Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Angela F. Hoover v. Midland Credit Management

March 30, 2012

ANGELA F. HOOVER, CIVIL ACTION PLAINTIFF
v.
MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC, DEFENDANT



The opinion of the court was delivered by: James Knoll Gardner United States District Judge

OPINION

This matter is before the court on Defendant, Midland Credit Management, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, which motion to dismiss was filed June 6, 2011. *fn1

Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, which opposition was filed June 21, 2011. *fn2 The Reply of Defendant Midland Credit Management, Inc. to Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss was filed on July 8, 2011. On July 22, 2011 the Sur-Reply of Plaintiff, Angela Hoover, in Further Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was filed.

After the motion, opposition, reply, and sur-reply were filed and this matter was under advisement, the parties sought leave to provide supplemental memorandum regarding the decision of United States Magistrate Judge Thomas M. Blewitt of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania in the matter of James Gula v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., Civil Action No. 2010-cv-02241 (M.D.Pa. February 1, 2012). *fn3 By the Order dated and filed February 13, 2012, I directed the Clerk of Court to file the parties supplemental materials, and on February 14, 2012 he did so.

SUMMARY OF DECISION

For the reasons expressed below, I grant defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's Amended Complaint and dismiss it with prejudice.

I grant defendant's motion and dismiss plaintiff's claim that defendant violated Section 1692d of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") (which prohibits harassment by a debt collector) because plaintiff failed to provide factual averments supporting a reasonable inference that defendant's conduct was meant to harass or annoy her.

I grant defendant's motion and dismiss Ms. Hoover's claim that defendant violated Section 1692e of the FDCPA (which prohibits false, deceptive or misleading representations by a debt collector) because I conclude that defendant's Settlement Letter satisfies the notification requirement of Section 1692e(11) (that the letter is being sent to collect a debt), and because the Settlement Letter is not deceptive and not violative of Section 1692e(10) (which prohibits false representations or deceptive means to collect a debt).

Finally, I grant defendant's motion and dismiss plaintiff's claim that defendant violated Section 1692f of the FDCPA (which prohibits unfair or unconscionable means to collect a debt) because the Amended Complaint fails to plead facts which support a reasonable inference that defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f, and which are not redundant to the factual averments that plaintiff contends amount to violations of Sections 1692d and 1692e.

JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) *fn4 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges that defendant violated the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and thus poses a federal question.

VENUE

Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events giving rise to this action occurred in Strasburg, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, which is within this judicial district.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Angela F. Hoover initiated this action on November 22, 2010 by filing a one-count Complaint against defendant Midland Credit Management, Inc., which alleged that defendant had violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p. In her Complaint, plaintiff demanded a trial by jury.

By my Order dated and filed February 10, 2011, I approved a stipulation submitted by the parties which gave defendant until February 14, 2011 to respond to plaintiff's Complaint.

On February 14, 2011 the Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint with Affirmative Defenses by Defendant, Midland Credit Management, Inc. was filed.

On February 18, 2011 an arbitration hearing in this matter was scheduled for June 16, 2011.

On March 14, 2011 defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. By my Order dated April 28, 2011 and filed April 29, 2011, I dismissed the motion for judgment on the pleadings as moot.

On May 4, 2011 the arbitration hearing scheduled for June 16, 2011 was cancelled; and plaintiff, on May 27, 2011, filed her Amended Complaint. On June 6, 2011, Defendant filed its motion to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint, which motion is now before this court for disposition. Hence this Opinion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A claim may be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion requires the court to examine the sufficiency of the complaint. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80, 84 (1957) (abrogated in other respects by Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).

Generally, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record, including other judicial proceedings. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2008).

Except as provided in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9, a complaint is sufficient if it complies with Rule 8(a)(2), which requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) "[does] not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d at 949. *fn5

In determining whether a plaintiff's complaint is sufficient, the court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210 (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)).

Although "conclusory or 'bare-bones' allegations will [not] survive a motion to dismiss," Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210, "a complaint may not be dismissed merely because it appears unlikely that the plaintiff can prove those facts or will ultimately prevail on the merits." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231. Nonetheless, to survive a 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must provide "enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s]." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. at 1965, 167 L.Ed.2d at 940) (internal quotation omitted).

The court is required to conduct a two-part analysis when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. First, the factual matters averred in the complaint, and any attached exhibits, should be separated from legal conclusions asserted therein. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. Any facts pled must be taken as ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.