The opinion of the court was delivered by: O'neill, J.
Now before me is an unopposed motion for summary judgment filed by plaintiff United States of America. For the reasons that follow, I will grant the motion for summary judgment.
A delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States made
federal income tax assessments jointly against Si Tae Yu*fn1
and Jung Hee Yu for tax years 1990, 1991 and 2004, as is
further set forth in Paragraph 17 of the Complaint. The United States
gave Sie Tae Yu and Jung Hee Yu proper notice and demand for payment
of the assessments. They have not fully paid the tax assessments. In
2005, notices of federal tax lien with respect to the assessments were
properly filed in the office of the Prothonotary of Montgomery County,
Pennsylvania. As of September 1, 2008, the estate of Si Tae Yu and
Jung Hee Yu are jointly indebted to the United States in the amount of
$254,805 together with statutory additions and interest according to
law accruing thereafter.
At the time that the income tax assessments were made against him, defendant Si Tae Yu owned a one-half interest in a property housing a grocery store located at 1925 Cheltenham Avenue, Elkins Park, Pennsylvania.*fn2 He subsequently transferred his one-half interest in the property to the owner of the other half of the property, defendant Joong Hyun Yu. Joong Hyun Hu has stipulated that federal tax liens with respect to the assessments against Si Tae Yu remain attached to the one-half interest in the property at 1925 Cheltenham Avenue that was formerly owned by Si Tae Yu. See Dkt. No. 11.
On October 15, 2009, the United States filed this action against defendants Pil Hyun Yu and Yong Hyun Yu, the administrators of the estate of Si Tae Yu, Jung Hee Yu, Joong Hyun Yu, Commerce Bank, National Association and T.D. Banknorth, National Association*fn3 seeking enforcement of its tax liens by foreclosure and sale of the property at 1925 Cheltenham Avenue. Defendant T.D. Bank, N.A., as successor to Commerce Bank/Pennsylvania, N.A. holds a first lien mortgage in the amount of $1,150,000 on the property located at 1925 Cheltenham Avenue.*fn4
On February 16, 2010, the Court entered a default for failure to appear, plead or otherwise defend against Jung Hee Yu, the administrators of the estate of Si Tae Yu, and the bank defendants. On November 9, 2011, the United States filed the instant motion for summary judgment. On November 18, 2011, Defendant TD Bank N.A., as successor to Commerce
Bank/Pennsylvania, N.A., filed a motion to strike the default entered against the bank defendants. On December 22, 2011, I granted that motion as unopposed. By letter dated January 19, 2012, counsel for non-defaulting defendant, Joong Hyun Yu, represented that he would not file a response or otherwise oppose the instant motion for summary judgment. TD Bank filed an answer to the Complaint on January 27, 2012. TD Bank has not filed a response to the motion for summary judgment.
Although the motion of the United States is unopposed, before entering summary judgment in its favor, I must review the merits of its motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Blasi v. Attorney Gen., 30 F. Supp. 2d 481, 484 (M.D. Pa.1998) ("[T]he district court may not grant a motion for summary judgment . . . solely because the motion is unopposed; such motions are subject to review for merit.").
The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If the movant sustains its burden, the non-movant must set forth facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. A fact is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law. Id. The "existence of disputed issues of material fact should be ascertained by resolving all inferences, doubts and issues of credibility against" the movant. Ely v. Hall's Motor Transit Co., 590 F.2d 62, 66 (3d Cir. 1978) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
To establish "that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed," a party must:
(A) cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) show[ ] that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to ...