 Consequently, Rovner requests that the court clarify its sealing directive with respect to those four exhibits.

II. Standard of Review

A party seeking to seal court documents from access by the public must demonstrate "good cause" for protecting that material from disclosure. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(C). The Third Circuit has long recognized a right of access to judicial proceedings and to judicial records -- a right that is now "beyond dispute." SeePansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d. Cir. 1994) (quoting Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 677-78 (3d Cir. 1988)). The "good cause" analysis of Rule 26(C) applies whether the request for confidentiality is made "at the discovery stage or any other stage of litigation." Shingara v. Skiles, 420 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786). To establish good cause, the moving party must "specifically demonstrate[] that disclosure will cause a clearly defined and serious injury." Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 484 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786). "Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples" are insufficient to establish good cause to seal proceedings or filings. Id; see also In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 194 (3d Cir. 2001).

The Third Circuit has articulated a number of factors which District Courts may consult in determining the existence of "good cause" for purposes of a confidentiality order:

(1) whether disclosure will violate any privacy interests; (2) whether the information is being sought for a legitimate purpose or for an improper purpose; (3) whether disclosure of the information will cause a party embarrassment; (4) whether confidentiality is being sought over information important to the public health and safety; (5) whether the sharing of information among litigants will promote fairness and efficiency; (6) whether a party benefitting from the ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.