The opinion of the court was delivered by: Rochelle S. Friedman, Senior Judge
BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge
HONORABLE RENEE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE FRIEDMAN
Thomas F. Ribarchak d/b/a Fisher Associates (Fisher) appeals from the June 17, 2011, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County (trial court), which denied Fisher's motion for partial summary judgment and granted the motion for summary judgment of the Municipal Authority of the City of Monongahela (Authority), Galway Bay Corporation (Galway) and Chester Engineers, Inc. (Chester) (collectively, Appellees).*fn1 We affirm.
The Authority, by and through Chester, solicited bids from various contractors for a renovation project for its sewage treatment plant. Galway submitted a bid for the project and included Fisher as a subcontractor. The Authority awarded Galway the contract on November 16, 2000, pending review of the solicitor, engineer and general manager. On April 16, 2001, more than thirty days after Galway's bid was accepted, Galway requested that the Authority consent to the substitution of Kiski Valley Systems (Kiski) as a subcontractor in place of Fisher. According to the contract drawn up in October 2000, between the Authority and Galway, "[n]o substitutions will be accepted after 30 days from the Contract award date." (Contract, 10/00, ¶ D.5, at D-3; R.R. at 19a.)*fn2 However, the Authority agreed to Galway's substitution of Kiski for Fisher.
On October 15, 2001, Fisher filed an action against Appellees claiming breach of contract and negligence. Fisher claimed that it had a valid contract with Galway and the Authority because Galway included Fisher in its general contractor's bid to the Authority and the Authority accepted Galway's bid, which listed Fisher as a subcontractor. Subsequently, Fisher and Appellees filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On June 17, 2011, the trial court denied Fisher's motion for summary judgment and granted Appellees' motion. Fisher now appeals to this court.*fn3
Fisher first contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant it partial summary judgment as to liability because Appellees breached the contract they had with Fisher.
In order to form a contract, there must be an offer, acceptance, and consideration or a mutual meeting of the minds. Yarnall v. Almy, 703 A.2d 535, 538 (Pa. Super. 1997). It is well established that the submission of a bid constitutes an offer and becomes a binding contract when the bid is accepted by the agency. Muncy Area School District v. Gardner, 497 A.2d 683, 686 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985).
Here, Fisher made Galway an "offer" by submitting its bid proposal to Galway to do the instrumentation work for the Authority's sewage treatment plant project. The terms of the offer were set forth in Fisher's bid proposal.
The question now before us is whether Galway accepted Fisher's offer. Initially, Fisher contends that Galway accepted Fisher's bid proposal by using it in Galway's general contractor's bid to the Authority and that this acceptance was further confirmed by the Authority's acceptance of Galway's bid, in which Fisher was named as a subcontractor.
There are no Pennsylvania cases precisely on point. However, many jurisdictions have rejected the notion that the use of a subcontractor's bid by a general contractor constitutes legal acceptance of the bid. See, e.g., Finney Co. v. Monarch Construction Co., 670 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Ky. 1984); Cortland Asbestos Products, Inc. v. J. & K. Plumbing & Heating Co., 304 N.Y.S.2d 694, 696 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969); Plumbing Shop, Inc. v. Pitts, 408 P.2d 382, 386 (Wash. 1965); N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman Construction Co., 319 F.2d 736, ...