The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge Caputo
Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief from the Court's Order to Stay Pending Arbitration. (Doc. 14.) On February 23, 2011, the Court granted the parties' Joint Motion to Stay Pending Arbitration (Doc. 8) as the parties agreed to engage in binding arbitration to resolve the claims in this matter. (Doc. 9.) On February 20, 2012, before any arbitration proceedings were conducted, Plaintiffs filed the present motion for relief from the Court's Order staying the action pending arbitration. Plaintiffs argue that relief from the Arbitration Order is necessary because they have recently become aware of facts that were unknown at the date of the stipulation to arbitrate. This, Plaintiffs assert, constitutes "surprise" and "newly discovered evidence" under Rule 60(b)(1), (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and warrants relief from the Arbitration Order. Because Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the stipulation was improvidently agreed upon and they have failed to satisfy their burden to demonstrate that the newly learned facts amount to "surprise" or "newly discovered evidence" under Rule 60(b), Plaintiffs' motion for relief from the Arbitration Order will be denied.
Plaintiffs commenced this action against Defendants on or about December 17, 2010 by the filing of a Complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1, Ex. 2.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants owned, operated, drilled, and hydraulically fractured natural gas wells in a manner that contaminated Plaintiffs' groundwater supply. (Doc. 1, Ex. 2.) On January 18, 2011, Defendants removed the action to this Court. (Doc. 1.) After Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, but before Plaintiffs filed a response, the parties filed a Joint Motion to Stay Pending Arbitration. (Doc. 8.) On February 23, 2011, the Court entered an Order granting the Joint Motion to Stay Pending Arbitration and directing the parties to engage in binding arbitration of this matter. (Doc. 9.)
On February 20, 2012, before the parties engaged in binding arbitration, Plaintiffs filed the present motion seeking relief from the Court's Order to stay pending arbitration. (Doc. 14.) According to Plaintiffs, relief from the stay is warranted because "conditions affecting Plaintiffs' property and residence, as well as Plaintiffs' knowledge of the relevant facts, have changed significantly since the date of the stipulation" to arbitrate. (Doc. 15.) Plaintiffs argue that these changed conditions constitute "surprise" as used in Rule 60(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 15.)
In opposition, Defendants argue that: (1) Plaintiffs' request for relief from the stay was untimely; (2) Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the stringent criteria for vacating a consented-to order; and (3) Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden to prove "surprise" within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1). (Doc. 19.) Plaintiffs' reply to Defendants' opposition asserts that the "clear and convincing standard" of proof applies only to allegations of "fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct under Rule 60(b)(2) or (3)." (Doc. 20.) In addition, Plaintiffs argue that the recently developed factual events relating to Defendants' conduct amounts to "newly discovered evidence" justifying relief from the Arbitration Order. (Doc. 20.) As Plaintiffs' motion has been fully briefed, it is now ripe for disposition.
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). According to the Third Circuit, "the general purpose of Rule 60, which provides for relief from judgments for various reasons, is to strike a proper balance between the conflicting principles that litigation must be brought to an end and that justice must be done." Boughner v. Sec'y of Health, Educ., & Welfare, 572 F.2d 976, 977 (3d Cir. 1978) (citing Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2851). In that regard, the Third Circuit has cautioned that "the remedy provided by Rule 60(b) is 'extraordinary, and special circumstances must justify granting relief under it.'" Moolenaar v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands, 822 F.2d 1342, 1346 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Page v. Schweiker, 786 F.2d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 1986) (Garth, J., concurring)) (emphasis added); see also Smith v. Widman Trucking & Excavating, Inc., 627 F.2d 792, 795 (7th Cir. 1980) ("Rule 60(b) is to be used to disturb the finality of judgments only on narrow grounds and upon a showing of exceptional circumstances"); Boughner, 572 F.2d at 977 ("relief from a judgment under Rule 60 should be granted only in exceptional circumstances"). While the decision to grant relief under Rule 60(b) "is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court," Pierce Assocs., Inc. v. Nemours Found., 865 F.2d 530, 548 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Giordano v. McCartney, 385 F.2d 154, 155 (3d Cir. 1967)), "one who seeks such extraordinary relief from a final judgment bears a heavy burden." Plisco v. Union R.R. Co., 379 F.2d 15, 17 (3d Cir. 1967) (emphasis added). As Plaintiff's motion, brief, and reply advance arguments related to "surprise" under Rule 60(b)(1) and "newly discovered evidence" under Rule 60(b)(2), the Court will address each separately.
1. Rule 60(b)(1)- "Surprise"
Plaintiffs first argument for relief from the Arbitration Order is predicated on "surprise" as used in Rule 60(b)(1). Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that the harm to their property is more severe than originally believed, and "this knowledge and information came as a surprise to Plaintiffs, who relied on an inaccurate understanding of the relevant facts when stipulating to stay litigation." (Doc. 15.) Although Plaintiffs rely on "surprise" to support their motion, Plaintiffs readily acknowledge that "neither the Third Circuit nor the ...